

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

Foreign Policy
Number 15, Summer 1974

Opinion

ON BEING CENSORED

by John Marks

In places like Santo Domingo and Saigon, the local authorities on occasion object to the publication of certain news stories and, as a result, papers roll off the presses with gaping blank spaces. Americans abroad seem to react to this phenomenon in two ways: They smile knowingly at the foolishness of trying to suppress the truth, and they say that such heavy-handed censorship could never occur back home.

Yet in June, a critical book which Victor Marchetti and I have written about the Central Intelligence Agency will be published with blank spaces scattered throughout its 400-odd pages. While the United States still maintains higher standards of press freedom than a banana or domino republic, it was the U.S. government—acting on behalf of the CIA—that demanded that these deletions be made, and so far at least two Federal courts have upheld the government's right to censor, although one judge—ruling essentially on technical grounds—refused to allow 85 percent of the government-requested deletions.

There seems to be a tendency in the foreign affairs community to discount our case as being of little import to others. But if the government succeeds in muzzling us, then a legal precedent will be established that the government has the right to rule on the acceptability of writing done by virtually all former officials. The public, as a result, may well be deprived of one of its principal sources of information about American foreign policy. Also, aspiring bureaucrats may become reluctant even to enter government service when they realize that their prospective employer can assert lifetime control over their work.

The same legal action taken against Marchetti, as a former CIA official, and taken against me, as an ex-State Department officer, could be used to force a future George Kennan to submit his *Memoirs to State* for prior approval. It could even require Leslie Gelb, a former Defense official now with the New York Times Washington Bureau, to send all his copy to the Pentagon before giving it to his editors. Those prospects should be disturbing even for people who

disagree with our premise that if there is ever to be meaningful reform of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community, then the public and the Congress must have a better idea of what these clandestine agencies are—and are not—doing.

Carefully Nurtured Myths

Marchetti and I strongly believe that our First Amendment rights have been violated and that the only possible justification for government-mandated cuts in our book would be strict adherence to the standard set forth by Justice Stewart in the *Pentagon Papers* case, namely that disclosure would "surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to the Nation or its people." However, we believe that there is no damaging material of that sort in the book, although we do acknowledge that publication might puncture a few carefully nurtured myths about the CIA; might embarrass some Agency officials; might cut down the frequency of certain ongoing "reconnaissance" activities every bit as provocative and as dangerous as the ill-fated U-2 flights over the Soviet Union; and might even put some pressure on Congress to exercise a degree of control over American intelligence.

The CIA has a different view of the case. What is at stake, according to the government lawyers, is the sanctity of contracts entered into by all officials authorized to handle classified information and, beyond that, the ability of the government to keep secrets.

High officials of the CIA have attached extraordinary importance to the book, devoting, by their own admission, thousands of Agency man-hours to deciding what should be censored. Their absolute control over their employees—both past and present—seems threatened, and they claim that if this control is weakened, the "national security" will be also. But this argument confuses national interests with bureaucratic interests.

Marchetti and I are both ex-bureaucrats, and when we joined, respectively, CIA and State, we signed so-called secrecy agreements in which we pledged not to "reveal" any "classified information" without the permission of our chiefs. The government maintains that these agreements bind us to silence for the rest of our lives. Yet, until our case arose, most government lawyers—and indeed the CIA's own Office of the General Counsel—did not believe that the agreements were enforceable in the

courts.¹ In fact, no legal action was taken to hold Daniel Ellsberg to his agreement even after the government received advance intelligence that he was trying to release the Pentagon Papers; nor, of course, was any action ever taken against Lyndon Johnson, George Ball, John Kenneth Galbraith, Roger Hilsman, or any other of the many former officials who have made unauthorized use of classified material in their post-government employment writing.

But after the Supreme Court ruled in June 1971, in the Pentagon Papers case, that newspapers could not be blocked from printing documents on the Vietnam war that the government claimed were classified, the Nixon Administration sought new ways to prevent unauthorized disclosure. In its effort to tighten the lid, the White House created the infamous Plumbers. Other government departments devised their own strategies. It was the CIA, in April 1972, that came up with the most original "legal" approach: the idea of applying judicial prior restraint against a potential discloser of information, Victor Marchetti. The CIA knew Marchetti was planning to write a book, according to a sworn affidavit from a CIA man named Robert R. B. Lohmann "assigned to the Agency's offices in New York City," because it had received a copy of Marchetti's outline, along with a draft magazine article by him, "from a confidential source, who has provided reliable information in the past." (Unless the CIA was lying and actually stole the outline and the article, that "confidential source" had to be connected with one of the six New York publishers to which Marchetti submitted the material, since no other copies existed outside his possession. That the CIA, which is legally forbidden from domestic operations, apparently has spies inside New York publishing houses is one of the most disquieting but least noticed aspects of the case.)

Carefully avoiding the civil libertarian-inclined bench in Washington, D.C., the CIA went into an Alexandria, Virginia Federal District Court, seeking a permanent injunction against Marchetti, which would require him to submit all his future writing

—"factual, fiction, or otherwise"—about the CIA or intelligence in general to that Agency for advance approval. Former Director Richard Helms swore that Marchetti's unabridged work "will cause grave and irreparable harm to the national defense interest of the United States" The heart of the CIA's position, however, was contained in another affidavit, stamped "Secret" and submitted by Thomas H. Karamessines, the head of the Agency's Clandestine Services.

The effect of this classified filing—which while part of the court's records still cannot be revealed—was initially to prevent even Marchetti's lawyers, from the American Civil Liberties Union, from viewing the most important document the CIA was using against their client—a seemingly clear infringement of his right to counsel. The government waited until four days before the case was scheduled for trial—a week after the original papers were served—before giving security clearance to the ACLU lawyers. Furthermore, it insisted that any expert witnesses for Marchetti would have to be cleared before they could become involved in disputing the "Secret" aspects of the case. When a list of experts was submitted, the government refused to approve two: Richard Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies and Princeton University Professor Richard Falk. Barnet chose not to dispute the matter, but Falk demanded that the presiding judge, Albert V. Bryan, Jr., order him to be cleared. The government resisted, on the grounds that Falk had recently visited North Vietnam and also because he had told an FBI agent that he agreed with Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers.

The government was, in effect, trying to disqualify Falk as a witness for the defense because he actively opposed Administration policies. Even Judge Bryan found this "unreasonable," and he ruled that Falk should receive a clearance.

Finding and clearing expert witnesses was a lengthy process for Marchetti's lawyers—a process not made any easier by the reluctance of most of the best and the brightest of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, several of whom had used classified documents in writing their own memoirs, to take the stand in support of Marchetti. Some, after being apprised of what was wanted, did not return phone calls to Melvin Wulf, the Legal Director of the national ACLU. Others said that they were reluctant to become involved, and still others reported that they believed the government did have the right to censor Marchetti's work. Those willing to challenge the government on the issue, in addition

¹ In a classified document, CIA's Assistant General Counsel John D. Morrison, Jr. wrote in 1966: "The problem of protecting official government secrets and related material, in our free society deadlocked as it is on the Constitution with its attendant Bill of Rights, has long plagued the intelligence community. Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides ample legal sanction following acts of espionage, sabotage and unlawful disclosure of classified information; however, with the exception of the injunctive powers granted the Atomic Energy Commission under Title 42 USC 2280, there is currently no truly effective legal weapon, in use, whereby CIA or the intelligence community can protect classified or related information from disclosure from within, even given information to the effect that such a disclosure is contemplated by an employee of the intelligence community."

were Abram Chayes, who had been Rusk's State Department Legal Advisor; Morton Halperin, ex-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; and Paul Blackstock, a professor and former intelligence official.

Just A Contract

On May 15, 1972, a one-day trial was held in Judge Bryan's court to determine whether Marchetti should be put under permanent injunction. Despite the efforts of the ACLU lawyers and their expert witnesses to introduce First Amendment arguments, Judge Bryan, in essence, accepted the government's premise that the only issue to be discussed was the enforcement of a contract. He ruled out testimony on matters such as the public's right to know what its government is doing, the constant leaking of classified information by government officials, the legality and the misuses of the whole classification system, and the selective prosecution of Marchetti.

Furthermore, since the bulk of the government's case was classified, the public—including Marchetti's family and friends—was barred from most of the proceedings. As a result of these closed sessions and the "Secret" affidavits, media coverage was very limited. At the preliminary hearings and the trial itself, reporters were reluctant to wait outside in the corridors to try to learn what was happening, especially since all participants were forbidden from discussing the key elements of the case.

While every American does not have the inherent right to have news reporting of his or her legal difficulties, the decision to cover a trial should belong to the press, not the government. Ideally, the glare of the media should have no effect on judicial proceedings, but in our less-than-perfect world—in case after case involving civil liberties—public attention can make a significant difference in both the government's tactics and the judge's reactions.

In any event, the government carried the day with Judge Bryan, who put Marchetti under permanent injunction. At the appellate level later that spring, Judge Clement Haynsworth affirmed the CIA's right to censor Marchetti, but added the following qualifications: only "classified" information could be excluded; information already in the public domain could not be excluded; nor could facts learned by Marchetti after he left the CIA be excluded. In December 1972, the Supreme Court, by a 6-to-3 vote, refused to consider the case—possibly because the majority agreed with the lower courts' decisions or because

the case was not "ripe," since Marchetti had not yet written his book.

It was shortly before the Supreme Court announced that it would not review the case that I became involved in the book. Faced with the government's legal pressure and other problems, Marchetti asked me to co-author the work. We spent the next nine months writing. With his injunction hanging over our heads, we were barred from discussing our progress with Daniel Okrent, the editor assigned to us by our publisher, Alfred A. Knopf.

In July 1973, about a month before we finished the first draft, I received a letter from Charles N. Brower, the State Department's Acting Legal Advisor, which indicated that State had "received information" about my involvement and was thereby issuing a "formal request" that I provide my work to State for prior clearance. On the advice of counsel at the ACLU, I ignored Brower's letter, knowing full well that Marchetti would have to submit the same manuscript to the CIA, from which State could get a copy.

The CIA received our draft on August 27, 1973, and, within the terms of the injunction, had 30 days to review it. At the end of that period, Acting CIA General Counsel John S. Warner wrote, "The United States government has determined that proper classification of the manuscript is TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE," and said that the book could only be published if we deleted 339 items, 15 to 20 percent of the book.

Shocked and somewhat dejected by the CIA's wholesale hatchet job, Marchetti and I spent four hours late on a September afternoon sitting in an ACLU conference room along with our chief lawyer, Melvin Wulf, cutting up our own manuscript with x-acto knives. Some of the CIA-cleared pages wound up looking like pieces of Swiss cheese; others had huge holes in them through which one could peer out. The easiest pages to eliminate were the 17 on which the CIA claimed that every last word endangered "national security." As painful as the task was, we had little choice but to do the CIA's actual scissors work for it, since the only way we could legally show the work to the publisher was to first make the deletions ourselves.

Then, as on numerous other occasions, we were forced to follow the extremely restrictive rules laid down by the government and largely enforced by Judge Bryan. Secretaries had to receive security clearances before they could type our legal briefs. At times, our lawyers could not retain possession of various "Secret" legal documents related to the case but had to read them while the papers were still in the

physical possession of the CIA. Depositions on the most routine matters were classified and thus required special handling.

We had to ignore the great number of outside experts who might have been consulted informally because such people still had to be approved by the government.

We did have one small glimmer of hope when the CIA made its demand for the 339 deletions, as a result of an accompanying offer to talk the case over. In early October, Marchetti and Wulf sat down with CIA and Justice Department lawyers to see what the government had in mind:

(I did not attend because we did not want to acknowledge that the CIA had any jurisdiction over my work.) At that meeting, the government lawyers largely remained quiet while Marchetti and Wulf listed reasons why certain deletions were particularly outrageous—in some cases pointing to books or newspaper articles in which the alleged classified material was printed; in others, explaining how Marchetti could not possibly have learned the information while he was in the CIA, since the events occurred after his 1969 resignation.

Shortly after this session, the CIA granted us permission to print 114 of the original 339 deletions, and in the following months, the Agency twice authorized publication of large chunks from other offending passages. By the end of February 1974, the CIA had "voluntarily" cut back its list of deletions to 168—less than 50 percent of the number with which it started.

Once-Forbidden Passages

While the CIA's reduced demands might be thought, in some quarters, to show reasonableness, a look at the restored material indicates that much of what was originally censored was so un-secret as to be ludicrous. A few examples of the once-forbidden but now acceptable passages illustrate the point:

> A statement that former Director Helms had mispronounced the name "Malagasy" at a National Security Council meeting. (Ironically, the CIA did not choose to censor the fact that at the same session President Nixon called the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "Admiral Mormon.")

> All reference to CIA ownership of Air America, even though this connection has been widely written about for years.

> A chart showing the size and budget of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community—data which Senator William Proxmire had read into the Congressional Record in similar form.

> Two references to the Tom Charles Huston domestic surveillance plan approved and then supposedly rescinded by President Nixon in 1970. This document was printed

in its entirety in the New York Times and it was from that newspaper that we learned of these particular domestic spying efforts.

While admittedly there is other censored information in the book which is of greater substance than the passages cited above, these examples would seem to indicate that at a minimum the CIA overreacted to our work. In our case, at least, the Agency's censors have proved to be arbitrary and capricious Savonarolas, whose constantly changing definition of what will damage the "national security" would be laughable if it did not do violence to the First Amendment.

In any event, despite the CIA's alleged charity, we decided, in October 1973, to go back into court to challenge the remaining deletions, both on a practical item-by-item basis and on broader constitutional grounds. Significantly, Knopf joined us in this new legal action, thus making a final (and very expensive) commitment to publication of the book. In the view of the ACLU, the inclusion of the publisher in the suit (called Knopf, Marchetti, and Marks v. Colby and Kissinger) strengthened our claim that the government was not so much enforcing a contract as interfering with the publication of a book.

The government's initial reaction to the suit was to file a countersuit asking Judge Bryan to put me under a permanent injunction identical to Marchetti's. Thus the club of prior restraint was to be extended beyond the CIA to yet another government agency, the State Department.⁴

As the new suit progressed, again in Judge Bryan's court, the government, if anything, was more unreasonable than in the first case. It refused to clear any expert witnesses for our side, claiming they were not needed by us, since the injunction against Marchetti left to the CIA, not to the courts, the power to say what was classified and hence must be deleted. Similarly, the government refused to submit any evidence showing that the 168 deletions were indeed classified because, in its view, the simple say-so of the four CIA Deputy Directors—men all authorized under the executive order governing classification to be "classifying officers"—was sufficient proof, even though the government admitted that the decisions on what was actually classified were questions of "judgment." Judge Bryan did not agree with the government on either issue and ordered it to clear witnesses and show documentary evidence.

The prospect of again bringing a few experts into the case so alarmed the

⁴ The State Department's suit against me was settled in March by a consent agreement that joined me to Marchetti's injunction for the purposes of this book but which does not bind me in the future.

CIA that Director Colby offered to make a personal appearance before the judge—in camera, of course—to explain why giving "Secret" details to these additional people would endanger the national security. Bryan rebuffed Colby's personal plea and let stand his order that the experts be cleared. In February, the government appealed this decision, thus threatening to put off the trial, which was scheduled for the end of the month, and further postponing our publication date, which had already been stalled for over six months. Obviously, at that point, time was not on our side, so we finally accepted a compromise under which the government agreed to clear one—and only one—witness, Morton Halperin, and we dropped our insistence on having others. Even more effectively than in the first case, the government had succeeded in limiting the scope of our position in court by controlling the number of witnesses we could use.

During this same pretrial period, the government moved to have Marchetti and me put in contempt of court, alleging that certain information censored from the manuscript had later appeared in the media. Five examples were cited in a "Top-Secret" letter addressed to Judge Bryan, including interviews the two of us had taped with Canadian TV, news stories from the Washington Post and the New York Times, and an article in Harper's. Judge Bryan decided, after looking at the material sent to him by the government, that he did not believe that the injunction had been violated and that he was "not inclined" to take action.

The Key Questions

The trial opened on February 28, 1974, and lasted for three days. Judge Bryan would not accept testimony on the constitutionality of the so-called secrecy agreements, nor would he listen to First Amendment arguments, although we managed to preserve both these issues for future appeal. Thus, the three questions we were allowed to dispute were:

(1) Whether we had learned of any of the deleted material after we had left government service. Although perhaps 25 percent of the deletions fell into this category, we had great difficulty proving it without naming our sources, which we refused to do and which Judge Bryan insisted we do to back up our claim. Consequently, in most cases the Judge lumped together the fruits of our post-government employment independent research with the material we had learned at our respective agencies.

(2) Whether any of the deletions were already in the public domain. On this question, the Judge agreed that

contention that even if information has already been revealed in the media, it may remain classified until it has officially been put on the record by the government. In an interesting commentary on the limited civil rights of former officials, Bryan admitted that his ruling puts "Marchetti and Marks in a position of being unable to write about matters that everyone else has written about. But they are different from 'everyone else' because of their former employment and employment agreements." Bryan went on to say that with our "former employment status as an added credential," our discussing classified information is "quite different" from a news reporter's or a congressman's doing so.³

(3) Whether any of the 162 deletions were in fact classified (not whether they had been legally and properly classified in the first place). Throughout the trial, the government contended that the simple say-so of the four CIA Deputy Directors was sufficient proof that material was classified. Judge Bryan disagreed, ruling "the ipse dixit of the Deputy Directors . . . is not sufficient, and cannot suffice if the First Amendment rights of these plaintiffs or others like them are to survive. If the reasonableness of classification is not to be subjected to judicial review, then adoption of such a standard would leave plaintiffs' First Amendment rights unprotected and subject to the whim of the reviewing official." While Bryan's pretrial ruling that the government must show our lawyers documentary proof of classification indicated how he felt on this issue, in his words, "It was only after the plaintiffs' expert Halperin testified that his examination of the government's documents revealed only 12-13 instances where the documents supported the classification determination, that the documents were offered in evidence." On the whole, Bryan found that the documents proved nothing. The CIA—as ever, obsessed with secrecy—pruned and masked these papers to such a degree that Bryan found most of them lacked "specificity" and some were "so thoroughly excised as to be meaningless as evidence." Apparently, the CIA was so concerned that additional secrets would be introduced into the closed proceedings that it held back proof even when additional information would have supported its case. Thus, the Judge ruled that we could publish 140 of the 168 deletions on the grounds that no evidence of classification had been provided.

³ Judge Bryan was not the only person to speak about our credibility. Under cross-examination, William Nelson, the head of the CIA's Clandestine Services, conceded that only the truth can be classified; falsehoods cannot be and thus could not be deleted from the book. While Nelson surely had no such intention, we were gratified to have his testimony in support of our accuracy.

Naturally, we were pleased that Bryan was allowing us to print so much of the deleted material. Yet, we were still disturbed that the government's right to censor its former employees remained intact. While we won on an essentially technical question of evidence, the next time the government tries to block a former employee's book, it should be smart enough to bring in sufficient documentation. Moreover, we anticipate that the government will now institute new procedures for handling documents to provide the "specificity" on what is or is not classified that Judge Bryan found lacking. For example, bureaucrats will probably be required to classify material on a paragraph-by-paragraph or even a line-by-line basis so that every fact deemed sensitive will be individually noted.

There is such a thing as an authentic "secret." Marchetti and I do not dispute this point. We completely reject, however, the notion advanced by government lawyers that anything the executive branch decrees is classified—and now, with Judge Bryan's modification, that can be shown to be so marked—can be excluded, without any appeal to Justice Stewart's standard, from our book or any similar one. Giving such editorial control to an agency like the CIA allows it to cut not only material which is already on the public record but also information that might publicly embarrass and hence politically weaken it. To give a specific instance, one of the passages in our book that the CIA insisted on deleting concerns some dubious financial practices in the sale of an ostensibly private research

think-tank owned by the Agency. If this kind of possible conflict of interests is worthy of censorship, then it is not too difficult to accept the fact that burglarizing a political party's headquarters can be justified to protect the "national security."

We are appealing the case on First Amendment grounds, and the government is appealing the specifics of Judge Bryan's ruling. Considering the length of time that will be involved, however, Marchetti and I decided—and Knopf agreed—to bring the book out in June with actual blank spaces to indicate where the deletions are. There will be only 27 blanks remaining if higher courts can clear the material restored by Judge Bryan in time, and we are optimistic that this can be done, since his decision hinged on a question of fact (insufficient evidence) rather than on a vastly more complicated question of law. Hopefully, later editions will include all of the deleted material, but waiting any longer would only hurt the book's timeliness and further serve one of the CIA's original purposes: blocking publication. Readers should see more than enough, even in the censored version, to accept or reject what we have to say. And while authors might be reluctant to admit it, blank spaces can often read more eloquently than actual words.

After all, one of the book's main themes is that the CIA as an institution is both repressive and inept. We believe that the censored book will give living proof to our argument. With no apologies to McLuhan, the book has become the message, and the message is the book.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
11 June 1974

THE APARTMENT building is ordinary and, inside, all the doors look alike. Behind one lives a lawyer; behind another, a secretary; behind another is a secret school for spies.

On a sunny spring day, three men in business suits enter the building, take the lift to the fourth floor and step into the apartment. They are carrying attaché cases. The routine is regular. They come during daylight, stay a few hours and leave. Always the same apartment. The apartment is rented in the name of a husband and wife—but nobody seems ever to have seen the wife and the husband doesn't spend his nights there.

A visitor takes note of this, and one day, while walking along the fourth floor corridor, he hears a man's voice coming from inside the apartment.

"... microdot ..."
"... KGB ..."

The voice, it becomes apparent, belongs to the trainer. No electronic eavesdropping equipment or any other device is ever used by

I spy from MARTIN SCHRAM, Washington

the visitor. It is not necessary. The trainer is blessed with a rich, clear voice. It can be heard while lounging casually in the hallway against the wall opposite the apartment door. It can be heard even better in the laundry room, across the way, where the cement-block walls create an echo-chamber effect.

Usually background music plays in the apartment, perhaps as a precaution against being overheard. The trainer's voice carries above the music, but the voices of the students do not. They speak more softly—their comments come in a decided foreign accent.

One day the trainer is lecturing on how a spy can avoid being followed. "Go to three or four locations in a city—like a wide-open square. Go to the first one and look around. See who's there. Then go to a second place far removed. Look around. If you see any of the same faces, you're being followed." Then class is over for the day. When the spies-in-training leave they walk

several blocks and enter another apartment building where they seem to feel very much at home. They emerge a short time later on a corner balcony several storeys above the street and proceed to take in the afternoon sun.

It is easy to follow the trainer. He takes the lift down to the basement garage and drives out in a blue sedan. The car has Virginia licence tags and an Arlington, Virginia, inspection sticker. A check of the sticker registration reveals the trainer's true identity.

On occasion, the school for spies has another visitor who drives a Volkswagen. On a rainy day, he gives a couple of the other students a ride. His car has Maryland licence tags. A registration check reveals his identity as well.

A Newsday reporter telephones the Rockville, Maryland, home of the man with the Volkswagen. A relative answers. "He's not here," the relative says. "He's at work." In response to questions, the

relative adds: "I don't know his phone number at work ... he works for the Government ... I don't know which agency or which branch of the Government ... He doesn't tell me anything ... That's the way they are and I don't ask."

It seems a good time to call the CIA.

A Newsday reporter telephones an official at the CIA headquarters. The reporter identifies himself and says he wants to try to verify the employment of three men. He gives the names of the men in the blue sedan, the man with the Volkswagen.

The official explains that such requests cannot usually be fulfilled. Maybe this time, the reporter says, adding that he is concerned because: "If they are not ours, then they are probably theirs."

The CIA official checks and calls back with the answer.

"They are our guys," he says. "You've come across something that is quite useful and legitimate. It's a training exercise. There is training going on at various times and various places."

"This is all rather embarrassing,"—Newsday.

WASHINGTON POST
23 June 1974

The Joy of Snooping

THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE. By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Knopf. 398 pp. \$8.95

By LAURENCE STERN

THERE WAS A PERIOD last year when the timing seemed right, when Congress finally had political grounds to conduct that long-overdue examination of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

High-ranking CIA officials were trooping up to Capitol Hill in frequency and numbers approaching the level of high school seniors at Easter recess. Agency men who not long ago would have rather swallowed the pill than be caught within sight of still cameras were suddenly pi-rouetting before four separate congressional committees.

The men from the agency came with their impassive faces and sharply circumscribed testimony designed mainly to "distance" their place of employment from the political crimes of Watergate. But as soon as senatorial questioning began blundering into the CIA's own business the answers trailed off into calculated obscurity, as a visiting homicide squad detective might be rebuffed for asking the price of the house.

What was the extent of the CIA's role in the Chilean coup? Was it involved in the junta's take-over in Greece? Is there any prospect of more large-scale CIA operations such as the war in Laos? What is the extent of the agency's domestic operations?

The answers came back, engraved with politeness, but ungiven: "To the best of my knowledge, Senator, no." "I would be happy, Senator, to go into that a little more in closed session." "We have no evidence of that, sir."

And yet these questions were all symptomatic of the need for a serious and comprehensive oversight job on what the CIA is up to, what sort of checkreins there are to its covert operations targeted within the United States as well as abroad. The need has existed. The political opportunities are rare.

This is not to question the legitimacy of intelligence gathering or the need for forms of state security in the American government, consistent with what we consider to be the base price that must be paid for maintaining an open society. The requirement for review policies is urgently to the operational programs of the CIA's clandestine services which are conducted beyond the

pale of public assent to serve often questionable interests in achieving dubious goals by illicit means.

What we are talking about is United States financial manipulation of foreign elections and domestic political processes, the mounting of coups, toppling of governments, bribery of public officials, clandestine programs of public opinion

through blackmail, terrorism, murder, sabotage and "psywar." We are talking about programs of disinformation (a term of the art for counter-propaganda) directed against United States audiences, as well as manipulation of the news media.

The Watergate scandal has shown us that the CIA, for all its vaunted acumen at the intelligence game, was played for a patsy (and that is the charitable view) by the White House to help stage a disinformation and espionage operation against Daniel Ellsberg at a time when he was campaigning against the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam.

The presumption of innocence on the part of the CIA shrinks considering the behavior of CIA Director William E. Colby in the fall of 1972 upon being questioned by former Watergate Prosecutor Earl J. Silbert about the identity of the White House official who first requested CIA assistance for E. Howard Hunt. Colby's response, at first, was evasive. He "danced around the room for ten minutes," by his own admission, before Silbert finally pinned him to the wall with a direct question. The answer was John D. Ehrlichman. Colby explained afterwards that he was reluctant to inject a name so controversial as Ehrlichman's into the case.

In doing so, he came within a hairline of obstruction of justice. Had it not been for Silbert's persistence—and perhaps the fact that Silbert knew the answer to his own question—Colby might have succeeded in willfully concealing information from a government prosecutor in a pending criminal case.

Watergate must indeed have brought a special anguish to the CIA. For the White House, in trying to put the Watergate monkey on the agency's back, used some of the same techniques that have been employed by the CIA in its own operations. There was the diffuse charter of "national security" through which the White House operatives sought to stall the FBI investigation of Nixon campaign funds through Mexico, to arrange for covert payoffs of the Watergate suspects, to disseminate a cover story that the Watergate burglary was a CIA operation, and so forth.

The agency was, in effect, being targeted as a decoy by the president's office which was dipping into the classic black bag of dirty tricks.

Hunt and his Cuban proteges, then in the pay of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CREEP) were so ingrained in the ways of their alma mater at Langley, the Clandestine Services, that they seemed to be genuinely incapable of drawing the distinction between serving the United States government and carrying out the sleazy schemes of the White House-CREEP Politburo.

As an example of what they call the "clandestine mentality" John Marks and Victor Marchetti cite this exchange before a federal grand jury between Hunt

bert has asked whether Hunt was aware that he had participated in "what might commonly be referred to as illegal activities."

HUNT: I have no recollection of any, no, sir."

SILBERT: What about clandestine activities?

HUNT: Yes, sir.

SILBERT: All right. What about that?

HUNT: I'm not quibbling, but there's quite a difference between something that's illegal and something that's clandestine.

SILBERT: Well, in your terminology, would the entry into Dr. Fielding's (Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist) office have been clandestine, illegal, neither or both?

HUNT: I would simply call it an entry operation conducted under the auspices of competent authority.

These are the values of the apparatus, which had become pervasive among the sad young men of the Nixon White House. It is the moral code of the black side of most espionage services as well as, we must reluctantly conclude, the top side of the CIA.

Congress has had the chance to bite at the apple and run the risk of corrupting its own innocence. But no one was willing to take on a confrontation with executive authority. No one even was able to formulate the right questions other than those bearing on the extrication of the CIA from Watergate.

And so the function of oversight continues to be abdicated to daily journalists and writers of books. It is not an altogether fruitful alternative. Books rarely generate legislation. Daily journalists are not equipped to penetrate the reinforced armor of secrecy by which CIA is shielded from public scrutiny.

Leaks from within are self-serving. What passes for candor by top CIA officials in the congressional hearing room is the frankness of the schoolboy standing before the brained canary and denying all, with his sling shot in his back pocket.

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence is a welcome addition to the body of literature which constitutes the only form of genuine oversight being currently practiced. Both Marchetti and Marks are former practitioners of the intelligence trade and were privy to some of its secrets. There is the inevitable bias of the analyst against the dirty tricks boys.

John Kennedy learned the dismal lesson in the Bay of Pigs 13 years ago that Clandestine Services tends to operate within its own narrow world of assumptions and political theology. The atmosphere of the clandestine shop is conspiratorial, paranoid and action-prone. It reeks with suspicion of social and political change on the left.

Marks and Marchetti take us through the sometimes familiar, sometimes new, sometimes deleted catalogue of covert interventions and patterns of secret proprietorships and domestic activities which have flourished in a vacuum of resounding public indifference since the agency instrument of executive

THE NEW REPUBLIC
22 JUNE 1974

Spy Story

The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti
and John D. Marks

(Knopf; \$8.95)

power in the early 1950s.

The book represents a triumph of determination by its authors, the publishing house of Knopf and the American Civil Liberties Union, which defended the manuscript against a partially successful effort to censor it. Melvin L. Wulf, legal director of the ACLU, notes in the introduction that co-author Marchetti was the first American writer to be served with an official censorship order issued by a United States court.

His case, along with that of Marks, raises two interesting constitutional issues: (1) the power of the government to abridge by a contractual oath of secrecy, the First Amendment rights of government employees; and (2) the authority of an executive agency to classify information by mere post facto declarations that it is classified. In the battle of the book the CIA was able to produce no proof that much of the material it wanted to excise was in fact classified.

At this point in the still-pending appellate court fight the government has prevailed on the first question and the authors prevailed on the second issue.

One of the consequences of the Marchetti-Marks case is that William Colby has asked for new authority to bring criminal charges against any government employee authorized to receive classified information. The proposed legislation also would empower the CIA director to define what is classified—thereby circumventing the district court's ruling in the matter of Marchetti and Marks.

An indicator of the quality of that judgment is that when the CIA's original 339 deletions in the manuscript were submitted to a test of classification they were reduced to 168 by negotiation and then to 27 by judicial review. Unfortunately the book went to press before the judge's final decision and so *The Cult of Intelligence* is adorned throughout with that talismanic word of our time—(deleted)—to tantalize the curious and bolster the sales.

If the Colby proposal were in effect at the time Marchetti and Marks had undertaken publication of their manuscript this review would never have been written. Both would probably be in jail. □

Diplomacy at its best is chess rather than poker, a game played with visible pieces rather than hidden cards. Thus the function of a peacetime espionage service is to provide the information with which diplomats can bargain with their adversaries. The Central Intelligence Agency has performed that job admirably over the years. In 1962, using data obtained from electronic devices, its experts were able to detect the build-up of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and that knowledge served President Kennedy's successful effort to compel the Kremlin to retreat. Nor would the interim agreement with the Russians on the limitation of strategic arms have been possible unless the US negotiators had possessed details on Soviet weapons deployments.

But such valuable services represent the smaller portion of the CIA's activities. Its predominant role has been to pursue an assortment of unsavory clandestine political and paramilitary operations, and these suggest that our leaders have subsidized and encouraged an organization that is not only dedicated to illicit actions abroad, but also, as the Watergate scandals have revealed, has cooperated in criminal conduct at home.

Victor Marchetti, a former CIA employee, and John D. Marks, who once worked for the State Department, have written a study of the agency's doings that has obviously touched raw nerves. In an attempt to suppress their work, the CIA has dragged them through the courts, and the case is not yet over. The unfinished legal hassle prompted the authors to go into print with a volume in which more than 140 passages have been deleted. Yet its Swiss cheese quality curiously reinforces rather than diminishes the book's credibility, which is further strengthened by its sober, almost dull literary style. One is tempted to speculate that it might have eluded public notice had not the CIA chosen to fight its publication, and so the agency merits a nod of gratitude for having unwittingly launched it in the direction of the best-seller list. The book deserves wide readership because it illustrates the extent to which, despite our rhetorical devotion to self-determination of nations, we have been violating the sovereignty of foreign states.

Marchetti and Marks correctly empha-

size that the CIA is not an autonomous monster, but a White House tool acting under orders. This is doubly alarming in my opinion, since it underlines the fact that the agency's egregious covert operations have not been aberrations, but were carried out in the pursuit of high policy shaped by our most distinguished officials. The authors recall such familiar clandestine maneuvers as the CIA's successful putsch against Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and its abortive attempt five years later to overthrow Indonesian President Sukarno by supporting insurgent forces on the island of Sumatra. They describe the agency's programs for training Tibetan rebels to fight against the takeover of Tibet by the Communist Chinese, and they hint at the possibility that the CIA raids against North Vietnam in 1964 may have provoked a North Vietnamese reaction against US destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, thereby handing Lyndon Johnson the pretext to win congressional authorization for large-scale American involvement in Indochina.

Highlighting the degree to which we permit ends to justify means, the authors relate a 1969 episode in which CIA operatives acting with top Washington approval permitted a group of Brazilian radicals to hijack an airplane and endanger the lives of its 49 passengers so that Brazil's security forces could break up that country's principal revolutionary faction. During the Cultural Revolution in China in the mid-1960s, the book discloses, CIA operatives on Taiwan transmitted phony broadcasts contrived to resemble official Communist statements. The broadcasts contributed to the chaos roiling China at the time—but they also misled the agency's own analysts at home, who were not clued into the so-called "disinformation" effort.

The most interesting section of the book deals with the CIA's proprietary companies. The agency owns one of the world's biggest fleets of aircraft that variously operate under the names of Air America, Rocky Mountain Air and Southern Air Transport. Such firms are indispensable to an outfit engaged in covert activities like moving irregular troops and transporting supplies, especially in Southeast Asia. But these corporations have not been held accountable. Although they are theoretically responsible to the public, their records are classified and even their financial balance sheets are a secret, and that raises the question of whether they may have contributed to the private fortunes of occult business interests.

For that matter, though, to whom is the CIA itself accountable? The agency is technically supposed to be supervised by four different congressional oversight committees, but these groups

rarely meet, and, when they do, it is mainly as rubber stamps. Legislative attempts to reform the oversight system chronically go nowhere, and they are likely to remain blocked as long as men like John Stennis, who runs one of the Senate committees, believes that "you have to . . . shut your eyes" to the agen-

cy's activities. The principal casualty in all this, then, is truth, a rare commodity these days made even rarer by President Nixon's assertion of a couple of weeks ago that "we cannot gear our foreign policy to the transformation of other societies." He was, quite clearly, not referring to Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Cam-

bodia, Indonesia, China or the Congo, to mention a few places in which the CIA, under instructions from him or his predecessors, has intervened in domestic affairs that were none of our business.

Stanley Karnow

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
26 June 1974

The uncloaking of the CIA

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. \$8.95.

By David K. Willis

The value of this controversial book about the Central Intelligence Agency is not so much the James Bond-style secrets it reveals — though there are some of those. It is the questions it forces Americans to ask about the role of a secret agency in an open society that make it significant.

Along with so many other institutions, the CIA has come under searching scrutiny in recent years, intensified by Watergate and the agency's role in helping the White House "plumbers" in their work against Daniel Ellsberg.

This book is perhaps the most detailed yet to appear on how the CIA works, but its publication is also a symptom of the post-Vietnamese disillusion at home with America's attempt to make the world over into its own anti-Communist image.

The authors — a 14-year CIA veteran and a former foreign service officer who has seen intelligence operations from the State Department end — have produced a sustained, 400-page attack on CIA covert activities abroad — and at home.

Victor Marchetti and John Marks believe the secret agency should be more open, more accountable to Congress, less concerned with overthrowing foreign governments and more with collecting intelligence about the Soviet Union, mainland China, and other nations abroad.

But it is virtually impossible for the average reader to judge the veracity of much of the book. The CIA steadfastly refused to confirm (or deny) its contents. Its two-year fight to block publication has been waged in a closed courtroom, amid warnings that the national interest will be endangered if the proceedings — or the book — reaches the public.

Now the book is well and truly out — but does not, to this non-007 eye at least — appear to rock the boat of national security.

paper readers and close followers of various other reports already know that during the cultural revolution the CIA had sent balloons carrying propaganda sheets floating from Taiwan across to mainland China.

They already know that the CIA had trained the Dalai Lama's troops after the Chinese had driven him from Tibet — though they may not be aware that frustrated CIA operatives, despairing that the troops would ever be unleashed against the Chinese and retake Tibet, turned to Tibetan prayer wheels for solace.

They already know that CIA B-26 bombers flew against Sukarno troops in the late 1950's.

But they did not know that the CIA set up a "miniature Fort Bragg" training school deep in the Peruvian jungles to help President Fernando Belaunde Terry defeat local rebels.

Nor may they have heard rumors of one particularly exotic plan in which a CIA agent would penetrate mainland China's strategic missile complex carrying two oversized suitcases. The suitcases would contain an entire, if small, aeroplane. Mission accomplished, the operative would open the cases, assemble his aircraft, and fly to safety. The plan was vetoed by senior CIA hands. . . .

Again, we meet the Nungs possibly for the first time. They are a minority group of Chinese hill people in South Vietnam, whom the CIA used to spy on North Vietnamese troop movements down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Since the Nungs were illiterate, the CIA equipped their radio transmitters with buttons adorned with pictures of tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and other weapons.

When a Nung saw such a weapon, he would press the appropriate button and if he saw another, he would press it again. The signals were received at a base station or by spotter planes circling above and directing air strikes accordingly.

If we can assume the authors know whereof they speak, then we learn now that an agent can authorize a covert field operation to the tune of \$10,000. Anything more expensive requires a nod

anything over \$100,000 must have the stamp of the director himself.

We are told that the CIA has an official strength of 16,500 and an official budget of \$750,000 — but that both figures are much higher when all operatives, mercenaries, and hangers-on are counted.

The authors plead for tighter congressional scrutiny. Their main object, however, is to strip the agency of some of its secrecy, and to urge that it stick to collecting and evaluating intelligence.

The CIA has tried to stop publication of their book — first by arguing that Mr. Marchetti is violating the contract he signed when he joined the agency — promising not to reveal its methods or secrets — and then by invoking national security and the sanctity of classified material.

At first the agency won an injunction against Marchetti, and deleted 339 passages out of the 400 pages, or about 20 percent of the text. Mr. Marchetti, Mr. Marks, publisher Knopf, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) fought back and the agency restored all but 168 passages.

Then the judge upheld the authors' right to restore all but 27. A CIA appeal on this ruling has yet to be decided. Until it is, and all appeals have been exhausted, only the first set of restorations appear in this edition (they are printed in bold type). Blanks appear where deletions have been made.

The reader is left to ask: Can the U.S. really dispense with all "dirty tricks" in a world where opponents of the U.S. and what it stands for do not hesitate to use such tricks against it? Should the CIA concentrate more on evaluating and on leading the overall U.S. intelligence community?

Answers to these questions, involving a redefinition of the CIA's role, and ways to prevent it from embarking on another Watergate adventure, are worth searching for. This book's value lies in how much it helps the discovery of such answers.

David Willis is the Monitor's American news editor.

VIRGINIA GAZETTE
21 JUN 1974

New Book Documents Camp Peary Operations

A NEWLY PUBLISHED book examining the Central Intelligence Agency and its worldwide operations contains detailed descriptions of the CIA's activities at Camp Peary.

The book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," (Alfred A. Knopf) was written by Victor L. Marchetti, former executive assistant to the CIA's deputy director, and John L. Marks, a former intelligence analyst with the State Department.

Marchetti and Marks recount in detail various paramilitary and "intelligence tradecraft" courses offered to CIA recruits at Camp Peary, as well as the training and safeguarding of foreign nationals who have signed on with the agency.

Camp Peary is used by the authors as an example of "the agency's orientation towards covert action" as early as the mid-1950s when the base was acquired by the CIA. The 10,000-acre facility, known to CIA employees as "the farm," is "the agency's West Point . . . operated under the cover of a military base...."

"The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" corroborates previous accounts of the CIA's involvement at Camp Peary given by other former agency employees. The book also expands upon allegations made to *The Virginia Gazette* last year by Marchetti himself regarding the training of local police departments at the base during 1967-71.

Training facilities at the base include weapons ranges, a simulated "closed border of a mythical communist country," parachute training towers, and other facilities used for planning special operations, the authors wrote.

CIA recruits graduate from the basic paramilitary courses at Camp Peary and are sent to a North Carolina CIA base to learn courses in heavy weapons and explosives. They also undergo jungle warfare instruction at a CIA base in the Canal Zone.

Marchetti and Marks included in their description of CIA-clandestine operations the account of a former CIA clandestine operator's training in weaponry first published in *Ramparts* magazine: "The array of outlawed weaponry with which we were familiarized included bullets that ex-

ploded on impact, silencer-equipped machine guns, home-made explosives and self-made napalm. We were shown a quick method of saturating a confined area with flour or fertilizer, causing an explosion like in a dustbin or granary.

"The CIA professional . . . is involved in the creative challenge of plotting and orchestrating a clandestine campaign without resorting to violence," the authors wrote. "The SOD (Special Operations Division, the agency's 'armed forces') man wages war, albeit on a small and secret level." LEVEL."

Marchetti and Marks said in the book that their intention is to "demysticize" the workings of the CIA and the American intelligence community, especially the agency's fixation with covert operations.

"There can be no doubt that the gathering of intelligence is a necessary function of modern government," the authors stated. But then they asked of the CIA, "should it be permitted to function . . . as an operational arm, a secret instrument of the presidency?"

When Marchetti began work on the book in 1972, he was served with a federal court injunction prohibiting him from publishing anything about the CIA without first submitting the manuscript to the agency for review. The injunction was based on a secrecy agreement signed by all CIA employees upon hiring.

The CIA originally deleted 339 passages from the book, but relented on 171 of them. The reinstated passages, which include most of the Camp Peary allegations, were printed in boldface type.

A statement issued by the CIA last Wednesday said the agency "identified for deletion those portions of the manuscript which were classified, were learned during Mr. Marchetti's employment with the CIA, and had not been placed in the public domain by the U.S. Government."

Marchetti said in a telephone interview Monday that the censored manuscript portions relating to Camp Peary were reinstated by the CIA as a result of prior newspaper accounts of the base.

WASHINGTON POST
26 June 1974

CIA Seeks New Power to Halt Leaks

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Legislation that would significantly broaden the government's power to bring criminal sanctions against employees or government contractors for disclosure of intelligence secrets is being circulated within the Nixon administration.

The measure, proposed by Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby, could also empower him to seek injunctions against news media to prevent them from publishing material he considers harmful to the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Colby's draft would give the CIA director more statutory muscle to define national security secrets and punish transgressors than ever before.

Its appearance comes against a background of court battles on national security secrecy issues ranging from the Ellsberg case to the book, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," written by former government intelligence officers Victor Marchetti and John Marks. The book, the first to be published in the United States after pre-publication censorship by the federal government, went on sale yesterday.

Had Colby's proposal been law a year earlier the book might well have never seen the light of day and the two authors would have been subject to 10-year prison sentences and \$10,000 fines.

Under existing law, however, the best the CIA was able to do was invoke the secrecy oaths signed by both men as grounds for a civil action requiring them to submit their manuscripts in advance for government clearance.

The government won the first round in the courts when the binding nature of the secrecy oaths was upheld. But Marks and Marchetti challenged the CIA's demand, on grounds of classification, for some 350 deletions in the manuscript. After adjudication of their countersuit before U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr., in Alexandria, the number of deletions was reduced to 27.

Bryan required the agency to go beyond the mere assertion by Colby and four CIA deputy directors that material in the book was classified. He asked the CIA to demonstrate

LOS ANGELES TIMES
19 June 1974

\$6 Billion a Year Spent on Spying, Authors Say

Much of Funds Wasted by Supersecret
'Intelligence Cult,' Book on CIA Contends

WASHINGTON (AP)—The authors of a contested book about the CIA contend the federal government is spending about \$6 billion a year on intelligence and covert activities, and that much of it is wasted.

The Central Intelligence Agency itself, they say, has an authorized strength of 16,500 but employs tens of thousands more as mercenaries, agents, consultants and so on. And they say its authorized budget of \$750 million yearly does not include hundreds of millions more provided by the Pentagon.

Their book, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," argues that a cult, which it calls a secret fraternity of the American political aristocracy, seeks to further foreign policies by covert and usually illegal means.

The book was written, after litigation going back more than two years, by Victor Marchetti, a former executive assistant to the CIA's deputy director, and John D. Marks, a former State Department official.

Marchetti has been ordered by the federal courts to publish nothing of a classified nature that he learned as a CIA employee.

When he submitted his manuscript to the agency for approval last October, it ordered that 339 passages, ranging from single words to entire pages, be deleted.

After extended discussions with the authors and their attorneys, the CIA agreed to reinstatement of all but 168 of the deletions. An additional 140 passages were cleared for publication by a federal judge, but appeals to higher courts have held up their publication.

Alfred A. Knopf is publishing the book with blank spaces indicating the deletions and with the reinstated passages set in bold face type. Among the latter are the references to the CIA's manpower and budget.

The CIA last week announced that its decision not to

contest major parts of the manuscript "does not constitute an endorsement of the book or agreement with its conclusions."

A major conclusion of the book is that the intelligence community is dominated by a clandestine mentality that thrives on secrecy and deception, preventing Congress and the public from knowing what is being done in their names.

"It encourages professional amorality—the belief that righteous goals can be achieved through the use of unprincipled and normally unacceptable means," Marchetti and Marks write.

"Thus, the cult's leaders must tenaciously guard their official actions from public view . . . With the cooperation of an acquiescent, ill-informed Congress, and the encouragement and assistance of a series of Presidents, the cult has built a wall of laws and executive orders around the CIA and itself, a wall that has blocked effective public scrutiny."

They say that the desire for secrecy has led high officials to lie about CIA involvement in such things as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the U-2 spy flights over the Soviet Union. They say lies were told also about the CIA role in an abortive attempt to overthrow President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958 and about its role in the Congo in the early 1960s.

"Contrary to denials by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the CIA gave direct assistance to rebel groups located on the island of Sumatra," the authors say of the Sukarno incident.

"Agency B-26s even carried out bombing missions in support of the insurgents . . .

"The agency also became deeply involved in the chaotic struggle which broke out in the Congo in the early 1960s. Clandestine service operators regularly bought and sold Congolese politicians and the agency supplied mon-

ey and arms to the supporters of Cyril Adoula and Joseph Mobutu," the book says.

The agency was created in 1950 to gather intelligence and to coordinate the intelligence activities of other federal departments, but, the book says, it now devotes about two-thirds of its funds and manpower for covert operations and their support—a ratio relatively constant for the last 10 years.

"The CIA's primary task is not to coordinate the efforts of U.S. intelligence or even to produce finished national intelligence for the policy-makers," the authors say. "Its job is, for better or worse, to conduct the government's covert foreign policy."

The CIA has refused to comment on specific parts of the book other than to say it "did not correct or contest the publication of factual errors in the manuscript."

It said it had reviewed a number of book manuscripts by former employees and that "in no case has the agency attempted to suggest editorial changes of the authors' opinions or conclusions."

WASHINGTON POST
24 June 1974

Colson: Nixon Suspected CIA

By Rudy Maxa

Washington Post Staff Writer

In the days before he walked into a federal courtroom to enter a guilty plea early this month, Charles W. Colson made a startling series of allegations about President Nixon's fears of a Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the Watergate scandal.

Colson, once among the President's most trusted White House aides, gave his account during two bizarre evening confessionals with Washington private investigator Richard L. Bast at Bast's home in McLean, Va.

In the course of the conversation Colson told Bast that President Nixon confided to him in January that he was on the verge of dismissing Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby because of suspicions that the agency was deeply implicated in Watergate.

He also told Bast that the President was finally dissuaded from launching a full-scale investigation of the intelligence community by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and White House chief of staff Alexander M. Haig Jr.

Colson portrayed the President as a virtual captive in the Oval Office of suspected high-ranking conspirators in the intelligence circles against whom he dared not act for fear of international and domestic political repercussions.

The former White House aide told Bast of a January phone call from President Nixon after which Colson characterized Mr. Nixon as being "out of his mind over the CIA and Pentagon roles" in Watergate.

Colson's underlying suspicion, as expressed to Bast, was that the CIA planned the break-ins at Watergate and the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The motive: to discredit the President's inner circle of advisers.

Colson indicated that the CIA was concerned that it was being bypassed on policy matters and channels of information bearing on national security.

This could well be the main line of Colson's forthcoming testimony to the House Judiciary Committee and the Watergate special prosecutor although he has yet to substantiate it with specific evidence.

Colson first went to Bast on May 13 on the recommendation of mutual acquaintances to discuss the possibility of a private investigation of the CIA's role in Watergate. He returned for another session

beside Bast's lushly landscaped swimming pool on May 31—three days before he went before U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell to deliver his guilty plea to a charge of obstructing justice.

Bast, who has largely retired from private investigations to conduct a highly speculative commodity futures fund, and other business interests, disclosed the substance of the conversations on the basis of his records and an understanding with Colson that Bast would be free to speak about it after Colson was sentenced.

Colson was sentenced last Friday to a one- to three-year jail term and \$5,000 fine.

Watergate investigators said that Colson had told them about some of the same allegations he made to Bast. Some of those charges, they said, are being looked into.

Haig and Kissinger declined through spokesmen to comment on the Colson account.

One of the most detailed assertions Colson made to Bast concerned a March 1, 1973, memorandum by a high-ranking CIA official dealing with the agency's relationship to the Washington public relations firm of Robert R. Mullen & Co.

Mullen is the firm which employed Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. after he left the CIA and before he was hired as a member of the White House "plumbers" unit.

Colson said he was allowed to read the 25-page memorandum drafted by Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of the central cover staff of CIA's clandestine directorate, last December at the home of Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee.

The existence of the classified memorandum has been confirmed by Watergate investigators. Colson summarized the contents of the Eisenstadt memo for Bast as follows:

- Robert Mullen, founder of the public relations firm, complained that former CIA Director Richard M. Helms "twisted my arm hard" to hire Hunt.

- Former CIA Director James R. Schlesinger, who succeeded Helms, now Defense Secretary, endorsed a suggestion by Eisenstadt that Mullen and Robert Bennett, an associate in Mullen's firm, be permitted to read FBI and CIA memoranda on witnesses who should not be interviewed in the Watergate case. The Mullen firm was directed to "lie if necessary" in denying any association with the CIA, Bast said he was told.

- The Senate Watergate committee was informed of the times and places of at least 300 break-ins conducted by convicted Watergate burglar Eugenio Martinez.

- Bennett, the son of Sen. Wallace Bennett (R-Utah), bragged to the CIA of favorable news treatment in the national media, including Newsweek and The Washington Post, for stories he planted to discredit the President's top White House advisers.

- A prominent Charlotte, N.C., lawyer with CIA connections reported after a plane ride with Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N. C.), chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, that Ervin would steer clear of CIA involvement in Watergate.

(The lawyer named by Colson told The Washington Post he was indeed a friend of Ervin but denied either suggesting or receiving assurances described by Colson.)

- Bennett reported to the CIA that "through his father, Senator Wallace Bennett, he could handle the Ervin committee if the CIA could handle E. Howard Hunt" (Robert Bennett denies having told that to the CIA.)

Colson told Bast that he made the unusual approach to the private investigator in order to get proof of the extent of CIA's Watergate role on behalf of himself and H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, John N. Mitchell, Robert C. Mardian, Gordon Strachan and Kenneth Parkinson, defendants in the Watergate cover-up conspiracy case.

He also told the detective he wanted information on who was "financing" John W. Dean III and also a closer look at the circumstances of the plane crash which took the life of Hunt's wife, Dorothy, in December, 1972.

In explaining his motives in seeking the investigation, Bast related, Colson said: "I'm interested in getting out of my problems but I'm more interested in straightening out what's going on in the country right now."

The former White House aide who has recently proclaimed himself a witness for Christ spoke with high emotion of his concern over the CIA. "If this happens with us, it could happen to any President," he told Bast.

But Colson acknowledged that "what is exculpatory for me is if I am able to expose the fact that there was a major plot by the CIA and they were responsible for the

cover-ups throughout the investigation."

In the early days of the Watergate scandal President Nixon, through Haldeman and Ehrlichman, sought to delay the FBI's investigation of Nixon campaign donations funds funnelled through Mexico on grounds that it might expose covert CIA activity and imperil national security. The President later acknowledged that his fears were groundless as far as the Mexican funds were concerned.

Bast said he would, under certain conditions, consider undertaking an investigation of alleged illegal CIA influence directed at the White House.

Those conditions, he said, included the authorization of grand jury subpoena power, full presidential backing and the appointment of an additional special prosecutor. But Colson found no takers at the White House, as far as could be determined, though Colson told Bast the President was "enthusiastic" about the idea.

During his two conversations, Bast said Colson portrayed the CIA as a "frightening" power operating with no congressional or executive branch control.

He disparaged the chairman of the House and Senate CIA oversight subcommittees and told Bast that "almost everywhere you turn" the CIA has its "tentacles." Colson indicated his belief in the pervasiveness of the CIA encouraged him to ask acquaintances to recommend an incorruptible investigator.

Bast, 41, a child of Washington's Southeast blue-collar district, developed a reputation for flamboyance, toughness and blunt talk during his climb into diversified business activity from the ranks of private investigators. ("My fees start at \$100 an hour, I accept one case a year only if I find it interesting," he told Colson). Bast told Colson at the start of their conversations that the Nixon administration "tore the Constitution to shreds."

"I'm not saying that's not true," he quoted Colson as replying. "But I'm not sure that the guys who are going after us now aren't doing more disservice to the country," Colson was quoted.

Bast said he told Colson that "perhaps your whole crew maybe belongs in jail" but not if "they (the special prosecutor's staff) violated your constitutional rights."

"They've been violated several times," Colson replied glumly. He offered no specifics but commented on the overwhelming strength of Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski's prosecutorial staff against an individual de-

LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 June 1974

High Court Rejects Suit to Force Public Disclosure of CIA Budget

BY RUDY ABRAMSON

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court Tuesday rejected a Pennsylvania man's suit to force the Central Intelligence Agency to make public its budget, which is now hidden in appropriations for other federal agencies.

The 5-4 decision, reversing an opinion by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia, held that William B. Richardson had no standing to sue in federal courts for disclosure of the secret budget.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, speaking for the majority, said a taxpayer could not use the courts to air a general grievance about the conduct of government.

"In a very real sense," he said, "the absence of any particular individual or

class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.

"Any other conclusion would mean that the founding fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the national government by means of lawsuits in federal courts."

It is generally estimated that the CIA has an annual budget of \$750 million, part of an overall federal outlay of \$6 billion a year for intelligence. The actual CIA figure, as well as the total budget, is divulged only to key members of Congress.

Officials have defended secrecy of the total budgets, not to mention detailed breakdowns, on the ground that disclosure would be of great value to potential enemies of the United States.

The Richardson suit, seeking public disclosure of CIA expenditures, had been dismissed in a federal district court in Pennsylvania. But in July 1972, the appeals court ordered the case tried.

The Justice Department argued that a decision requiring disclosure would set off a flood of citizen challenges in the courts to

numerous federal programs.

Burger was joined in the majority by justices Byron R. White, Harry Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist.

In concluding that a taxpayer has no standing to air in the courts a general grievance against government conduct or allocation of power, Burger noted that this "does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls."

"Slow, cumbersome and responsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times," he said, "our system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them."

In dissent, Justice William O. Douglas argued that Richardson was not making "generalized complaints."

"They do not even challenge the constitutionality of the Central Intelligence Agency acts," he said. "They only want to know the amount of tax money exacted from them that goes into CIA activities. Secrecy of government acquires new sanctity when their claim is denied."

defendant.

"You know how strongly I feel about all this?" Colson asked Bast three days before pleading guilty. "You're going to think I belong in an asylum when I tell you this: I've thought about walking into that courtroom Monday [June 3] before Gesell and saying 'I want to plead guilty.'"

"I told him in that case—he'd have to go to jail," Bast said.

WASHINGTON POST
25 June 1974

Allegation Is Denied By Colson

Former White House aide Charles W. Colson denied yesterday any knowledge of an allegation attributed to him that President Nixon was considering firing Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby.

Colson was responding to published assertions by Washington private investigator Richard L. Bast growing out of two lengthy conversations between the two men at Bast's home last month.

In the course of those discussions, according to Bast, Colson claimed the President had told him he was considering firing Colby because of a suspected CIA involvement in the Watergate break-in and cover-up.

The former White House aide acknowledged that he had met with Bast "in confidence in an effort to explore a possible professional relationship." He said that "none of the statements I made to Mr. Bast were intended for public consumption."

Bast, in response to Colson's statement last night, said, "Mr. Colson was either lying when he talked to me last month or he was lying in his press release" on the subject of the President's alleged statement about Colby.

"I will swear under penalty of law to my veracity," Bast said. "After hearing his statement this evening, I doubt that Mr. Colson will do the same." The investigator said the former Nixon adviser agreed to release him from "any bond of confidentiality" after Colson's sentencing in U.S. District Court.

Colson said he talked to Bast "in a very offhand fashion, largely exploring the

for many of which I had been unable to obtain factual support."

Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee, said his panel has had for many months a 25-page CIA document which Colson described in his conversations with Bast. Nedzi said the memo, written by Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of the CIA's central cover staff, produced no conclusive evidence of an undisclosed implication of the agency in the Watergate scandal.

The document, said Nedzi, summarizes relationships between the CIA and the Washington public relations firm of Robert R. Mullen & Co. The Mullen company employed convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. after he retired from the CIA. It also provided a private cover for CIA operatives at two of its overseas offices, according to informed officials.

Senate Watergate committee sources also denied an allegation attributed by Bast to Colson that the committee had been told of 300 break-ins by Watergate conspirator Eugenio Martinez.

In his statement, Colson said yesterday that he would "explain my views and whatever facts I know to appropriate investigative bodies."

Questions Abound on Forgery of Diem Death Cable

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sometime during the Christmas week of 1972, then-acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III took a sheaf of classified documents from his Stonington, Conn., house and burned them with assorted paper, ribbons and bows collected during the seasonal gift-giving.

According to later testimony by Gray, he glanced at one of the documents before burning it and was shaken by what he read. "I do not recall the exact language," Gray testified later, "but the text of the cable implicated officials of the Kennedy administration in the assassination of President Diem of South Vietnam."

The cable was a forgery, later admitted to by Watergate conspirator and sometime White House "plumber" E. Howard Hunt Jr., and the full story of its fabrication and purpose has been slow in unfolding.

Now, information in papers filed in U.S. District Court here last week by attorneys for former top White House aide John D. Ehrlichman has created a juxtaposition of events that leaves unclear what, if any, relationships may exist between presidential actions and the Hunt forgery.

The story goes back to a remark made by President Nixon during a press conference he held on Sept. 16, 1971, when South Vietnam was preparing to hold an election with incumbent President Nguyen Van Thieu running unopposed. Mr. Nixon was asked what he thought about using "leverage" to "redeem the situation."

In response, Mr. Nixon said, among other things, that if the suggestion was that "the United States should use its leverage now to overthrow Thieu, I would remind all concerned that the way we got into Vietnam was through overthrowing (President Ngo Dinh) Diem and the complicity in the murder of Diem."

President Nixon's statement about United States "complicity" in the assassination of Diem did not bring any follow-up questions from reporters or create any stir among them after the press conference. According to one participant in the press conference, the charge of American complicity in Diem's death was common enough in Washington circles that it might easily go unremarked by reporters.

President Nixon may still have been interested two

days later, however, in the coup that overthrew Diem and took his life. According to a brief filed in U.S. District Court here last Thursday by lawyers for Ehrlichman, "discussions on Sept. 18, 1971, reflect the President requesting that Ehrlichman have Room 16 employees obtain documents on the Diem coup to prepare for an upcoming press conference."

Room 16, located in the Executive Office Building, was the headquarters of the special White House investigative unit known as "the plumbers."

Two days later, on Sept. 20, 1971, according to the U.S. State Department, White House aide David Young, later revealed to be one of the plumbers, phoned the State Department and asked that Howard Hunt be given access to cable traffic to and from Saigon for period of April 1 through Nov. 30, 1963—a period that included the coup.

According to State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, Hunt obtained copies of 240 cables from the State Department.

It is not clear whether Hunt has access to documents in the State Department prior to the Sept. 20 call from Young. According to Hunt, whose sworn testimony before a federal grand jury in April 1973 was made public, he discovered while examining State Department cables that "a number of cables were missing."

Among the cables missing, Hunt testified, were some immediately before and after the Diem coup and assassination. Hunt said he checked with the Central Intelligence Agency, which received the same cables, to see if that agency could fill in the gaps. Hunt said he was told that the CIA did not keep cables back to 1963. He said he was told much the same thing at the Pentagon.

"And there came a time when I mentioned this to Mr. Colson, who I had been directing my researches into—the at the particular period—the Vietnamese war, and told him that, in my opinion, a lot of stuff that should have been there had been extracted," Hunt testified.

"He (Colson) said, 'How do you account for that?' And I said, 'Well, some of the cables that they still have on hand at the Department of State have been

sent, with date stamps, saying photographed or duplicated for the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library."

"So I said, 'Well obviously, anybody who had been given access to the Department of State file for the purposes of incorporating them into material held by the J.F.K. Library would also have had opportunity to remove any cables that could have been embarrassing to the Kennedy legation."

"And he (Colson) said, 'Well, what kind of material have you dug up on the files that would indicate Kennedy complicity?' And I showed him three or four cables that indicated that they had pretty close to pulled the trigger against Premier (sic) Diem's head, but it didn't say so in so many words. Inferentially, one could say there was a high degree of administrative complicity in the actual assassination of Diem and his brother."

"And, he said, 'Well, this isn't good enough. Do you think that you could improve on them?'"

Hunt testified that he replied he could, but not without "technical assistance." But, Hunt testified, Colson replied, "Well, we won't be able to give you any technical help. This is too hot. See what you can do on your own."

Colson initially denied giving Hunt any such order when the story of the forged cable was first made public. Colson later altered his position to say that Hunt may have acted on the basis of a misunderstanding.

Hunt produced two cables that did not satisfy him, but he showed them to Colson anyway. Hunt told the grand jury. Colson "seemed to like" the cables, Hunt testified, so he told Colson.

"These will never stand any kind of scrutiny. Let's be very sure about that."

In any event, sometime during this same period, William Lambert, a reporter for Life Magazine asked Colson about President Nixon's comment about "complicity" in the murder of Diem.

According to Lambert, his conversation with Colson occurred in early October. Lambert said Colson told him that materials showing additional complicity in the Diem murder on the part of the Kennedy White House had been located. Colson said he would have someone

contact Lambert and Lambert recalled that he talked to Hunt on the phone shortly after.

Lambert said he and Hunt spoke first at Lambert's hotel and then again at Hunt's office at the Robert R. Mullen Co., the public relations firm where Hunt worked after leaving the CIA.

Hunt took some photocopies of cables from a manila envelope on his desk and showed them to him, Lambert said. "I started going through them and they didn't mean anything to me," Lambert recalled. "I told Hunt, 'I don't know what you're driving at here. Hunt fished through them and pulled out one and said, 'Here's your story.' And that turned out to be the document that was faked. I was shocked. What he saw, Lambert said, amounted to a "death warrant" for Diem.

Following these meetings with Hunt, Lambert said, he went through several months after protracted negotiations with Hunt in an effort to get a photocopy of the cable. At the same time, Lambert said, he was trying to contact Colson, but "I couldn't get to him."

Ultimately, nothing came of Lambert's efforts and the matter lapsed until late April, 1973, when Hunt's attempt to forge the cable was revealed publicly.

Among a number of questions that remain unanswered are: Why did President Nixon bring up the Diem assassination in his Sept. 16, 1971, press conference? Why may he have asked Ehrlichman, as Ehrlichman's lawyers now allege, to obtain documents on the Diem coup "for an upcoming press conference"? For exactly what purpose was Hunt directed to prepare the forged cables implicating President Kennedy in the Diem assassination?

Mystery also still surrounds the Diem assassination itself. No definitive official history of what took place has yet been made public, although President Johnson, according to Washington Post White House correspondent Carroll Kilpatrick told reporters during a discussion of Vietnam in August, 1967, "On instructions of ours we assassinated Diem and then, by God, I walked into it. It was too late and we went through one government after another."

WASHINGTON POST
21 June 1974

Behind Psychological Assessments' Door, A CIA Operation

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

At first glance the interior of the room on the fourth floor of the Van Ness Shopping Center office building looks like the many dozens of private consulting firms scattered in their smartly appointed quarters throughout Washington.

The neat lettering on the door says: "Psychological Assessments Associates, Inc." Admission is gained by pushing a buzzer and waiting for someone to unlock the door from the inside.

But Walter P. Pasternak, the operating head of Psychological Assessments, is not anxious to see unscheduled visitors. "We have nothing to say," he told a visiting reporter in terse and angry tones, moving immediately toward the door.

The reason for Pasternak's reticence is that Psychological Assessments is unlike most other businesses. From the time of its incorporation in 1965, its principal source of funding has been the Central Intelligence Agency, which is what Pasternak does not want to talk about.

"We could never have existed without this support," acknowledges the firm's retiring president, John W. Gittinger, who founded it with two other former CIA psychologists after they left full-time employment with the agency.

Gittinger is less reluctant to talk because he is disassociating himself from Psychological Assessments on July 1 and is proud of the work it has done as well as his long years of service to the CIA, to which he is still personally under contract as a consultant.

The company won an ob-

scure and perhaps unjustified mention in the case of former White House special counsel Charles Colson, who pleaded guilty on June 6 to an obstruction of justice charge growing out of his role in the Daniel Ellsberg break-in case.

Colson had asked the office of the Watergate special prosecutor to provide "documents or records concerning the psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg compiled by Psychological Assessments, Inc., for the CIA."

Gittinger heatedly denies any association with the Ellsberg profile or, indeed, any involvement with the White House on Watergate or national security matters. "It's an absolute, positive lie," said the 57-year-old psychologist of Colson's implication of the company's involvement in the 1971 "plumbers' break-in of Dr. Lewis Fielding's office in Los Angeles. Fielding was Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday the agency will not comment on whether it has financial or operational relationships with Psychological Assessments. The CIA has a policy of saying nothing about its links with U.S. domestic concerns.

Gittinger acknowledges that the company behind the unobtrusive door at 4301 Connecticut Ave. NW has conducted training programs for CIA operatives abroad and performed psychological evaluations for overseas employees of American firms with foreign-based offices or subsidiaries.

The rubric of "psychological assessments" covers a variety of services which both the firm and Gittinger, in his private consulting role, have provided the CIA.

It covers the study of brainwashing techniques by foreign intelligence organizations that was carried out by a New York-based predecessor organization to PAA called the Human Ecology Fund.

It also provides training to CIA employees for assessing the credibility of foreign intelligence informants. "It's a question of trying to understand whether someone is lying or telling the truth when he comes through the door and says he wants to give you information," Gittinger explained.

The beginning of the psychological assessment program, Gittinger related, goes back to the early 1950s when former CIA Director Allen W. Dulles sought neurosurgical treatment for his son, Allen M., who was seriously injured in Korea, from a New York neurologist, Dr. Harold G. Wolfe.

Dulles became interested in Wolfe's research into Chinese indoctrination of captured American pilots during the Korean war. CIA began financing the research work through first the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, with which Wolfe was associated, and then the Human Ecology Fund, according to Gittinger.

Both operated a private research organization with headquarters in New York and with branches overseas.

"This whole project was Allen Dulles' baby," Gittinger explained. "It grew out of his son's injury in Korea."

Because of the growing controversy over CIA financing of private organizations in the mid-1960s, the Human Ecology Fund was abandoned. The controversy was touched off by disclo-

sure that the agency was funding activities of U.S.-based student, labor, journalistic and cultural organizations.

The Human Ecology Fund was spared public mention during the furor over clandestine CIA financing. It folded quietly after Gittinger moved to Washington to start Psychological Assessments Associates Inc.

Current programs by PAA, said Gittinger, are strongly pointed toward Soviet, Chinese and Arab cultural training. He declined to discuss the specific nature of the programs or whether PAA carried out such programs for foreign intelligence or security organizations.

The commercial side of PAA's activities—screening foreign employees of American firms—has shrunk in recent years, making the company almost wholly dependant on its CIA contracts.

He emphasized that the company has never taken a government or private contract which involved the "assessment" of an American citizen. "We do absolutely no domestic advising," Gittinger said. "We have never been asked to evaluate an American."

Gittinger and the two other ex-CIA founders of PAA, Robert E. Goodnow and Samuel B. Lyster, have ended their active association with the company. It was understood that the new operating group is seeking to divest itself of the CIA financial sponsorship. "I am very proud of what I have done for the agency over a long period of time in the assessments field," said Gittinger. "There is nothing I am ashamed of, nothing I have to hide."

THE NEW REPUBLIC
29 JUN 1974

An Odd Bit of Hidden History: De Gaulle's CIA Aide

Charles de Gaulle is reputed to have been an ultranationalist who was almost paranoically suspicious of any foreign intrusion into France's internal affairs. Yet for several years prior to his return to power in 1958 he knowingly maintained regular contact with a covert US Central Intelligence Agency operative, partly because he wanted to preserve a link with America and partly because he was personally attached to the American assigned to keep tabs on him. But although the CIA was able with his own cooperation to watch de Gaulle closely, it failed to perceive that he would regain authority and at one stage it even tried to block him by financing his opponents, a fact that certainly did not elude him and may have contributed to his later wariness of Washington.

I encountered this historical footnote the other day in the person of John F. Hasey, the former CIA agent attached to de Gaulle. A slight, easygoing man in his mid-50s, Hasey compensates for the prosaic pace of his present retirement by recalling past experiences, and he told me of his years with de Gaulle as we chatted in the living room of his home outside Washington. He had gone to France as a student in the 1930s, but instead of studying he landed a job in Paris with Cartier's, the jeweler. After France fell to the Germans, he met de Gaulle in England at a friend's dinner table and was so impressed by the Free French cause that he enlisted in the foreign legion. Some months later, fighting against the Vichy forces in Syria, a burst of machine gun fire shattered his face. His exploits earned him membership in the *Ordre de la Liberation*, an exclusive fraternity created by de Gaulle to honor his supporters. Only three other Americans were similarly honored, among them Dwight Eisenhower.

Hasey went to work for Cartier's in New York after World War II but hankered for something more exciting, and when Eisenhower was appointed commander of the Allied armies in Europe in late 1950, Hasey asked to join him. Ike forwarded the request to the CIA, and not long afterward Hasey was in Paris performing various agency duties. He organized a clandestine surveillance team composed of former foreign legionnaires. He persuaded a young Laotian captain by the name of Phoumi Nosavan, then at the *Ecole de Guerre*, to become a paid CIA protégé. His chief task, however, was to stick close to de Gaulle, who was then in the political wilderness. As Hasey tells it, he went to see de Gaulle at the general's shabby office in the Rue de Solferino and announced that he represented CIA Director Allen Dulles. De Gaulle remembered Hasey from wartime days and said: "My door is open any time you need me because you rallied to my side when

I needed you."

Dedicated as they were to a united Europe under US auspices, CIA policymakers during this period feared that de Gaulle would, if he came back to power, wreck the Atlantic alliance then in its embryonic phase. Hasey was under instructions to report any moves that de Gaulle might make in that direction. De Gaulle reassured him that he had no intention of toppling the feeble Fourth Republic. Nevertheless Hasey sensed that the general would eventually reemerge, and he sought to convince the CIA of the wisdom of cultivating de Gaulle, thus building up "goodwill" for the future. He proposed, for example, that the agency quietly bring the general to the US for an operation to remove cataracts from his eyes. That idea was spurned. Hasey was permitted to provide de Gaulle with unclassified materials for memoirs he was then writing, but a recommendation that the general be authorized to receive confidential US analyses of world affairs was rejected. According to Hasey, the US ambassador in Paris at the time, Douglas Dillon, was reluctant to visit de Gaulle and only agreed to do so after it was learned that the Soviet envoy was seeing the general regularly.

At meetings between de Gaulle and Hasey, which took place about once a month, the two men reminisced or speculated on global matters. One theme that de Gaulle often emphasized, Hasey recalls, was that the US and the Soviet Union were countries too large to govern and would ultimately fragment. That notion suggested to Hasey that de Gaulle was thinking that the residual French empire would also break up and that independence for Algeria, a burning issue in France at that time, was inevitable. Hasey stresses, however, that nobody really knew what was going on in de Gaulle's mind. Even after he was propelled into power by the uprising in Algiers in 1958, Hasey recalls, a member of the Gaullist inner circle, Gen. Pierre Koenig, told him: "I know that de Gaulle will never let Algeria go, and you report that to Washington."

If the CIA did little to court de Gaulle's goodwill during the late 1950s, its efforts to mobilize his adversaries against him failed. When the Algerian eruption opened the way for de Gaulle's return to power, for instance, a CIA agent in Paris delivered a black bag containing \$75,000 to former Premier Guy Mollet in a last-ditch effort to help the Socialist party leader stop the general. Mollet not only did nothing to halt de Gaulle, but in a curious turnabout, joined the Gaullist government and lent it legitimacy. The CIA, incidentally, never again saw the \$75,000.

Stanley Karnow

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

16 JUN 1974

Colby and the CIA: A Cutback on Cloaks and Daggers

VERA GLASER

Washington Offbeat

WASHINGTON

HERE'S A NEW, more open style at the hush-hush Central Intelligence Agency.

Director William E. Colby, often tagged the nation's "chief spook," doesn't hide in the woodwork.

His home telephone is listed, he goes sailing with neighbors, is a pillar of the Little Flower Catholic Church and sometimes dines with journalists.

His wife, Barbara, has been known to invite an unexpected visitor in for coffee and a chat about family matters.

And a Colby aide at CIA headquarters even introduced himself wryly recently as the agency's "spooksmen."

For years CIA has been trying to scrub up its image as an insidious "invisible government" abroad and, more recently, an alleged ally of Watergate burglars at home.

Congress has tried to get a "handle" on CIA's controversial covert operations — or "dirty tricks" — which reportedly have overthrown governments and funded foreign guerillas, U. S. foundations and even assassinations.

Now reliable Capitol Hill sources say the "cloak-and-dagger" doings have dwindled to less than 10 percent of the agency's activity.

The trend began before Colby was named to the job about a year ago, but he has encouraged it. For a long time the super-secret agency was identified on an access road off a major highway with a deceptive sign. Now it's plainly marked "CIA."

Colby's crucial, delicate role makes him President Nixon's principal intelligence adviser and participant in National Security Council meetings — where confidentiality is a "must."

But Colby claims he "comes clean" with subcommittees of Congress.

"I'll tell them anything. There are no secrets. It's good for bureaucras to be under surveillance," he said at a rare interview at the fortress-like CIA Building in Langley, Va., where all ground-floor windows are screened in chain-link.

TO REACH HIS SANCTUM, one rides to the seventh floor in a private elevator, waits briefly in an isolated reception cubicle, then is ushered into a spectacular glass-walled office with a stunning view of the lush spring landscape.

The soft-spoken, 54-year-old CIA boss, in his horn-rimmed glasses, muted plaid suit and dark tie, looks more like an accountant than a spy.

The graying hair is neatly slicked down, the blue eyes are cool and seemingly indifferent. He uses the same casual tone to speak of the Soviet Union and China as he does to chat about the crabgrass on his lawn.

Colby's job is managerial now, but he knows every "dirty trick" in the book after a lifetime in Intelligence and the "operations" end of CIA. During World War II, he parachuted behind enemy lines, worked with the French resistance, and was dropped into Norway to blow up a German rail line.

Now he rides herd on an agency whose size and budget are top secret. Outside authorities have estimated that CIA employs upwards of 20,000 people around the world and spends about \$750 million a year. It is actually a small part of the U. S. international Intelligence network.

cutback in covert action. In recent weeks, for example, the last of a CIA-trained "secret army" was withdrawn from Laos. At one time it was said to have reached 30,000 men at a cost of more than \$300 million a year.

"We're kind of a bad word in a lot of places in the world, unfortunately," Colby conceded. "Some of this is sensationalism and not well-founded. Some we deserve."

MRS. COLBY, a lively, knowledgeable helpmate, who stays up until 2 A. M. reading newspapers so as "not to miss anything," claims her husband has done much "to wipe out the cult of secrecy-for-secrecy's sake at the CIA."

Sources on Capitol Hill agree.

Last July Colby became the first CIA Director to testify in open Senate confirmation hearings.

He conceded CIA may have overstepped by engaging in domestic actions and that the Laos war probably exceeded the agency's legal authority.

He admits frankly it was a mistake for the CIA to equip White House operatives with disguises for their illegal break-in in California—and in the next breath chuckles that CIA's experts were insulted by persistent press reports that a red wig furnished to Watergate burglar Howard Hunt was "ill-fitting."

Colby has made a good impression on Sen. John Stennis and Rep. Lucien Nedzi, the Democrats who head Armed Services subcommittees which ride herd on the CIA.

"I don't think we've tripped him in any way," Nedzi said. "He has never flinched in responding to us."

But Sen. William Proxmire worries that "a real possibility exists of using this enormous apparatus to unscrupulous or illegal ends here at home."

He wants covert operations entirely wiped out, and his amendment to a pending military procurement bill would more tightly limit CIA to international activity and extend Congress' powers of scrutiny.

Later this summer a Stennis subcommittee will review in depth the 1947 National Security Act which created CIA.

Nevertheless Nedzi believes the agency is "moving in the right direction, with less meddling in other people's business." He calls it "the finest Intelligence apparatus in the world."

COLBY CONSTANTLY emphasizes that "the real nature of intelligence today is the intellectual process of gathering bits and pieces of information and making over-all assessments from them."

Covert operations, he says, "contribute a small and sometimes critical part to a total picture. I would not favor abandoning them. We have had foreign envoys who have lied to our President about something critical. It can be very important to the country to know when they're lying and when they're telling the truth."

In a recent speech Colby said the CIA would "continue to need Americans and friendly foreigners willing to undertake clandestine Intelligence missions."

The toughest parts of his \$42,500 job, he says, are "the longer-term projections of what's going to happen to the world, and what the major threats to the U.S. are going to be. Some important countries are fairly close with their information and it's hard to find out truly what's going on

there."

Colby was born in St. Paul, Minn., the son of an Army officer. He spent three boyhood years in Tientsin, China.

He was "pacification chief" in Vietnam, with the personal rank of ambassador, in 1969 and 1970, was named deputy director of CIA in March 1973, and shortly afterward appointed to the top job.

Colby describes himself as "parsimonious about time." He works a 12-hour day, often on Saturdays, and has a safe at home for secret papers. He is in touch by "beeper" even

when sailing—a pastime so cherished that Colby hopes to spend a year on a boat when he retires at some indefinite future time.

Colby keeps a good luck charm on the window sill of his modernistic office, a large green ceramic dragon. He explains it's a Vietnamese temple artifact designed to ward off evil spirits.

"Does it work?" he was asked.

"We haven't done too badly," Colby smiled, an assessment which even his critics would confirm.

NEWS, Buffalo, N.Y.
25 May 1974

Watergate Restyled CIA's Cloak

By LUCIAN WARREN
News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — It's an ill wind that doesn't blow somebody some good, and that's the cliché that fits exactly what Watergate did to the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency did have to squirm for awhile as the revelations showed how the CIA became ensnared in the Howard Hunt machinations. In a way, though, the CIA has been a help in ferreting out the truth about Watergate.

The CIA was able to supply to the appropriate authorities the date (July 7, 1971) and substance of a call from John Ehrlichman to Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., then CIA director, in which the CIA was asked to help Hunt, former CIA employee, in an intelligence operation.

It has provided the transcript of a subsequent conversation between Cushman and Hunt on July 27, 1971, when the nature of the help needed was outlined. At that time Hunt asked modestly only for a wig and tape recording equipment for a one-time only operation he didn't explain.

The CIA has no idea what he used the equipment for — possibly the famous Dita Beard interview on the ITT matter.

It does know that Hunt came back to the CIA for more and more material until finally the agency realized it was being used for a domestic political intelligence operation for which it had neither moral nor legal authority. It then blew the whistle on Hunt.

Hunt, by the way, apparently performed his duties satisfactorily when he was a CIA employee, but it's rumored that his old associates were pretty shocked when they found Hunt was used for an illegal entry operation (Watergate) as this was not his field of expertise in CIA.

AS A RESULT of getting its fingers burned by the Hunt operations, the CIA under Director William Colby has been subjected to a major overhaul. Colby apparently has done a thorough housecleaning job and nailed down the operating procedure for the CIA in a set of unmistakable directives to the organization.

If some new Hunt tried anything similar on the CIA, which by law must confine itself to foreign

intelligence-gathering operations, alarm bells would almost literally ring all over the place.

The CIA has changed in other ways, too, not as a result of Watergate problems, but a result of the changes climate of East-West relations. The old covert operation, the paramilitary adventures that failed in Cuba but largely succeeded in Laos, is now a small part of the CIA's activity.

The machinery is, of course, still there, waiting to be used if the National Security Council orders.

But even when used, it is not something the CIA suddenly decides on its own would be in the national interest to launch. It has to have an okay from the National Security Council and the President.

The National Security Council, an organization of top officials from a number of government agencies which used to be run by Henry Kissinger, has some 44 committees which review the nation's needs in defense and intelligence operations. The CIA performs from directives from the NSC.

THERE IS ANOTHER check on the CIA, performed even more zealously in the post-Watergate period. Director Colby or one of his top officials meet once in every two or three weeks with Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D., Mich.), chairman of the intelligence subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

Nedzi bores in hard with questions about what the CIA is doing and by whose authority. There is a similar CIA contact with a Senate subcommittee. There's apparently very little these trusted members of Congress don't know about CIA operations.

And so the CIA has quietly, it would seem, reformed itself and set about the main business for which it was intended — find out what friends and enemies are planning to do that might affect the security of the United States.

Even with reform, it doesn't always bat 1000. No intelligence-gathering organization ever does.

It most conspicuous recent failure was in not predicting the October war between Israel and the Arabs. The CIA candidly acknowledges that it placed too much emphasis on indicators there wouldn't be a war, and not enough on those suggesting there would.

But the CIA apparently is supplying some pretty good material these days to our government on such subjects as the upheaval in China, Russian-Chinese hostilities and the future of the sophisticated missiles in the Soviet Union.

In China, there is some turbulence over a Mao-directed campaign to shake up the bureaucrats in line with his philosophy of a "perpetual revolution."

Chou En-lai, even though bowing out of some foreign ceremonial functions, is still believed to be in charge of running the country.

The CIA appears to have no evidence of any direct outbreak of hostilities between China and the Soviet Union along their borders, although both still have large forces facing each other.

RUSSIA NOW has the capability of deploying Multiple Independently Targeted Vehicle (MIRV) missiles, but there is no evidence it is engaged in a massive deployment effort and apparently intends to phase them in gradually over the years. If it changes its mind on this, the policy would soon become known here.

It is in the transmittal of such facts as these, assuming they are accurate, that the CIA justifies its existence. No major power can afford to be without such an agency if it is well run and the agency knows enough to profit by past mistakes.

NATION

22 JUNE 1974

The State of the Department

Flying at close to the speed of sound and setting new endurance records in the annals of diplomacy, Henry Kissinger has achieved Egyptian and Syrian cease-fire agreements and raised the possibility—no more than that—of a future stabilization of relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

But, giving all credit to the Secretary of State, what of the State Department? Some commentators argue that modern communications have made jet diplomacy feasible, with negligible drawbacks. Writing on "How Kissinger Runs State by Remote Control" in *The Christian Science Monitor*, Benjamin Welles suggests that electronics has made location immaterial. From whatever runway Dr. Kissinger's plane lifts off, he is linked to Washington via the White House global communications system. When he is on the ground he works through U.S. Embassies and diplomatic mission code rooms. Encoded, a priority message from Damascus to Washington may travel by overland circuits, submarine cable and microwave in less than four minutes. From the State Department's communications center in the White House, it goes to the Pentagon and the CIA at speeds of thousands of words a minute. Welles reports that by teleprinter, which accounts for most of Dr. Kissinger's traffic, during his thirty-four-day absence he sent seventy "flash" messages and received forty-five; he sent 633 immediate priority messages and received 1,075; etc.

That sort of thing makes good journalism in the popular science, "gee-whiz" genre, but politically it makes no sense. Diplomacy by jet and electronics comes at a high cost. It is the stuff of which drama is made and the press naturally loves it, but many people in the State Department and the White House, including some who have worked with Kissinger, complain. Back at the State Department, Richard Dudman of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* writes that praise for Kissinger's *tour de force* in the Middle East is mixed with "concern approaching desperation over the state of the department." It is in something of a mess.

Kissinger did not create the mess; it goes far back. Since the Presidency of Herbert Hoover, there have been perhaps half a dozen task force reports on the need to reorganize and reform the State Department. Secretary

Rogers set up the Macomber group, which in 1970 issued a 600-page program of reform for the department. About 500 changes were proposed. The department continued as before; if anything, it became more chaotic.

Kissinger knew the department's failings and promised to cure them. That commitment, in effect, was a condition of his confirmation as Secretary of State, but while setting himself up as a 1970s' John Foster Dulles—more intelligent but also more peripatetic—Kissinger seems to have forgotten the pledge he made to "institutionalize" foreign policy.

The consequences could be disastrous in some future emergency, which the State Department may create by its own disorganization and managerial disarray. Consider only the foreign service, just one of the divisions that, with more than 12,000 employees in all, make up the department. In our June 15th issue we ran a piece by Barry Rubin itemizing some of the odd characters who represent us in various parts of the world. Aside from the time-honored spoils system, under which a Walter Annenberg—by no means the worst example—can buy himself the ambassadorship to Great Britain with a campaign contribution of \$250,000, more than 1,500 CIA personnel are currently carried on the State Department rolls. Some of these people are highly malignant—ex-coup-makers and the like. One reason that Washington seems to have such bad relations with the "outs" in Greece, for example, or in Portugal before the de Spínola switchover, is that we send obsessed rightists to such trouble spots. Surely, even with a crippled Administration, we can come up with more reasonable foreign service officers than irrational "freedom fighters."

But basic reforms of this kind call for more concentrated attention than Kissinger can give his department when most of his colleagues see him only on TV. And an even more disquieting possibility arises. Kissinger's skills as a foreign negotiator are universally recognized, but is he the prima donna type? He has just lost his deputy secretary, Kenneth Rush, who has gone over to the White House as the President's chief economic adviser. Three of the five top posts in State are reported to be vacant. It is a reasonable suspicion that Kissinger wants to do it all himself, that he temperamentally lacks the basic managerial attribute of delegating responsibility. He should allay this suspicion before it is too late.

THE CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW
WINTER/SPRING 1974

Resources For Civil Libertarians

COUNTER-SPY

A new quarterly, 75 to 100 pages long, slated for publication May 15 by the Organizing Committee for a Fifth Estate, which was formed by the recent merger of the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC) and The Fifth Estate, founded and funded largely by Norman Mailer and friends. The Organizing Committee's purpose is "to investigate United States intelligence and secret government operations and to resist technofascism." *Counter-Spy* supersedes a

publication of the same name put out quarterly by CARIC. Some recent articles discussed lawsuits to force the CIA to release budget information, secret U.S. operations in Cambodia, the use of government infiltrators in the Gainesville Eight trial of 1973, and the exposure of anti-war activist "Crazy Annie" as an intelligence officer of the Washington, D.C., police department.

Subscription: \$6 (institutions \$10). Write: Organizing Committee for a Fifth Estate, P.O. Box 647, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044.

GENERAL

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Tuesday, June 18, 1974

Maritime Muddle

Tide of Pessimism Is High as Talks on Law Of Sea Near Opening

Formidable Agenda Awaits UN Meeting in Caracas: Fishing, Mining, Pollution

A Plethora of Positions

By BARRY NEWMAN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Over the protests of the State Department and a threatened presidential veto, Congress recently passed a law declaring once and for all that a lobster isn't a fish.

State Department emissaries argued at hearings that lobsters jump up and down when they get mad and swim a few feet, showing that they are more like fish than, say, clams are. But that didn't hold up in the face of scientific testimony that lobsters make whoopee on the sea floor, demonstrating that they don't swim much at all.

With the law on the books lobsters now are considered "creatures of the sea floor" and, unlike fish, are off limits to foreign fishermen. The whole lobster question still gives State Department diplomats heartburn. They might not actually care very much if a lobster is classified with fish or not. What really upsets them is that the new lobster law is another in a long list of pushy unilateral actions by the U.S. and other countries rustling rights to the oceans before the United Nations has a chance to decide peaceably on an international law of the sea.

That chance will come this week. On Thursday, in Caracas, Venezuela, the UN will convene a big Law of the Sea Conference for 70 days of dickering. Debate over the lobster's swimming ability will be just one niggling point of friction among thousands at what promises to be the biggest international gathering in history—and quite possibly the most confusing.

Hangers-On and Calligraphers

There will be about 150 countries attending; that's about 70 more than even existed at a previous Law of the Sea Conference in 1958. Delegates, advisory committees, interest groups and assorted hangers-on will number close to 5,000. And the UN is sending 89 translators, 38 revisers and another 89 typists and calligraphers—plus a contingent of executives to run the show.

To house this mob, the Venezuelan government has reserved every inch of first-class hotel space in Caracas and has taken over a just-finished luxury housing project, turning a 43-story tower into delegates' quarters and converting a movie theater into a plenary meeting hall equipped for simultaneous translating into five languages. The cost to the host government was \$16.5 million.

What all these people are going to try doing in Caracas is to boil down six fat vol-

umes of turgidly composed proposals into one neat document that would:

—Put a uniform world-wide limit on how far out to sea a coastal state can claim sovereign authority.

—Create an intermediate zone where a coastal state retains power but where other states have rights to navigate and exploit resources.

—Impose international law over the deep sea beyond national jurisdiction, especially over the mineral wealth at the bottom.

—Establish authority transcending national and international bounds to control pollution and encourage scientific research.

The complications are phenomenal. "It is fair to say," one expert asserts in all seriousness, "that mankind has probably never before attempted such a difficult task."

The Conflicting Interests

All the traditional alliances have come unstuck in a negotiation awash in conflicting interests dictated simultaneously by military, economic and geographical distinctions. Delegations are themselves divided into interest groups, and factions are warring within factions.

Coastal states want as much power as far out to sea as possible; landlocked states want to share that power. Advanced states want to exploit the sea; developing states fear exploitation. Maritime states want freedom of navigation for their vessels; straits states want to control shipping. States with concave shorelines worry about being squeezed by states with convex shorelines. States without islands are nervous about being pushed back by states with islands.

There are combinations and permutations: coastal states that are maritime powers vs. coastal states that aren't; developing states with rich, seabed mineral resources vs. developing states without them. Oil interests within any one delegation may be pushing for freedom to drill while fishing interests want to prevent pollution. The oil interests may themselves be split between shippers wanting freedom to navigate and operators who don't want foreigners competing in coastal waters. And the fishing interests can be split just as often between those who want to chase the tuna anywhere on earth and others who want to protect coastal banks against poachers.

No wonder pessimism is riding high. "Most people just don't think we're going to get out of this thing with a treaty the United States Senate will ratify," a congressional observer says. "Our only hope is that everybody else will turn out to be more screwed up than we are."

There is, however, one strong incentive for diplomats to find a workable treaty, and that is the thought of what might happen if they don't. There is too much of value in the oceans for the traditional "freedom" of the seas to persist. Without a treaty, the world is likely to see a wave of unilateral claims to vast ocean areas, putting map makers to work drawing boundary lines over the blue. Louis B. Sohn, a Harvard professor, sees such a free-for-all leading "to a division of the oceans among a few major powers along the lines of the division of Africa in the 19th Century; and such neocolonialist competition might easily degenerate into a new era of imperialist wars."

Some nations, impatient with the lack of legal framework for exploitation, are taking

the law into their own hands. Years ago several Latin American nations extended their territorial claims 200 miles out to sea, and Peru has harassed scores of U.S. fishing boats that venture too near.

More recently, Canada declared a 100-mile "pollution zone," and Iceland extended its territorial sea to 50 miles, touching off a "cod war" with Great Britain, its ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; that conflict reached the shooting stage last year. (Britain and Iceland signed an agreement on the issue last November, but it will only be in force for two years—presumably enough time for the UN to act.)

In recent weeks, two more NATO members, Greece and Turkey, have been edging toward a military confrontation over Turkey's exploration for oil in the eastern waters of the Aegean Sea. The area is only a few miles from Turkey's coast, but it is dotted with small islands owned by Greece. Turkey claims the floor of the sea, Greek islands or no Greek islands. Greece disagrees, and the international law applying to such questions is very muddy.

There are four international treaties, adopted at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference, but they have some deficiencies that are getting worse as technology for exploiting the oceans improves and the number of countries in the world increases. The treaties, for one thing, never clearly defined "territorial sea." For another, an average of only 40 nations ever bothered to ratify them.

By 1970 it was obvious that something more was needed, so the United Nations decided to throw another conference. A 91-nation committee was set up to decide what to talk about, and without a single dissent, the General Assembly declared that the guiding principle of the meeting would be the preservation of the sea as "the common heritage of mankind."

This inspirational declaration lost some of its high tones when the countries sat down to hash out the issues. "The seabed is the heritage of mankind," says Louis Henkin, a Columbia University professor, "but there has been no agreement as to who is or represents mankind or how mankind should enjoy that heritage."

A Mountain of Conflicts

The 91 countries that were supposed to spend four years arriving at a basic treaty text for 150 countries to ponder have instead dumped in Caracas a mountain of conflicting proposals. The six volumes don't include a single set of draft articles. The report of one of the three subcommittees has no fewer than 50 separate proposals, and appended to them are hundreds of anonymous "variants." Another massive section is written with alternatives that aren't accepted by one or more delegations enclosed in brackets—and there are even brackets within the brackets. The "press kit" for the conference consists of sheets of paper several square feet in area, on which the plethora of positions are separated into little boxes.

If the issues sound complicated, consider that the conference still has to decide on a system for voting on the issues. In another grand gesture, the General Assembly reached a "gentleman's agreement" that decisions would be made by "consensus." But nobody knows what consensus means, except that it definitely means more than a two-thirds vote. The assembly has ordered the conference to clarify the rules in the

first week of the meeting. The conference could vote to rescind that order. But it would naturally first have to decide how many votes would be needed to decide whether to reconsider the decision that everything should be decided by consensus.

An International Authority

Absurd as this seems, parliamentary procedure becomes deadly serious to states trying to line up alliances and predict how the conference will vote on a number of crucial points of conflict. "The business of the conference involves such concrete issues and interests that nobody wants to wind up in the minority," one UN official says.

One key confrontation will involve the creation of an unprecedented international authority to govern the exploitation of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This would have been an esoteric topic a few years ago, but now several major mining companies, mostly from the U.S., are ready to take huge tonnages of minerals from the ocean floor at depths as great as 20,000 feet.

Some developing countries, landlocked countries and countries not enamored of free enterprise want to share the wealth through an international authority that will operate the mines or at least form joint ventures. Advanced countries, namely the U.S., want an international body that will mainly grant mining licenses. Developed countries are worried about minerals shortages and expropriation threats; developing countries with rich resources don't want markets destroyed for minerals they mine on land. There isn't much room for compromise.

Just as contentious is the question of what to do about the sea under national jurisdiction. There is general agreement that coastal states will get absolute sovereignty 12 miles from their shores. But beyond that, about 200 miles to the edge of the continental shelves, there is a problem: how to retain national jurisdiction while giving the international community some rights in the area. This issue, says John Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the talks, "involves more interests of more states than any

other problem in the law-of-the-sea negotiations."

Some Latin American coastal states will argue for complete control of everything 200 miles out. A few of their neighbors will support a 200-mile "patrimonial sea" where other states can navigate but can't mine or drill without permission. On the other hand, the U.S.—as well as some states with resources but without the wherewithal to get them—wants coastal states to relinquish some jurisdiction and in return to share in the revenue of investments made off their shores.

Fish and Pollution

Living resources are another kettle of fish. There are countries that hook most of their catch off their coasts; they want to keep foreigners out. Other countries have fishermen who travel long distances after their quarry; they want access to foreign waters. And still other countries, the U.S. included, have both kinds of fishermen, and they want the law to apply differently to different kinds of fish.

Even further from resolution is the pollution problem. Ideally, ocean pollution could be controlled by an international body with power in national and international waters. Because a lot of ocean pollution starts out on land, this authority might even have some influence on the kind of garbage allowed in the oceans to begin with.

But that sort of rule would infringe on coastal-state sovereignty. As a result, the language of all the pollution proposals is high-minded but purposefully vague. International standards for land-based pollution are undoubtedly out the window. Some states want pollution standards that can be relaxed if their economic situation is bad. Others want the right to impose stricter standards if they choose. Any such ideas are anathema to maritime countries worried about their ships having to meet one standard in one port and another standard in another port.

There is one area on which the U.S. and other big powers aren't likely to compromise. These nations want freedom to pass through narrow straits, regardless of how

much the conference extends a nation's territorial limits. The major powers want their nuclear submarines to pass through the straits unimpeded and underwater.

Some U.S. groups are concerned that under Pentagon pressure to win on this issue, the U.S. delegation might bargain away all other points. One congressional aide says that the Pentagon "would trade every damn thing there is lying around—fish, oil and everything else—to be able to go through the straits of the world with their atomic subs under water."

The Question of Time

Various groups are also worried about how long it might take to put into effect any international law that might come out of the conference. Another conference session seems almost certain next year, but any final agreement it might produce could languish as long as a decade before wide ratification.

Congress is already considering a bill that would permit ocean miners to go ahead and mine if the conference doesn't come up with a pact by next year. Another bill, which has a good chance of being passed this summer although it would probably be vetoed by President Nixon, would extend U.S. control over foreign fishermen to 200 miles from the current 12 miles. Rep. Gary Studds of Massachusetts, a principal sponsor of the bill, says, "If we wait, the question will be academic. There won't be any fish."

Mr. Studds was also instrumental in getting the law passed that declared the lobster not a fish. He says he did it because he didn't think the lobster could wait for an international law of the sea either.

The State Department didn't agree with Mr. Studds on that, but there is in all this at least one point of almost universal agreement—clams. The State Department, Mr. Studds and almost everybody else seem to concur that a clam isn't a fish and is therefore under national jurisdiction. "Clams are sedentary," U.S. Ambassador Stevenson says. "There is no problem with clams."

WASHINGTON POST
17 June 1974

Men, Fish And Ocean Politics

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

ABOARD THE SHARON-AND-NOREEN—The fishermen in the fo'c'sle of this dragger bucking through the Atlantic swells had a message for the United Nations delegates who will open the biggest international meeting in history on Thursday.

Neither the fishermen nor the fish, the men said angrily, can wait much longer for the U.N. or anybody else to bring some law and order to the exploitation of the seas. Otherwise, it will be every country for itself.

The 5,000 delegates from 151 nations who will gather at Caracas, Venezuela, for the U.N.'s third Law of the Sea Conference know the fishermen are right. But it is improbable, despite the acknowledged urgency, that the delegates will succeed in writing an acceptable

erning two-thirds of the earth's surface — the seas.

The realities of ocean politics threaten to polarize the conference, with the biggest "have" countries — the United States and the Soviet Union — lined up against the "have not" countries backed by China.

For the law of the sea no longer means merely agreeing on who can sail where. Today — in a world running short of food, fuel and minerals — it means agreeing on who can tap what part of the ocean for resources that are running out on land.

"We may see a national race for the control of open oceans and seabeds comparable to the race for the control of land areas of the past three centuries," former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has warned in urging world leaders to update the law of the sea before mankind goes through the "sheer insanity" of another race for riches.

The New England fishermen aboard the Sharon-and-Noreen out of New Bedford, Mass., do not know much about the Law of the Sea Conference; nor the "have vs. have-not" problem, nor Dean Rusk. But they do know a lot about fish and fishing and the ocean politics offshore.

And, in making their case during a three-day sail from Washington to New Bedford, these fishermen portrayed the type of complexities that will bedev

the U.N. delegates and their governments all during the Law of the Sea Conference from June 20 to Aug. 29.

"If our oil guys have the right to drill up to 200 miles off our shores, why shouldn't we fishermen have the same right?" asked Edward E. Longo, skipper of the Sharon-and-Noreen. He sailed the dragger from New Bedford to Washington to lobby for a 200-mile-wide American-controlled fishing zone around the United States.

"If the Russians drilled oil right off four shores like they trawl for fish right now, you'd see something done," Longo said in the Sharon-and-Noreen fo'c'sle.

He felt no better when told that Secretary of Interior Rogers C. B. Morton said recently that it was "a hell of a good question" what the United States would do if the Soviet Union suddenly decided to drill for oil in the international waters off Maryland.

"A farmer—he can plant more next year if he did not raise enough stuff this year," said John C. Botelho, 51, skipper-owner of two

called trawlers. "But you can't do that with fishing once you take too many fish. They can't replenish themselves, then."

Haddock have been virtually wiped out by overfishing by foreign fleets off New England, Botelho said. The yellowtail flounder will be gone within three years unless the United States imposes controls for everybody, he added.

Why, Botelho asked in a voice heavy with frustration and pain, is the U.S. government standing by while foreign fleets ruin fishing for all time for everybody off the American coast. The government should appoint itself game warden and post rules for every country to obey when fishing within 200 miles of the U.S. shoreline, he argued.

"You've seen these fine mesh nets these foreign fishing boats use," complained Edward W. DeCosta, 34, engineer on the Sharon and Noreen. "How is it fair for our government to tell us to use only a certain size net and then other governments go ahead and use stuff so small it scoops up everything."

"We're getting desperate," Longo said. "In two years I don't think there will be any of the good fish left the way things are going."

Botelho—who has fished the waters off New Bedford for 31 years and reveres the sea to the point that "every trip is a lifetime"—agreed that fishermen are fed up with waiting. "We used to act like babies with pacifiers when people promised us things," he said. "But no more."

New England fishermen allied with a federation of interests called Save the American Fisheries already are lobbying for passage of a bill sponsored by Sen. Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.) and Rep. Gerry E. Studds (D-Mass.) to give the United States control of fishing up to 200 miles off its coast until an international agreement is reached. The bill faces an uncertain

future because the Nixon administration contends that going it alone at this point would undermine the Law of the Sea Conference.

Beyond lobbying, one picks up rumors that some fishermen go to sea armed in case the competition between American and foreign fleets should escalate to gun fire.

At the moment, the U.S. claims a three-mile-wide band of territorial waters plus nine miles beyond it as an American fishing zone—or a total limit of 12 miles. The U.S. delegation at Caracas will agree to extending the territorial limit from three to 12 miles but oppose designating 188 miles more as an American-controlled economic zone.

The fishermen would seem to be correct in assuming the Soviet Union could drill for oil as well as fish anywhere beyond that 12-mile limit. But there are some other American claims to the riches of the sea—claims that the Law of the Sea Conference will argue about in Caracas.

On Sept. 28, 1945, President Truman proclaimed that the U.S. continental shelf from the beach to a depth of 600 feet was American territory. He said the same day that the United States also reserved the right to establish American-controlled "conservation zones" for fishing, but did not define them.

In 1958, the U.N. General Assembly went further than the Truman proclamation by defining the shelf as "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas."

In other words, the General Assembly said, anything a nation can reach, it

can take. That is one sense of the "admits of the exploitation of the natural resources" language.

In faulting that loose language, George A. Doumani, in his book, "Ocean Wealth: Policy and Potential," said, "It is evident that the dependence of the delineation of the continental shelf on the technological feasibility of exploiting it can be used as license for encroachment. It has already led to confusion and may well lead to grievances among the nations of the world. Continued encroachment would weaken the effectiveness of international law."

Small wonder, then, that underdeveloped nations meeting at Caracas will try to put a fence around their coastal waters so they can keep the oil and fish for themselves.

Chile, Ecuador and Peru, for example, want to preserve the riches along their Pacific coasts to 200 miles out, with the proviso that foreign ships, submarines and airplanes could still navigate within 12 miles of their shores.

The 33 nations with little or no coastline want vast riches of the "common heritage" oceans divided up among all the nations of the world. They would like to see national claims limited to no more than 40 miles and apply share-the-wealth philosophy to rest of the seas.

One proposal to implement that objective is to establish an international licensing body to control sea mining beyond national jurisdictions. That is, out in the deep sea.

Here again competing economic interests and international ocean politics make it difficult for the world to agree on a set of rules.

American sea mining companies, for example, do not want to have to compete for licenses before an international body connected with the U.N. They fear they would come off second-best

because the "have-not" nations outnumber and outvote the "have" nations in the General Assembly.

Instead, the mining companies are seeking congressional authority to stake claims to big portions of the seabed.

Because of the complexities and billions of dollars at stake, law of the sea specialists predict the conference will fail to agree on a final treaty at Caracas but will instead settle for refining an agenda for voting next winter in Geneva.

However—and this is important to New England fishermen—the same specialists predict the conference majority will express itself in favor of a 200-mile "economic zone" where individual countries would control the fishing, drilling for oil and seabed mining.

The State Department is resigned to such an economic zone and realizes the Senate is unlikely to approve a Law of the Sea Treaty which does not provide for one. Even the State Department will continue to press at Caracas for apportioning jurisdiction over fishing on the basis of where fish live and travel—the "species approach" which critics contend would be too complicated and difficult to enforce.

The Defense Department is uneasy about 200-mile economic zones, even if territorial waters remain at 12 miles at the outset. Under the "creeping jurisdiction" argument, defense officials fear countries would attempt to extend territorial waters seaward toward the limits of the economic zone—perhaps posing problems for U.S. reconnaissance submarines and aircraft as well as warships.

At the minimum, the Defense Department is insisting as the right of transit through international straits even if overlapping territorial jurisdictions theoretically closed them off.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 June 1974

Mideast A-pacts: hazards debated

By David F. Salisbury

Staff writer of

The Christian Science Monitor

The effectiveness of international nuclear safeguards is under new scrutiny following President Nixon's agreement to provide Egypt with nuclear energy.

In particular, there is a danger that fissionable material used in a

power plant in Egypt might be stolen by terrorist groups and used for blackmail.

In the last few months, two independent studies have found even United States nuclear safeguards, the tightest in the world, to be inadequate to prevent the theft of nuclear materials by armed terrorist groups.

U.S. officials insist that the nuclear power program for Egypt will be under strict examination from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. This involves regular on-

site inspection.

The U.S. now has cooperative agreements under similar conditions with 25 nations.

The Indian plant from which basic fissionable material was generated for India's first atomic blast recently was not under IAEA supervision. It was set up with the help of Canada, which has since ended its assistance in protest against the Indian detonation.

U.S. atomic energy officials must also consider the possibility that the Egyptians could use the plutonium

generated by the U.S.-provided nuclear power plant to produce a nuclear weapon themselves.

Presently, the fuel rods that go into commercial nuclear reactors cannot be made easily into a nuclear bomb. However, in the core of the reactor some of the uranium transmuted into plutonium can be separated chemically and made into an explosive.

Separation difficult

Because the spent fuel is highly radioactive, this separation must be done remotely, behind heavy lead shielding. The process is very expensive.

But by the 1980's, when Egypt's first commercial reactor is to be completed, present plans of the nuclear industry call for enriching fuel with plutonium. This will make it easier for any country with a stockpile of fuel rods to divert materials and fabricate a bomb within days or weeks after they decide to do so, arms control experts concede.

According to information supplied to the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Egypt has agreed that it will not use any of the fissionable materials for even "peaceful" nuclear explosives, as the Indians have moved to do.

However, Republican Sen. Jacob Javits of New York, among others in Congress, is not so sure about relying on such promises. In a recent press conference, he recalled Egypt's violations of agreements made after 1956 and said, "We must be extremely wary about the possibility of introducing nuclear weapons into the Middle East tinderbox."

Congress has veto

Agreements providing nuclear assistance are subject to congressional

veto. They take effect unless disapproved by both houses within 60 days after being submitted to them.

Some members of the congressional Joint Committee say they would watch closely any proposed safeguards.

A member of the committee, Sen. Henry Jackson (D) of Washington, said he is considering introducing a resolution to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. He said this would have an effect of prohibiting the supply of nuclear equipment and fuel into the region.

The Washington Senator called the plan absurd to send reactors and atomic fuel into a region which has a huge pool of the world's oil and natural gas resources and also is prone to terrorism.

Sen. Frank Church (D) of Idaho, a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee, says he will introduce legislation prohibiting all American foreign aid to Egypt until the Cairo government signs the international treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, it is the concern of some that Palestinian or other terrorists might be able to steal generated plutonium and use it for international blackmail.

Mr. Nixon is expected to sign a similar nuclear agreement with Israel. The Israelis have operated a French research reactor since the 1950's. Experts feel the Israelis have enough plutonium stockpiled to make at least 10 atomic bombs. This is in contrast with Egypt, which has operated two small Soviet reactors but not long enough to generate much plutonium.

Dangers described

A long-time crusader for increased nuclear safeguards and co-author of one of the studies which found U.S. safeguards inadequate, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor has told how easy it would be for terrorists to steal nuclear materials and fabricate them into an explosive.

Both IAEA and U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) safeguards rely heavily on accounting methods, elaborate methods of weighing and measuring that are designed to detect theft of nuclear materials after the fact.

"A terrorist group would not care if their theft is detected," reasons Dr. Taylor. "In many cases they even want the publicity. So such a system does not serve as an effective deterrent."

Effectiveness doubted

In addition, Dr. Taylor's study and another panel commissioned by the AEC, both conclude that such a system is inadequate to keep track of the large amounts of nuclear materials that will be flowing throughout the U.S. and the world in the foreseeable future.

Instead, Dr. Taylor has been pushing for a system stressing armed guards and electronic surveillance to protect against theft. In the U.S. he is optimistic that such a system can be implemented for a few percent of the total cost of nuclear energy. Internationally, he is less optimistic.

"There has been an increasing amount of talk within the IAEA of strengthening safeguards, but not much action," he says.

In addition to the present IAEA safeguards, the U.S. is reportedly insisting that Egypt use special procedures to protect against theft and sabotage.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, June 27, 1974

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Allies Worried by Moscow Summit

By Jack Anderson

On his way to Moscow, President Nixon stopped off in Brussels to sign a NATO charter and to smile for the cameras. But behind the show of cordiality, our NATO friends are secretly worried that the President will give more than he will gain at the Moscow summit meeting.

This nagging concern appears in confidential draft reports prepared for the North Atlantic assembly, which gathered in Washington earlier this month.

The reports reveal that some NATO leaders believe the President has already signed away the Western military advantage. The result "could give the Soviet Union tremendous superiority in numbers of warheads and total 'throw-weight,'" warns one report.

NATO leaders are frankly suspicious of detente. "Detente in Soviet eyes," states another report, "is clearly to achieve recognition by the West of the political situation in Eastern Europe and to secure for the East as much economic and technological benefit as can be gained."

Unfortunately, adds the report, the political softening has been accompanied by a military tightening throughout the Soviet bloc. "Hence the price of detente in the political sphere," the report warns, "is increased readiness and vigilance in the military sphere."

A report on "Atlantic Political Problems" takes blunt notice of the "domestic problems" besetting President Nixon. These, according to the report, "threaten to severely handicap his... authority."

Declares the confidential document: "Most people would now acknowledge that above all, the President needs a major foreign policy initiative to counter the domestic issues that threaten to engulf him."

"This in turn increases the suspicion of his critics that he will seek a major agreement with the Soviet Union that will have more to do with domestic prestige than the long-term foreign policy interests of the country."

In one report, the latest U.S. doctrine that "nuclear attack would be met by whatever scale of launch the circumstances demanded" is described as a "dangerous development."

This permits "a theoretical approach to nuclear weapons which is out of touch with political reality," the document

charges. "It implies the possibility of waging limited nuclear war and the expression of such a possibility is a regressive step."

Not only do NATO leaders look with apprehension on the edge which President Nixon has already given the Soviet Union in missile numbers and payload, but the NATO partners are also concerned about the balance of troops and equipment in Europe.

The Soviet satellites, according to one report, could unleash a force of 925,000 men, 15,500 tanks and 2,800 aircraft "with very little warning." As a defense, the NATO nations have only 770,000 men, 6,000 tanks and 2,700 aircraft.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 June 1974

U.S. arms talks critics suspect hastiness

Soviet advantage seen in accord

By Richard Burt
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The resignation last week of the Pentagon's top strategic arms-control adviser, Paul H. Nitze, has fueled a growing controversy within United States Government circles which is likely to influence the outcome of President Nixon's talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow later this month.

Mr. Nitze's departure has brought to light a major split within the arms-control community over the advisability of signing an underground nuclear test-ban agreement with the Soviets. And experts here argue that regardless of the form it would take a testing accord will be subjected to substantial criticism from either liberals or hard-liners.

The circumstances behind Mr. Nitze's resignation, meanwhile, provide a rare glimpse into the bureaucratic maneuvering that consistently has characterized the formulation of U.S. policy concerning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

Mr. Nitze long has been a prominent member of the U.S. defense establishment, who has served in a variety of high-level jobs including

Secretary of the Navy in the Kennedy era.

Potential superiority

During the first round of the SALT talks in 1969, he acted as a top-level negotiator with the U.S. delegation and is said to have been responsible for working out many of the understandings that resulted in the U.S.-Soviet decision to restrict the deployment of antiballistic missiles.

Mr. Nitze reportedly was unhappy, however, with the other major accord reached at the first round of SALT, the interim agreement, which gave the Soviet Union a potential 50 percent superiority in numbers of land-based and submarine-launched offensive strategic missiles.

According to former associates, Mr. Nitze believed the agreement was too hastily arrived at and was, in part, designed to provide Mr. Nixon with what appeared to be a substantial foreign-policy success during his trip to the Soviet Union in May, 1972.

Mr. Nitze's dissatisfaction with the outcome of the SALT I was aggravated, officials report, by the publication of books and articles following the conclusion of the talks which gave Mr. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger the major credit for negotiating the first-round accords.

Owing to the secrecy that surrounded the negotiations, many of the

contributions made by Mr. Nitze and other negotiators, particularly former delegation chief Gerard Smith, have yet to be publicly reported.

Soviet momentum

During SALT II, which began late in 1972, a number of former and present SALT participants privately voiced the fear that the inequalities expressed in the first-round interim agreement would not be adequately addressed. These fears have been reinforced, in the minds of some observers, by the continued momentum in Soviet missile and warhead development and the Nixon administration's need, in the wake of Watergate, to score another foreign-policy victory in Moscow.

Last summer, when Soviet party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon announced in Washington their intention to limit the deployment of multiple warheads on U.S. and Soviet missiles, some analysts expressed concern that if such an agreement were tied to number of missile launchers and not payload, the Soviets, possessing larger rockets, would be given the ability to deliver a large number of warheads.

This fear vanished, however, when it became apparent during Dr. Kissinger's visit to Moscow in the spring that the two sides were still far apart on the means of controlling multiple-warhead deployment.

But concern now is directed toward the possibility that an accord limiting underground testing will be signed during Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit.

LONDON TIMES
18 June 1974

America's policy of détente: Realpolitik or Russian roulette?

President Nixon's speech last week at Annapolis, in preparation for his forthcoming visit to Moscow, was a classic statement of the Nixon-Kissinger position on détente. It argued with amenity and ability the case against critics of that position. All the same it largely misrepresented or misunderstood what it is that is widely felt to be wrong with the current American approach.

One would not wish to denigrate the skill with which the President and his Secretary of State have handled many issues; but, however serious in their own way, these issues are minor in comparison with the great central problem of world politics, the relationship with the Soviet Union. And no minor successes can conceivably compensate if a disastrous error is made over that.

The burden of the Annapolis speech was that relations between states should not be conducted on a purely idealistic basis, and that they should involve no interference with the domestic affairs of other countries. In a general sense, such a view will not be disputed. But in the context of relations with the Soviet Union as they are at present, it contains major fallacies.

First is the implication that Senator Jackson (with his celebrated amendment, overwhelmingly supported in the Congress, which makes the granting of Most Favoured Nation treatment dependent upon freedom of emigration), and those European statesmen who have stood for the free movement of ideas and people as essential to any détente, are motivated merely by an impractical idealism. The contrary is true. The attempt to represent Senator Jackson as a sort of hick Woodrow Wilson is anyhow absurd. He is certainly the American statesman

with the profoundest knowledge and grasp of international and defence affairs—as was indeed shown when he was approached in turn to serve as Secretary of State and of Defence. He and the European leaders, who have included Herr Brandt and such moderates as the Danish and Dutch representatives in recent negotiations, are moved precisely by a more pragmatic and more profound understanding of the Soviet Union than the American administration has—and of world peace too.

There is, of course, a sense in which the demand for free emigration and for the free movement of people and ideas can be represented as interference in domestic Soviet affairs. Not that the Russians themselves have any right to complain. Suslov or Ponomarev appear at the congresses of Western Communist Parties, Soviet political works, printed in English in Moscow, are sold freely in our countries. And, on a different tack, Soviet arms (shipped via Prague) turn up in the Bogside.

But in any case, such "internal" changes as are necessary in the USSR if détente is to mean anything are not concerned with the political or social system as such. They are concerned with the fact—un-

avoidably affecting international relations—that the Soviet Union is a siege polity and a siege economy. The right to emigration is by common consent an international one, since it is guaranteed by the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. And it might, incidentally, be held relevant to Russia's reliability in honouring its signature on international documents that it has subscribed to but not observed these provisions.

But the issue goes deeper even than that. Soviet-United States détente on present terms involves inside the Soviet Union not merely the thorough repression of all Western-style ideas, but a powerful campaign of indoctrination with hatred for all that the West stands for.

It is another major element of Kissingerite doctrine that trade will ease international relations. There is no historical warrant for this. The highest levels of Russian-German trade, for example, were reached in 1913 and 1940 respectively. And in fact, the whole Russian tradition, since Peter the Great and through Stalin, has been to import the technology of the West with the aim of strengthening the military, despotic and

general anti-Western system of rule. In present circumstances, moreover, an even greater absurdity arises. The Russian economy needs Western grain and other products precisely because it is enormously distorted in favour of the war industries—supporting a bigger defence effort than that of the United States with about half the gross national product. With a reasonable allocation of resources, Russia could master her own economic problems. As it is, Western imports are merely a form of subsidizing the weaponry massed against us. And this is to say nothing of the sale on the cheap of, for example, recent computer advances—that is, of making the

results of Western research and development available to the Soviet Ministry of Defence.

At Helsinki, the Russians were granted a fair margin of arms superiority over the United States. It was then held that American superiority in technique would compensate. More recent Soviet (Western-assisted) arms development has, for the time being at least, made nonsense of this. Nor can the huge lead in conventional weapons deployed in Europe be taken as particularly sweet fruit of the detente.

And then, of course, there is the Chinese issue. To put it mildly, there has been no detente on that long Asian

frontier. Yet detente is (as we were told peace was) indivisible. If the Soviet Union were really able to negotiate a disengagement, however temporary, in the West, and gain a free hand for dealing with China, one can only say that any such easing of the pressures on our flank would be about as much of a contribution to peace as the Nazi-Soviet pact.

Meanwhile, it is worth noting that almost all serious students of the Soviet Union, together with most observers of and participants in the international scene, are in general agreement with Senator Jackson's position. A detente in the sense of a truce may be achieved with a state which refuses to enter into the

normal comity of nations, maintains an armed might far in excess of its true economic capacity, and continues to inflame its population against all non-Soviet systems and ideas. But such a truce cannot in any way be thought of as reliable—particularly if the Russians are encouraged to use it to modernize and re-equip themselves, while making no concessions in exchange. A true detente must involve at least a lesser degree of intolerance towards the movement of people and ideas. Only in that direction are there any serious prospects of a really lasting peace.

Robert Conquest

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
25 June 1974

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Lovestone retiring from key position

End of an era for U.S. labor

By Ed Townsend
Labor correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

New York

An important and controversial era in American labor is ending.

Jay Lovestone, director of the AFL-CIO's International Department and the "gray eminence" of the federation's strong anti-Communist foreign policy, is retiring June 30.

There is general agreement among observers that not many in American labor have been as broadly influential at home and abroad in shaping not only union philosophies, but also wartime and postwar social and political structures.

Mr. Lovestone has been one of a small group of AFL-CIO "cloak and dagger" operatives — more out in the open now — who were highly effective in plots and counterplots throughout the world to oppose Communist global aspirations to infiltrate labor movements.

Meany still boss

But despite Mr. Lovestone's retirement, the AFL-CIO's international position will remain the same for some time to come, observers say. For no matter who holds the labor body's top international affairs post, it is George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, who is the final arbiter of policies — and there is not a more hard-line, implacable anti-Communist in U.S. labor.

"Labor and the free world owe him [Mr. Lovestone] a deep debt of gratitude," said Mr. Meany recently of his friend and long-time adviser. Then recognizing Mr. Lovestone's controversial position, he noted that his foreign policy aide also has long been

"the target of all who would pervert democracy and destroy democratic institutions."

Many in AFL-CIO share in varying degrees Mr. Meany's regard for Mr. Lovestone, onetime U.S. Communist leader who renounced communism to become a dedicated and highly effective foe of its ideology and tactics not only in the U.S. but throughout the free world.

Mr. Lovestone is still denounced regularly in the U.S. Communist press and by extreme leftists as a traitor and a "fascist." Those in labor who favor more flexibility in relations with unions abroad, often criticize him as too rigid in his beliefs and too responsive to old ideological positions.

Party founder in 1916

Mr. Lovestone helped organize the American Communist Party in 1916 and became its general secretary in the late 1920's, until he broke with Russian communism and was purged from the party by Joseph Stalin. A pragmatist, he had protested orders from Moscow to implement a worker and farmer action program during the depression as impractical. He then reorganized the Communist Party, U.S.A., along lines he and other American leaders considered best suited for the country and its workers.

At the same time, in the 1930's, he futilely sought to develop a strong backing for communism within rapidly expanding American unions — at one time with a particular emphasis on the struggling, young United Auto Workers. But in a dramatic philosophical reversal in the late 1930's, Mr. Lovestone renounced communism and became an effective

antagonist. He first began working with the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union in 1943, then later became active with the old AFL and later the AFL-CIO.

Significantly, Mr. Lovestone was decorated for his activities in Europe by former West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

The AFL-CIO staff official helped form the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and to maintain it for years as a counter to Communist unionism.

Although known particularly for foreign affairs, he also was a trusted aide to Mr. Meany in domestic and union matters. He was an intermediary — unsuccessful — between Mr. Meany, then secretary-treasurer of the old AFL, and John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers during efforts in the mid-1930's to avoid the industrial unions breakaway that led to formation of the CIO.

After World War II, he worked strenuously to shore up Europe's democratic unions and governments — with AFL-CIO's funds reportedly supplemented by a still-unconfirmed \$2 million a year from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. A former top aide of Allen Dulles, then Director of the CIA, is a source for reports that Mr. Lovestone's vastly informed labor intelligence operation was used to funnel CIA funds to groups fighting to strengthen democracy in Europe.

Mr. Lovestone is to be succeeded by Ernest S. Lee, his assistant since 1964 and Mr. Meany's son-in-law. A graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and onetime Marine Corps major, Mr. Lee's views usually are parallel to those of Mr. Lovestone — and of Mr. Meany — but they are less scarred by decades of ideological infighting.

WASHINGTON POST
21 JUN 1974

Food Supply 'Intelligence' Group Urged

By Nancy L. Ross

Washington Post Staff Writer

Two former presidential candidates and a former presidential economic adviser yesterday urged creation of an agricultural "intelligence" system to help alleviate the world food crisis.

On the second day of hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Sens. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) and George McGovern (D-S.D.) and Arthur Okun, who headed President Johnson's Council of Economic Advisers, said advance knowledge of countries

political attitudes on food-stuffs can help prevent problems such as those caused by the 1972 Soviet grain deal. "We have to know if it's a one- or a two-alarm fire," said Okun.

Agricultural intelligence would go beyond harvest estimates and food demands projected from expected population increases. It would seek, for example, to anticipate whether a country would tighten its belt during a time of shortage or import large quantities of food, and

whether it would store or export surpluses.

Humphrey deplored the fact that, despite an agreement with Moscow signed a year ago, the U.S. is still not receiving information on Soviet agricultural priorities. He said he had asked President Nixon to do something about it during his Moscow visit next week.

McGovern said: "If the Soviet Union is going to come and ask us for a substantial part of our crop, it should keep the international community advised of its grain priorities. And we should keep them advised of the availability of food here."

Ray A. Goldberg, professor of agriculture at Harvard School of Business Administration, urged that agricultural intelligence be U.S. policy at the world food confer-

ence in Rome next November. "Right now we have 60 different food prices and policies; there are extemporaneous changes in production and consumption. We can't read the minds of the leaders."

Goldberg was chairman of a panel on nutrition and food availability.

The committee also suggested establishment of international futures markets, especially in developing countries, so that producers would be able to make their plans free of the burden of having their creditors determining the market prices of their crops.

Other proposals were for development of new food technologies, new sources of protein, aquaculture ("farming" the waters and seas), and centralized kitchens to cut down labor costs in school lunch programs.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
26 June 1974

A proposal to blacklist the Soviet Union as a violator of the convention abolishing slave labor was rejected by delegates to an International Labor Organization conference in Geneva. A conference committee voted last week to cite the Soviets, the first time in the ILO's 55-year history that a major power has been proposed for the "special list."

BALTIMORE SUN
25 June 1974

Ernest B. Furgurson

How Much is a Good Multitude Worth?

Washington.

The word among our traditional allies in Western Europe is that Mr. Nixon's scouts have been asking about the reception he might get if he visited there, too, during the weeks when his case is before Congress and the courts. But in Moscow he never needed to put out feelers to our traditional adversaries; Brezhnev sent him an eager message way back, making him welcome again. All of which brings up the question of whether foreign excursions whose domestic political uses are so blatant can possibly produce anything beneficial to the rest of us Americans.

That judgment cannot be based on the size and telegenic enthusiasm of the hordes trucked in to line the boulevards of Moscow. Minsk and wherever else the President travels, any more than an accurate assessment of his Middle Eastern trip can be taken from the White House's crowd estimates between Cairo and Alexandria.

Some may suspect I go too far in saying the cheering throngs will be trucked in. Unless the increased output of motor vehicles in the Soviet Union allows

them now to be bused in instead, that is exactly what happens.

Many times while awaiting the arrival of one or another great man at the Moscow or Sofia or East Berlin airport or train station, I have come early enough to watch the spontaneous crowds being organized. This is not a procedure peculiar to Communist countries, as any Nixon advance man can tell you, but those countries are more skilled at it.

They already have each apartment house, block, assembly line and factory organized, with leaders assigned right down to squad level. So on a special occasion, when the order is issued that the workers of Red Banner Synthetic Fiber Factory No. 12 in the name of Vladimir Ilyich will have a holiday from work, and that they will show up at their assembly point at 8 A.M. sharp, dressed in their proletarian best, they show up.

Their group leaders check them off like a marine sergeant preparing his troops for Saturday morning inspection. They board their trucks and when they arrive at the airport or their designated spot along the motorcade route they are issued tiny flags of the visiting dignitary's

country, to wave for him and the cameras as he passes by. And then they wait several hours, do their jobs, and the press reports that the visitor got an overwhelming reception that bodes well for the important economic and military negotiations that are to follow.

In 1972, the scale of the precisely controlled Moscow reception for Mr. Nixon surprised many students of East-West atmospherics. The agreements reached and communiqués issued as the President departed were not of earth-shaking moment. But things have become clearer in retrospect, since for example the giant grain deal of that fall, after which the prices of groceries for American consumers have never been the same.

Even as he departs on the current trip, Dr. Kissinger is having to deny that he made a special side agreement on the previous one, allowing the Russians more nuclear missiles aboard submarines than was stated in the formal SALT communiqués signed two years ago.

Should this smack of cynicism from one exposed too long to what is happening in Washington, consider the view of a west-

ern European specialist in these affairs, Pierre Hassner of the Centre d'Etudes des Relations Internationales in Paris, writing in Potomac Associates' new book, "A Nation Observed":

"If one judges the grain deal or other economic agreements with the Soviet Union as political bargains, one may wonder whether the value of Soviet concessions was not limited to face-saving for the Nixon administration in circumstances that it had unnecessarily brought upon itself, and whether the administration's heralded diplomatic successes have not led primarily to a discreet but steady increase in the power of the Soviet Union. As an Albanian newspaper put it, Moscow might be able to have its civilian economy financed by the West and thus be in a position to concentrate more heavily on military development."

Which is not necessarily to discount in advance any agreements formalized in Moscow this week. It is, however, to remind that all the quid pro quo will not be typed out in the communiqués. The most substantive thing Mr. Nixon gets may well be the crowds turned out for the American cameras accompanying him.

WASHINGTON POST
25 June 1974

George F. Will

The Proliferation of Plutonium

More than by a scarcity of food or energy or clean air or living space, civilization is threatened by an exotic surplus. It is threatened by the proliferation of plutonium.

Bear this in mind as the government, floundering along miles behind events, debates the wisdom of giving Egypt a nuclear reactor. The problem is a lot bigger than that reactor.

Plutonium is the crucial—the explosive—component in nuclear weapons. It is a man-made element. Slightly more than three decades ago all the world's plutonium was in a cigar box in a U.S. laboratory.

But the rapid growth of the nuclear power industry, which is just beginning, will produce a terrifying amount of plutonium. Plutonium is a by-product of the fissioning of the fuel (enriched uranium) in the nuclear reactors that are used increasingly to generate electricity.

The process of enriching uranium is still very complex, secret, and expensive. But most nations can build (and, if necessary, conceal) a reprocessing plant for extracting plutonium from used reactor fuel.

And a determined group or nation can get plutonium even if it has neither a reactor nor a reprocessing plant. It can steal it.

Once one has weapons-grade plutonium, construction of a bomb is a manageable task for a few competent physicists. If they need some tips they can send \$4 to the U.S. Commerce Department for a book (declassified in 1961) that describes the technical problems

involved in building the first atomic bombs.

The cover of the book says the government does not assume "any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of, any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report."

(Cultural note: People were outraged in the mid-1960s when the cover of the New York Review of Books contained a sketch showing how to construct a Molotov cocktail.)

Looking ahead to the proliferation of electricity-generating reactors in the U.S., an expert says:

Private companies will soon own more plutonium than exists in all the bombs of NATO. With the predictable growth and expansion of the nuclear industry, power companies will make a cumulative total of 10 million kilograms of plutonium within the last quarter of the twentieth century. . . . Enough plutonium to make a weapon could be carried in a paper bag.

A small group of determined persons could steal that much from private industry here or from public or private installations abroad. Indeed, that already may have happened. We can not know for sure.

We protect plutonium no more rigorously than we protect currency. And keeping track of plutonium as it is processed and used involves a significant margin of inaccuracy.

This is called MUF—material unaccounted for. Today, skillful pilfering of

weapons-building amounts of plutonium MUF could go undetected here and around the world.

Nations or groups that do not have the patience for embezzling plutonium might try instead a bolder form of stealing, such as hijacking. By the end of this century a million kilograms of plutonium will be shipped annually by planes, trains, ships, and trucks between thousands of nuclear plants in more than 50 countries.

Brazil and Libya, perhaps with the help of India or France, soon may join the nuclear weapons club, which soon may be the least exclusive club in the world. According to some sober physicists, most nations could join.

It is possible that, say, Uganda could "go nuclear" in a few years. Getting the necessary physicists would be harder (but not all that much harder) than getting the necessary plutonium.

Imagine how stimulating life will be when a blithe spirit like Uganda's General Amin adds the tang of nuclear blackmail to his already frolicsome politics. But that thought, gruesome though it is, is not the grimmest thought one must consider.

The other day a terrorist bomb made a mess of Westminster Hall in London. It may not be long before the more sophisticated terrorist organizations will have bombs that can make a crater out of central London—or any other city.

Imagine the Irish Republic Army or El Fatah as a nuclear power. Someone once described the Nazis as "Neanderthals in airplanes." Neanderthals with nuclear weapons may be the ultimate 20th-century terror.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
15 June 1974

French bombs Germany-bound?

From JAMES MacMANUS, Paris, June 14

THE French nuclear strike force is directed against Germany and not Russia, according to a version of a lunchtime conversation between the late President Pompidou and the recently dismissed Reform Minister, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber.

In an interview with the German magazine Die Welt, M. Servan-Schreiber disclosed that in 1968 President Pompidou, then Prime Minister under General de Gaulle, told him the true target of the French Force de Frappe. Seeing his guest's astonishment at the suggestion, M. Pompidou went on: "But

what do you expect? In ten years the Germans will be so strong economically that they will demand the bomb. What would France do if she was deprived of it?"

M. Servan-Schreiber did not record his answer to the question which, however, did little to dampen his campaign against the French nuclear weaponry.

There is naturally enough no information about the scheduled destination of the missiles in the 18 silos near Marseilles or the atomic bombs carried by the 36

Mirage fighters which are split into four squadrons around France.

The French President, who shares the secret with a handful of senior Ministers and military officials, reviews the targets every year. The missiles have to be given definite targets, and, once given, the targets cannot easily be changed since the missile's computer system has to be fed with fresh information to gear it to a new target.

It would be ironic if the missiles on the bleak Plateau d'Albion, in the South of

France, do carry the names of German cities. For in the early 'sixties General de Gaulle expended considerable diplomatic effort urging Chancellor Adenauer to partake in a jointly manned Franco-German nuclear bomber.

The idea was to lure the Germans from under the American nuclear umbrella and strike, so the General thought, a deadly blow at the Americans' domination of Europe. The Chancellor clearly did not trust the French and their fledgling bomb and Germany remained firmly under American shelter.

BALTIMORE SUN
23 June 1974

SLA and its dogma: The Brazil connection

By HARRY SYLVESTER

Washington.

Virtually all significant revolutionary movements have their rubric. What is known about the young people who gathered to form the Symbionese Liberation Army indicates that they were drawn to the writings of Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Regis Debray and Carlos Marighela.

Almost everyone knows something about Guevara and Debray, both of them distinguished for their romanticism, their impracticality and their long histories of failure—while Marighela is known mainly to professionals on both sides of the law, and was respected and feared by them. Marighela, who knew more about the political use of violence than Guevara and Debray together, died in a police stakeout on a November night in 1969 in Brazil's giant industrial city of Sao Paulo. He was 58 years old and had been an effective terrorist for about 40 years.

That the SLA has lasted as long as it has, and had at least some success according to its standards, may be a tribute to Marighela. Unlike Guevara or Debray, Marighela was orderly, reasoned in his dictums, psychologically sound in judgments and, paradoxically enough, prudent. In his "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," he gives detailed instructions for effective terrorism, supports these with surprising insights, and delineates which social categories are most effective for such activity. ("Students are noted for being politically crude and coarse and thus they break all the taboos . . . Churchmen . . . represent a sector that has special ability to communicate with the people, particularly with workers, peasants, and the Brazilian women." His strictures on students appear to apply to some SLA mistakes.

Long before the kidnaping of Patricia Hearst, Marighela wrote: "The kidnap-

Mr. Sylvester is a Washington-based journalist and former specialist on Latin America with the State Department and the United States Information Agency.

ing of personalities who are known artists, or are outstanding in some other field, but who have evidenced no political interest, can be a useful form of propaganda . . . provided it occurs under special circumstances, and the kidnaping is handled so that the public sympathizes with it and accepts it." With the same sophistication Marighela lists the seven deadly sins of the urban guerrilla, including in them vanity, boastfulness and impatience.

Marighela appears to have written his instructions over a 20-year period, but did not bring them together into the Minimanual, written in his native Portuguese, until June, 1969. Five months later he was dead. Not surprisingly his death gave impetus to the spread of the manual. As a memorial of sorts, the Havana-based Organization of Solidarity of The Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America reprinted the manual in a 1970 issue of its magazine *Tricontinental*. Typed copies of the English-language version found their way to the United States and became required reading among the Weatherman and similar groups. It is known that some members of the SLA read it before that group was organized.

Some of these might be called intellectuals and Marighela lists the special virtues of intellectuals for terrorism just as he does those of the clergy and the military. But he knew most terrorists are not of great intellectual capacity and accordingly reduced some of his formulas for violence to acronyms that could be easily recalled. (Whether SLA represents this is anyone's guess.)

There appears to be a lack of an ideology among urban guerrillas, including the SLA. Political anarchism is not incompatible with their activity and it appears both they and the SLA slipped into this much as did Marighela himself—out of internal and personal reasons rather than for external political ones. For years Marighela was a leader in the orthodox Brazilian Communist party (PCB). When the Moscow line changed in 1962 to one of "peaceful coexistence," the Brazilian party split, with leaders such as Mauricio Grabois and Joao Amazonas forming the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (using the same initials as the orthodox party). Four years later a wave of terrorist activity,

uncharacteristic for Brazilians, began. It appears to have been directed by the splinter group although Marighela did not leave the orthodox party openly until 1967. The time was a confused one following the overthrow of the left-wing Goulart government in 1964, and rightist groups and student ones were also engaged in terrorism.

The rigid political stance of the Brazilian splinter party had not attracted many followers. Its ideological differences with the orthodox one could be reduced to whether violence should be stopped, as Moscow directed, or continued within the Brazilian context. The latter course suited the temperament of some of the dissident leaders. The operational document of the group became Marighela's manual or rather its components before these were compiled into book form. Kidnapings were far less common then than now, but killings by gunfire—some political, some apparently at random—bank holdups to fund terrorist activity, sabotage and abortive attempts to subvert the military all could be traced in time to Marighela's systematic direction.

Yet within the historic context, the violence of that time appears mindless at best. That violence has been a major factor in the acceptance of most Brazilians of a succession of military governments as something to be feared less than the terrorists. It also widened the split with Moscow, so that the dissidents found they had to turn to China and Cuba in hope of logistical and moral support. Both Mao and Castro, by what seems more than coincidence, had manifested an anarchic bent at some time in their careers. (Castro proclaimed his allegiance to anarchy early, in my belief, when he chose the traditional red and black anarchist colors as those of his 26th of July Movement.)

It is this anarchic violence, rationalized as a form of protest, that the SLA appears to have inherited from Marighela, however, unconsciously on their part and unintentionally on his. He disliked what he called "the penetration and domination of United States imperialism in our country," but it is most unlikely that he thought of his manual as figuring in an assault on the social fabric of the United States.

Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
17 June 1974

Nor Iron Bars a Cage

By Grace Paley

While in Moscow as members of a delegation to the World Peace Congress, the Rev. Paul Mayer and I were fortunate to be able to speak to a few Russian dissidents and were surprised by their ignorance of American political and economic life. They simply didn't know. Some wanted never to know. (Perhaps they thought if heaven doesn't exist, how are they to get out of hell?) Others like the Galiches and Sakharovs kindly listened to our views and extended their courage with new sadness.

Certainly in his last couple of addresses to, or interviews with, Western reporters, the views of Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn seem opinionated and uninformed. A couple of other statements by Andrei D. Sakharov are more responsive to the painful concerns of Western radicals, and are humane and attentive—though both men and their families have suffered similar persecutions.

The Soviet Government, which tries to keep news of American ease, affluence and electoral politics from all Russian citizens, has prevented Russian dissidents at least from believing the information about American internal fear and American methods of exporting terror with cash.

The Russian dissidents' families know from personal experience that the Soviet Union maintains prison camps, but they have not wanted to know, as Americans do not want to know, that the United States apart from its large penal system forces thousands of young Americans to live in exile in Canada and Sweden, keeps most of its prisoners in other parts of the world and has trained an élite police for South America in techniques sometimes called counterinsurgent but basically antidissident.

Every morning's paper brings news about that worldwide community of wardens and silencers. For instance, several weeks ago, I read the following three stories:

On Page 1, that fearful knock on the door was described—the one that preceded the forcible removal of Mr. Solzhenitsyn from his home and family. On Page 18, there was an article about the reinvestigation of a case in which two Americans were murdered

in their beds by Chicago policemen who didn't knock but shot 82 to 99 rounds of bullets into the room, thereby removing them forcibly from life itself. Then on Page 11, a two-inch story: 130 political prisoners of the South Vietnamese had been freed.

The Russian, as we all know, is a world-famous writer, a brave man, now in exile from his country and his language. This can be terrible for a writer, worse sometimes than prison among one's own people. He will live in free exile; he can't help but remember the thousands of political prisoners in Soviet prison camps.

The dead Americans were Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, two Black Panthers. They were fingered by their own security chief, a Federal Bureau of Investigation informer who had stocked and maintained the Panther arsenal. The grand jury thought the dead men were in the wrong. The police were acquitted. Family action and citizen concern have reopened the case.

The 130 Vietnamese were the first part of a group of 256 whose release and exchange had been planned; 100,000 to 200,000 others, nearly forgotten, remain in cages and prison camps paid for by the United States, guarded by police whose money comes from the United States. They are in effect prisoners of the United States.

Although these Vietnamese, the black Americans and the Russians have had an ideological and exemplary importance throughout the world, they've all been powerless to live free lives in their own countries. Some of us have asked: How can there not be understanding among all these people whose door the state has knocked on in rage, or broken open without knocking, shooting bullets?

As they emigrate toward our West, writing articles and giving interviews, the Russian dissidents must begin to include the pain of these other dissents, imprisonments, oppressions with their own. If they are unable to do this, they will have exchanged the condition of prisoner for the status of warden; they will have escaped the persecutions of one huge armored state for protection and employment in another.

Grace Paley, short-story writer, is author of "Enormous Changes at the Last Minute."

NEW YORK TIMES
17 June 1974

Art And Politics

By Anthony Lewis

LONDON, June 16—Lenin liked Beethoven piano music, especially the Appassionata Sonata. He told Maxim Gorky that it made him think "what marvelous things human beings can do." But then he added: "I can't listen to music too often. It affects your nerves, makes you want to say stupid nice things and stroke the heads of people who could create such beauty while living in this vile hell. And now you mustn't stroke anyone's head—you might get your hand bitten off. You have to hit them on the head without any mercy...."

Those words are brought to life in a remarkable play by Tom Stoppard, "Travesties," that has just opened in London. It is a play about, among many other things, attitudes toward art. In the character of Lenin, using his actual words, Stoppard traces how the idea of artistic and intellectual freedom becomes corrupted in the totalitarian mind to that of art as the servant of the state—and of artists as expendable "snivellers" and "whiners."

Soviet attitudes toward art and freedom are a subject much on the mind of London just now. The Bolshoi Ballet, here on a visit, opened with a lifeless production of "Swan Lake": vulgar, mechanical down to the obligatory Soviet happy ending, with an Odette who was only an imitation swan, not a bewitched girl suffering human emotions. It was a reminder of what fifty years of Leninism have done to Russian artistic creativity.

The Bolshoi visit is the occasion for debate here about what we in the West can do to help the victims of Soviet repression. Outside the theater, demonstrators protest the treatment of Soviet Jews. Many in official and artistic circles sympathize with the protesters. Others think it is wrong to annoy the Bolshoi troupe and argue that private representations work better than public protest.

In this instance there is convincing evidence for the first view, for public pressure on behalf of the oppressed. For it would have been very difficult

LONDON

to go on with the Bolshoi season at all if the Soviet authorities had not, just before the opening, relented in their two-year torment of Valery and Galina Panov and let those two dancers go to Israel.

It is always hard to know exactly what moved the U.S.S.R. off some course. In the case of the Panovs, were made —

Henry Kissinger took the case up with the Soviets last year. But there is reason to think that the intensity of the public campaign on their behalf had become a real embarrassment — especially in this country, threatening disruption of the Bolshoi, a Soviet prestige symbol.

Some of the great names in British theater and music and dance wrote to The Times of London about the Panovs just before the Bolshoi opening: Lord Olivier, Sir Frederick Ashton, Raymond Leppard, Dame Marie Rambert, Dame Peggy Ashcroft, Sir John Gielgud, Harold Pinter among others. Lord Harewood, head of the National Opera and a cousin of the Queen, spoke with the Soviet Ambassador and Prime Minister Wilson wrote to Soviet Premier Kosygin, a private letter at first, then made public.

Is it an absurdly anachronistic idea, that the expression of freedom's ideals can help the victims of tyranny? For individuals, that seems to me an easy

question. The relatively few of us who live in freedom, and it is few, have no choice but to try to help—each in his own way, however feeble it may appear. Opinion just could matter: A letter, a raised voice, a political gesture.

For governments the question is harder: They simply must treat with regimes of which they disapprove. President Nixon was plainly right, at Annapolis the other week, when he said that détente will have its value if it lessens the chance of war between nations without affecting ideologies.

The danger is that in seeking political arrangements with authoritarian powers, democratic governments will seem to condone their cruelties. That is no abstraction when it comes to the Soviet Union. Those in the U.S.S.R. who suffer for their beliefs or their religion deeply fear that the Nixon-Brezhnev variety of détente will add legitimacy to the tyranny.

The fact is, for example, that Moscow has been cutting Jewish emigration—from an average of 3,000 a month last

year to about 1,225 now—and has been intensifying the harassment of those who dare to apply. If that trend continues after the Nixon visit, the United States will have made it that much more politically respectable.

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, of Columbia University has said that we used to think of détente as bringing "an increasing sense of shared ideals, with many in the Communist countries looking to us for inspiration. Détente today, instead, is a conservative balance-of-power arrangement, devoid of any moral content."

Ideals: Yes, but we can only press them on others if we live them ourselves. We can hardly expect Mr. Brezhnev to listen very seriously to talk about the rule of law from an American Government that commits burglaries and wiretaps its own officials. The answer to Lenin is that, in art and life, we are for the human spirit, not the state.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 June 1974

Boeing and Soviet Union may conclude world's largest contract for aircraft

By Paul Wohl
Written for

The Christian Science Monitor

Tass announced recently in seven lines what may turn out to be the biggest commercial deal in the history of air transport.

According to Tass, a "cooperation agreement" has been signed with Boeing covering the design and development of a new passenger aircraft and possible construction of a Boeing plant in the Soviet Union.

The agreement also covers helicopter development, and may therefore involve at least one of the major United States "chopper" manufacturers.

The outcome of the agreement may be production of the first wide-bodied aircraft in the U.S.S.R. based on Boeing design, "which will probably prove to be a Soviet version of the American 747 Jumbo Jet," writes English economist Richard Rockingham Gill, retired from Radio Free Europe, in his latest news letter.

Whether or not a Boeing factory will be built in Russia, this would be a transaction as spectacular as the big oil and gas projects sponsored last year. Moscow's cooperation agreement with Boeing is certain to come up in President Nixon's talks next week with the Soviet leaders.

Nothing similar to 747

The Soviets lack anything similar to the American 747. Their only plane of a comparable class is the Antonov-22 air bus and freighter which was in series production before the Boeing 747, but the latter is more modern in design.

Series production of the ANT-2 cannot have been very satisfactory

because last year the Soviet Air Force had only 15 of the mammoth aircraft.

The Soviets have another very large supersonic plane, the Tupolev-144, but of these only four carry out route-proving mail flights inside the country. One TU-144 crashed disastrously at the Paris air show last year. The plane's structural flaws are said to have been corrected, but its economics are still open to doubt. The target date for passenger service by the TU-144 now is 1975.

Another Soviet-built and designed wide-bodied aircraft, the Ilyushin-86 is not yet in service; it has only half the maximum payload and less than half the maximum range of the Boeing 747, of which more than 200 are flying all over the world.

Tests set for 1975

The IL-86 is scheduled to be ready for test flying next year. Another Ilyushin plane, the IL-62 was kept on test flights for more than four years and reached the air routes only in 1967. Judging by this precedent, the IL-86 may be ready for work in 1979.

This shows how important it would be for the U.S.S.R. to secure a plane of the type of the Boeing-747 which could be delivered at much the same time, if built under license. Aeroflot, the Soviet air line, would be the gainer in view of the Boeing's superior performance and proven design.

In the short term, the sale of Boeing's 747 to Aeroflot would be an economic advantage for the United States.

The advantage in the long range is not certain. If Aeroflot starts to operate planes of this type on its extensive international routes, which are believed to be the longest in the

world, this would cut into United States earnings from international air transportation, an important factor in the U.S. balance of payments.

There also are political doubts about the wisdom of supplying big turbofan technology to the U.S.S.R.

Engine question arises

Should the cooperation agreement announced by Tass lead to a deal, the question of the engine contracts comes up because Soviet engine designers have been notoriously poor on fuel consumption. The engine contracts also may go to the West, says Mr. Gill. The most likely prospects would seem to be Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney.

The latter firm, reports Mr. Gill, "already has sewn up part of the Chinese market by making the engines for the Boeing 707 which were sold to Peking, and so have Rolls-Royce by building the Spey engines for Chinese Tridents."

"If the Russians select either Pratt & Whitney or Rolls-Royce engines, the company concerned will have pulled off the once improbable feat of selling to the U.S.S.R., to China, and the United States, truly a multinational performance."

These are conjectures, of course, but the wording and timing of the Tass communique about Aeroflot's cooperation agreement with Boeing, covering the design and development of a new passenger aircraft and the possible construction of a Boeing plant in the U.S.S.R., undoubtedly were carefully planned.

The Soviets may hope that by announcing the deal shortly before President Nixon's visit, it may come off in the wave of bonhomie and trade enthusiasm which is likely to result.

Western Europe

NEW YORK TIMES

14 JUN 1974

The Land of the Free

By Tom Wicker

LISBON—While planning the coup that overthrew Portugal's 48-year-old dictatorship on April 25, the young army officers primarily responsible had no intention of letting the United States have the faintest inkling of what was afoot. They were convinced that if the Central Intelligence Agency knew a coup was even being talked of, the agency would promptly inform the D.G.S., Portugal's secret police, with which the C.I.A. had close and cordial ties.

Yet, in Spain, which now eyes free Portugal both uneasily and hopefully—according to one's political outlook—across their common border, a long-experienced former diplomat recently delivered himself of the opinion that the United States must have given its approval in advance for the Portuguese coup. Otherwise, he said confidently, the United States never would have permitted the dictatorial Caetano regime to be overthrown.

There was a lesson in that for Spain, he continued. If there was to be genuine change toward a democratic regime after the death of Francisco Franco, or movement toward such a regime before Franco's death, the United States would have to be convinced that such a development in Spain was in the best American interest. Washington simply would not permit democracy in Spain unless that point was made in advance.

A younger Spaniard, deeply involved in clandestine activities for a more democratic regime, took a darker view. Citing what "everybody knows," that the C.I.A. had over-

thrown the Allende Government in Chile, he remarked gloomily that the United States probably would never allow Spain to have democracy.

This kind of thing is deeply disturbing, even shocking, to an American who would like to think of his country as the champion of democracy and freedom everywhere.

The point is not whether the C.I.A. really did overthrow Allende, or whether the agency would in fact have betrayed the Portuguese coup to the D.G.S.; and explanations that the United States ought logically to welcome more democratic regimes in both Spain and Portugal, since that would ease the domestic political burden of alliances with these countries, do not alter the case. The fact is that many people abroad believe the United States is the enemy of freedom, and that it uses the C.I.A. relentlessly and efficiently to oppose democratic movements everywhere.

It is a sort of instant or ready-made paranoia. When the American Ambassador to Portugal, Stuart N. Scott, paid the first diplomatic call on Gen. António de Spínola after the coup in Lisbon, and again paid the first call on the general after he was named Provisional President, the United States did not get all the expected credit for welcoming the advent of democracy in Portugal. Instead, Communists and others spread the word to willing listeners that the calls had been to protest the coup; and this was widely believed.

To a great extent, the United States has no one to blame but itself for this state of affairs. The wheel has come full circle from the kind of American

thinking that, in the fifties and sixties, suspected a Communist plot behind every political development in the world. From the Iran of Mossadegh twenty years ago to the Chile of Allende in 1973, there have been ample facts and plausible reports of C.I.A. involvement in the overthrow of governments and the propping up of dictators—all augmented by the implacable set of American policy in Southeast Asia for the last fifteen years—to account for the world's paranoia.

Just recently, Mario Soares, Portugal's animated new Foreign Minister, was telling funny stories about his fruitless efforts, as leader of the outlawed Socialist party during the Salazar and Caetano regimes, to make some kind of contact with the American State Department. "Never got higher than a third secretary," he recalled. When one young American Foreign Service officer made an engagement for dinner with Mr. Soares's family in Lisbon a few years ago, the American had to call and report with embarrassment that the American Ambassador of the day had forbidden him to keep the date.

So when Mr. Soares became Foreign Minister a few weeks ago, he did not even try to approach the State Department directly; he asked his friends, Harold Wilson of Britain and Willy Brandt of West Germany, to put him in touch. They did, and no doubt Mr. Soares will soon be getting red-carpet treatment in Washington; but he has not forgotten—and probably won't—the years when no one but third secretaries paid attention to him.

BALTIMORE SUN
26 June 1974

NATO leaders preoccupied with internal problems

By GILBERT A. LEWTHWAITE
Sun Staff Correspondent

Brussels — The smiles and congratulations to be exchanged between President Nixon and other NATO government leaders during the signing of the new Atlantic declaration here today mask the real worries of the alliance members.

President Nixon, escaping briefly from the woes of Watergate, is not alone in having serious preoccupations.

Most of the major leaders he will meet today at the official ceremony and in a series of bilateral get-togethers have more than the last 25 years or

the next 25 years of NATO on their minds.

Harold Wilson, the British Labor party leader, has suffered a series of parliamentary defeats over his government's nationalization plans, a left-wing revolt within his own party over the latest British nuclear test, and the dilemma

of when to call the next general election in an effort to increase his razor-edge plurality in Parliament.

Courtling the shah

President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France was too busy courting the shah of Iran,

ruler of one of the world's major energy exporting nations, to make the 40-minute flight here from Paris for the ceremony.

Instead he sent Jacques Chirac, his premier, who left a nation shocked by the news that the energy crisis has forced its two largest private car manufacturers to merge to combat cost increases and falling sales.

Helmut Schmidt, the West German chancellor, faces the problem of controlling the only major western European economy which has avoided a loss in its trade balance, and which is perhaps even showing a sur-

plus. His difficulty is to maintain the performance despite the difficulties of his neighbors. He has offered to help those who help themselves, and is now waiting to see on which deserving cases to act.

All this means that while the signing of the anniversary declaration will be the ceremonial highlight of President Nixon's stopover here en route to Moscow, the immediate economic and political problems will be at the kernel of the series of private discussions the NATO leaders are to hold.

But so complex are they, that it seems likely that the most that such brief encounters can do is foster the spirit of international cooperation that will be needed to enable the Atlantic alliance to solve its economic problems so that it can finance its defense

Near East

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 1974

A Case Study in Disillusion: U.S. Aid Effort

in India

By JOSEPH LELYVELD

Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI—If there is such a thing as a historic anticlimax, then one occurred here early this year when Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan conferred his blessing and that of the United States on an Indian national piety and aspiration known as "zero net aid."

By definition net aid is what is left over after repayments on aid debts. Zero net aid, therefore, is not zero aid but whatever it takes to keep up with the debt. In the Indian mind, however, it has come to stand broadly for self-reliance

This is the third in a series of articles on the United States in Southern Asia.

—the end of demeaning dependence* on foreign assistance that the donors persist in regarding as handouts.

That, Ambassador Moynihan said in a lecture, "seems to me very much in line with national interests and offers the base for a strong and viable relation with other countries such as the United States." He added: "We are pleased that India has reached a stage of development at which such a decision is possible and proud to have been of some help."

Period of Disengagement

The valedictory tone was not inappropriate, for if there was any country from which the United States had clearly disengaged at the end of a traumatic decade in Asia, it was India, and if there was any field, it was foreign aid.

Of all Western nations, only Italy spends a smaller fraction of gross national product on foreign aid than the United States. American aid accounted for nearly two-thirds of the assistance funneled to the poor nations before the major troop build-up in Vietnam: now it is barely one-third. On the fact of it, foreign aid seems a war casualty.

That more is involved than a Vietnam hangover is demonstrated by the long-standing disillusion among Indians, the major recipients of American development assistance.

The standard indictment of aid in Washington used to be that it failed to buy influence and gratitude. The Indians complained that aid was an attempt to buy influence and gratitude and, besides, that it saddled them with a monumental debt without appreciably relieving their huge burden of poverty.

Those very complaints became part of the American arguments against aid in general and aid to India in particular. Last year, after having failed to enact any aid appropriations for two consecutive sessions, Congress passed a bill that virtually wrote the Indian critique into American law. It said development assistance should be spent only on programs that "affect the lives of the majority of the people in the developing countries," especially those "that directly improve the lives of the poorest of their people."

The language was conspicuously more far-reaching than the appropriation. About 60 per cent of the economic assistance designated for Asia was reserved for what was euphemistically called "Indo-China postwar reconstruction." In the main it was for neither reconstruction nor development but for outright support of the Thieu Government in South Vietnam and the Lon Nol Government in Cambodia, plus that portion of Laos not under Pathet Lao control; only in Laos was it possible to imagine any immediate application for the term "postwar."

That left less than \$350-million in development assistance for the rest of Asia. India, whose millions of "poorest" outnumber those of any other country, had been known to get that much in a single year. Now, with an annual obligation to the United States of \$60-million on a hard-currency debt of \$3.4-billion, India stood an outside chance for \$75-million.

In fact, the fiscal year is ending without any new aid agreement. As far as the United States is concerned, zero net aid has virtually been achieved and minus zero is looming as a distinct possibility. "They are becoming self-reliant in spite of themselves," a Western development expert said.


The numbers tell only a bit of the story, but they are striking.

In 1963 the aid mission in India was bulging with 260 Americans and 98 Indians. An established part of the Delhi scene, the Americans were regular callers at boy ministries, where—appreciated or not—their advice carried weight, carried weight.

By the start of this year there were eight Americans and 75 Indians left to supervise the dwindling disbursements on loans made before American aid was suspended at the time of the war over Bangladesh in 1971. Only rarely did the Americans see the inside of an Indian office.

American aid was now half what hard-pressed Britain was

giving and even less than Canada's. If there had not been a debt rescheduling of \$30-million, it would have been possible to tally the numbers in such a way as to show that



The New York Times/June 25, 1974
U.S. also provided \$848-million in aid through the World Bank in 1964-73.

the dollars were actually flowing from India to the United States.

Aid figures are notoriously deceptive and, in fact, India had been receiving a substantial dollar inflow in a disguised form through the International Development Association, the easy-money side of the World Bank. The association, which has depended on the United for 40 per cent of its funds, more than doubled its loans to India to make up for the slump in American help.

In January, however, the House of Representatives voted down the latest "replenishment" of the Development Association. Whether it will be revived is still much in doubt. If it is not, there is a real possibility, even though a bilateral aid program is being resumed, that debt repayments in the next year or two will surpass the aid.

Years ago, in speeches neither side would care to remember now, American aid to India was portrayed as a noble effort to justify democracy in Asia. The climax would come when "the world's largest democracy"—words that seem to be repeated only in mockery now—was self-sustaining, economically and politically. Few onlookers would say that of the India of 1974.

For all the talk of self-reli-

ance, a combination of natural and man-made disasters—drought and economic mismanagement—has put India in worse circumstances than any she has experienced since the famine of 1966-67, when American development and food aid reached its highest level, \$877-million in one year.

There were 490 million Indians then, 90 million fewer than now. India, having fallen short of goals for fertilizer production in the last five-year plan by more than 80 per cent, was staggered when the oil crisis produced an international shortage of fertilizer. Now, inevitably, cutbacks in fertilizer and crude-oil imports darken the outlook for increased food output.

A failure of domestic procurement as much as lagging production will force India to spend precious hard currency this year not only on oil and fertilizer but, it is estimated, on three million tons of American wheat. That is self-reliance with a vengeance, but not what Indian planners had in mind when they defined the goal. In fact, according to estimates prepared by the World Bank, aid needs this year amount to a record \$1.4-billion.

The prospects for assistance at that level may have been blasted by another Indian gesture toward self-reliance—the explosion of a nuclear device beneath the Rajasthan Desert in May.

Reins Put In Other Hands

On the level of economic planning, the basic Indian criticism of foreign aid was that it allowed donors to define development priorities. Their priorities, it was said, were not India's, for the efforts that had relied on aid had left the mass poverty virtually untouched; it was even possible to argue that it had worsened.

And so—not just in India, but among development experts generally—the old assumption that a high economic growth rate was synonymous with development came under critical review. What was development, anyway? How was it to be measured? In tons of steel and kilowatt-hours of electric power? Or was there another index, involving income distribution, the spread of employment, literacy, protein in the diet?

"We should not speak of development as having taken place," a British economist, Paul P. Streeten, writes, "in circumstances where poverty has not, either directly or indirectly, been relieved."

The theme has been taken up by Robert S. McNamara in

his capacity as president of the World Bank. Sounding less like a banker and more like an evangelist with every speech, Mr. McNamara keeps returning to a single statistic—that 40 per cent of the two billion people in the so-called developing countries live in conditions of "absolute poverty."

As it happens, that figure was first used by an Indian economist to describe conditions in his own country, where more than 230 million people live on less than \$60 a year. On the basis of that calculation, India promised to make an attack on rural poverty the "main thrust" of her fifth plan and thereby fulfill a campaign pledge by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to abolish poverty.

When similar themes were written into American aid legislation, there was no hint that the proponents of the new look in aid were thinking of India. "For all the talk," an experienced Westerner in the aid business here commented, "concern about poor people is pretty far down the list of what determines aid policies." "There is no way an aid program here can reach the bottom 40 per cent," a hard-boiled American declared. "That's just McNamara and his Vietnam guilt complex."

An official at the Indian Finance Ministry seems to agree. "We can always take a bundle of money and say, 'Let's paint the stars and stripes on it,'" he said, "but it's really very hard to identify a specific bundle with a specific project." The point was that India needed dollars to buy fertilizer and oil, not advice.

Even in making the case for India's continued need, the official felt constrained to point out that word "aid" is a misnomer. It is an old Indian argument: that the terms of aid are so disadvantageous to the recipient country as to make any suggestion of philanthropy unseemly. "External capital inflow" would be a better name for it, the official said.

The splitting of hairs provides the key to the basic Indian attitude. Having declared that foreign assistance was an evil, India had now compromised her position to the extent of conceding that it might be a necessary evil. This wariness, American officials say, is hardly calculated to make aid to India a popular cause.

More Modest U.S. Stance

In any case, it is apparent that there is little disposition on the American side to offer unwanted advice or reverse a major program. The deeper irony of all is that the Americans have accepted the Indian criticisms of the old relationship.

"The United States was never in a position to run India," an American said. "We have become very much more modest."

For an American returning to New Delhi after an absence of four years, the real proof of an American disengagement there is not in the low aid level

for the shrunken mission but in the changed attitudes and perceptions.

In some ways the mission Ambassador Moynihan heads is a negative image of the one over which Chester Bowles presided throughout the Johnson Administration. In those days every Congressional vote on an aid bill was felt to have a crucial bearing on the future of Indian democracy and American interests in Asia. It was a basic premise that the United States had sound practical and moral reasons to be intimately involved in India's economic planning.

Indians tend to remember those days with mixed emotions—resentment over the pressures to which they were subjected tinged with nostalgia for the concern. Most American officials speak of the period with unalloyed horror.

"Who Cares?"

"We were masochists then," one said. A moment later, he asked abruptly: "Say India goes fascist. Who cares?"

It was an atypically harsh expression of a view held even by those who said they would feel a deep sense of loss if India's ramshackle democracy collapsed: that whatever the United States can do for India will be only of incidental value at best; that whatever sentiments and values the two nations share, the United States has few vital interests here.

Again, this is acceptance of an argument Indians have made: that India's future rests on her ability to marshal her own resources, clear up the cancerous mismanagement that afflicts her government and industry, and grapple with the problems of rural landlessness.

"The real government here is the large landlords," said an American who works for an international agency. "To say the Government lacks the will for a program of agrarian reform misses the point. It's the same as saying they lack the will for self-denial. The truth is they've got the will to do just the opposite."


In this view, the arguments for aid to India reduce themselves to the one that is most offensive to Indian pride—that the country is so desperately needy.

No Santa Claus Role

The countries that are most successful now in attracting American assistance have always assumed what the Indians have always said but never quite managed to believe—that the United States coolly calculates its interests.

The Indonesian Minister of Mines, Mohammad Sadli, said, "We don't entertain the idea that you come in here as Santa Clauses." The American aid program in Indonesia has risen to \$100-million a year during a period in which, coincidentally or not, American mining and oil companies have been making major investments. The program is the largest administered by the Agency for International Development outside Indochina, a striking reversal.

Ten years ago, when Sukarno was President, he called



States Embassy in Jakarta and shouted, "To hell with your aid!" Indonesia got \$8-million that year, while India was getting \$337-million, not counting food.

Despite the change now, the effort to focus development assistance on problems of rural poverty and social inequality has received strikingly mixed reviews in Indonesia, where poverty and inequality are smoldering political issues.

Until recently aid officials seeking programs to support what could conceivably be said to involve "the poorest of their people" found that the Government had not really been thinking along those lines at all. The aid agency scrapped plans to back a program for new power stations in west and central Java on the ground that only 5 per cent of Indonesians have access to electric power. Since electricity is for the privileged, it was reasoned, a power program should sustain itself by making them pay higher rates.

Paving Rural Roads

The agency also shelved plans to finance part of a four-lane trans-Java highway at a cost of almost \$1-million a mile; for the same money, it was calculated, 2,000 miles of deteriorating rural roads could be upgraded. Despite obvious risks of graft, labor-intensive rural public works were seen as another likely field for support.

"Equity is now a major consideration," an American official declared.

The United States was also planning to get back into malaria-eradication programs in Indonesia. To older officials this suggested the cyclical nature both of Asian problems and of fashions in aid. An American-backed antimalaria program in Indonesia nearly two decades ago reduced the number of malaria cases on Java and Bali to 40,000. The latest count was two million.

Some Indonesian leaders found the emphasis on social

equity suspect. Mr. Sadli quoted President Suharto as remarking: "This may be the new form of imperialism. If the West contributes only to small-scale grassroots projects, our plight may be somewhat alleviated but we will never grow."

For major capital projects, the Minister went on, the poor countries would be forced to turn to the commercial banks of the aid-giving countries and pay high interest rates.

The Indian left is already voicing the same suspicion. A political weekly called Frontier, which is influential among Calcutta's intellectuals, concluded: "Mr. McNamara is trying to prescribe a course which, while keeping up neo-colonial exploitation, will bring down the danger of revolution in the starved countryside of the third world."

An Advantage Discerned

An economist named Houdhayyan Chattopadhyay who shared this view said he saw one major advantage in the slump in aid. "In the past we could always excuse ourselves by blaming the foreigners for their bad advice," he explained in a conversation. "Now we know that only we are to blame for what is happening to this country."

The conversation was less abstract than the usual discussion of Asian poverty in an office, study or cocktail lounge, for Mr. Chattopadhyay's middle-class dwelling stands at the very edge of one of Calcutta's worst slums. Twenty yards away Moslem women were burning a fuel made of coal dust and cow dung to cook their one daily meal; the acrid smoke wafted into the economist's sitting room and settled.

Was he saying, he was asked, that the rich nations should stand aside in the hope that the ensuing upheaval would prove benign? The question seemed to deepen his gloom. Almost wistfully he spoke of the idealism he often found in young Americans he met—how rarely it shows up among young Indians he remarked—but he noted that so few of those Americans seemed to count India among their concerns.

He had long been convinced that American aid would never be a positive factor in India, but now he was beginning to get a feeling that India no longer figured in the American world view, and it made him uncomfortable.

It is a feeling a number of Indians and Americans here mention. In Mr. Chattopadhyay's case, it came when he read a collection of essays by radical American scholars called "America's Asia," which mentioned India only in passing. "Asia without India," he mused. "It's a funny kind of Asia."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
25 June 1974

A critic's view of U.S.-Arab relations

By a Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Cairo

The man who until a few months ago was the most influential journalist in the Arab world and the confidant of Egyptian presidents takes a critical view of President Nixon's recent visit to the Middle East and of U.S.-Arab rapprochement.

He is Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, until last February editor of the important Cairo newspaper, *Al-Ahram*. He was always close to the late President Nasser. (Some said he could explain Mr. Nasser's thoughts better than Mr. Nasser himself.) And initially he continued in a role close to the seat of power under Mr. Nasser's successor, President Sadat. But he fell out with Mr. Sadat early this year because he insisted on the right to differ with the government in the columns of his newspaper. Mr. Sadat then dismissed him from his editorial post, which he was able to do since all Egyptian newspapers are government-run.

Another round?

But he has not become in any sense and "unperson." He is not under any constraint. He continues to express admiration for Mr. Sadat and agreement with much of what he is doing for Egypt. But he speaks freely.

Rocking back and forth on a white garden chair in the middle of a spacious lawn on his farm deep in the Nile delta, he said: "I fear the worst. I wonder whether the Israelis can really learn the lessons of October 6 before there is another round. I think another round will be inevitable."

His argument was that the Israelis had learned to respect the Arab soldier and that the disengagement agreement became possible as a result. But he doubted that the Israelis had learned to respect the

Palestinian guerrilla fighters, the young men who are willing to sacrifice their lives in attacks on Israeli settlements.

Concessions impossible?

"While the Israelis might be ready to deal with Egypt," he said, "I doubt they can appreciate and are ready to deal with the new Palestinians."

Mr. Heykal did not think the Rabin Government in Israel would last long. "If a worse one — namely a more hard-line one came into office — I don't see where we can go in Geneva." He meant that he did not see how Israel could then make the concessions necessary for a settlement.

He observed that in his opinion the Palestinians have come a long way toward adopting a line that would make settlement possible, no longer insisting on a secular state in the entire area of the old Palestine, including Israel. They agreed at their national council meeting in Cairo earlier this month to accept formation of a Palestinian national authority on a liberated part of Palestine, namely the West Bank of the Jordan River.

Freedom of movement

Personally Mr. Heykal did not think this would work. In the end, he thought, there would have to be either a secular state or a return to the 1947 partition border.

The reasoning behind this view is that some arrangement is required by the Arab world to avoid a land barrier between Egypt and the rest of the eastern Arab world, or more generally between the Arabs in Asia and the Arabs in Africa. Contact could be established either according to the 1947 partition plan — which would bring a Palestinian Arab state to the banks of the Gulf of Aqaba — or a secular state through which there

would be freedom of movement.

Unless there is progress on one of these schemes, Mr. Heykal predicted, "We'll be dragged into a system of closed borders at best, or no-war, no-peace at worst."

On President Nixon, Mr. Heykal said: "I think he made a mistake coming here and talking so much about economic factors, promising us \$250 million. So what? A week ago Abu Dhabi, one of the smaller gulf oil producers, gave us \$1.2 billion, not as a loan but as a gift. The Saudis a little earlier gave us another \$200 million. We got \$150 million from Kuwait and \$80 million from Algeria. Money is not the problem in the Arab world. The Saudis this year will get \$19 billion of which they can absorb only a portion, even if they take all the American gadgets, including Phantom and defense systems."

Mr. Heykal thought it striking that whereas President Nixon in his speeches kept talking about economics, President Sadat kept responding in terms of the Palestinian political problem. "That was President Nixon's mistake," he said.

Great crowds

He thought Mr. Nixon did not understand that the great crowds that welcomed him meant not that the Arab world was asking him for economic aid but was receiving him on a political note — the demand for American support in solving the Palestinian problem.

"So here comes the tragedy of the thing," the former editor concluded, "the question whether Nixon can respond positively, given his problems at home. The Soviet Union may welcome a weak American president — but we would have preferred an Eisenhower."

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
21 June 1974

Suez on the red horizon

By DAVID FAIRHALL

Speculation that the Soviet Navy has been invited to join the Americans and British in clearing the Suez Canal has grown after reports that a

fleet of five Soviet minesweepers passed through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean yesterday. The ships then headed west with supporting vessels.

Their destination is unknown, but it could be the Jubal Strait in the Red Sea. The strait is believed mined—probably with Russian mines that the Soviet Navy would best know how to sweep—and will have to be declared safe before shipping can begin using the Suez route again.

It is also possible that another move by the Soviet Navy concerns a minesweeping operation. This move, under

scrutiny by Western intelligence services, is the passage of the helicopter cruiser *Lenin* through the Bosphorus and into the Mediterranean.

The *Lenin* carries two big helicopters. She, too, may be heading for the Red Sea to act as a kind of mother ship.

Egypt's invitation to the US Navy and the Royal Navy to clear mines and other explosives from the Canal was a major political coup for the West. The Soviet vessels may be positioning themselves to be on hand if their help is requested—or they may have received an undisclosed invitation.

Africa

AFRICA TALKS STYMIED

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

26 JUN 1974

IS PORTUGAL MARCHING BACKWARD?

By WILFRED BURCHETT

Guardian staff correspondent

Lisbon

Recent speeches by Gen. Spínola have poured icy waters on hopes for an early end to the African wars and urgently needed social reforms in Portugal itself.

The atmosphere in Lisbon by mid-June was that of a race for time between those who wanted to consolidate the gains made since the April 25 antifascist military coup and those who wanted to turn the clock back.

Activists among the leftist parties in the provisional government are working day and night to preserve the alliance between the people and the young officers of the Armed Forces Movement, and to demolish the fascist institutions before the right-wing backlash sets in. Top-ranking U.S. CIA officials, on the other hand, have been working to head off any decolonization moves that would affect U.S. bases and interests in Africa or the interests of the racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa and to bring about the sort of economic chaos which preceded the end of the Allende regime in Chile.

As an extra measure of "insurance," the multinational monopolies in Lisbon have had U.S. systems analysts prepare computer scenarios for all options necessary to head off workers' demands for structural reforms of the economy. Some of the young officers, meanwhile, are already muttering doubts as to their choice of Spínola as a leader and wondering whether they might not have to do it all over again.

Spínola's speech of June 11, in which he set forth his impossible neocolonialist plans for the African territories, only confirms that Foreign Minister Mario Soares' handshakes and embraces with the heads of the PAIGC and Frelimo delegations in London and Lusaka respectively had nothing to do with his negotiating position. The terms for settlement were the cold neocolonialist pattern chosen by Spínola. As revealed in the latter's June 11 speech, they are almost a replica of the absurd terms Washington offered at the beginning of the Paris talks on Vietnam. It took four and a half years of negotiations and some of the bloodiest fighting of the war to bring them to reason.

This is what Spínola is "offering" the liberation movements of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique.

—A ceasefire, equivalent to asking the resistance fighters to lay down their arms and disclose their whereabouts.

—Accelerated economic reconstruction. The same was offered by the U.S. government for Vietnam. But where is it?

—Political settlement after the ceasefire. What happened in Vietnam? Exactly as with the French in 1954, the U.S. in 1973 fulfilled that part of the military terms which suited it. The U.S. got its POWs back and its demoralized army safely home—and then repudiated the political clauses. Is anyone foolish enough to think that African freedom fighters

imperialists and colonialists honor their pledges?

—Broad democratic organizations, political freedoms, etc. Where have we heard this song before? The Vietnamese people have been waiting 18 years for those freedoms and elections promised them both in the 1954 agreements with the French and the 1973 agreements with the U.S.

ROLE OF THE CIA

Did the CIA agents bring this revamped draft of the Paris Agreement with them to Lisbon when they arrived in force a month after the coup?

The landing of mercenaries in Guinea-Bissau while negotiations were in progress is an exact parallel to the landing of CIA-armed and financed mercenaries—headed by CIA officers—in North Vietnam while the 1954 Geneva conference was going on. It is described in detail in the Pentagon Papers. Of course this maneuver has sabotaged the talks between Guinea-Bissau and Lisbon. After resuming briefly in Algiers June 13-14, they broke up in an angry mood without a resumption date.

It was not for this type of trickery that the captains carried out the April 25 coup. To understand how they felt about all this, I spent the better part of two evenings discussing with one of them how the men who made the coup saw their role. For reasons best known to themselves, the members of the Armed Forces Movement seem to have agreed to remain as anonymous as possible, especially with the press. The captain with whom I spoke consented to the discussion only on condition I not ask his name. He said only that he commanded an artillery unit and played an active role in the preparation and execution of the coup.

"You must understand," he said, "that there were several attempts in the past at military coups. But these were always headed by some officer who had his own ideas and hoped for mass support afterwards. Now, for the first time, a group which was formed, developed a program and later chose a leader. It is a much more solid affair to have a movement based on the ideas of many instead of one individual."

ANTI-FASCIST OFFICERS

As to the background of the coup:

"We, the younger officers, did not agree with the government's African policy or the fascist regime at home. We could see that the African policy would lead to another Goa, the disgrace of the army, especially to the officer corps. There were 3000 troops in Goa when the Indians launched the invasion in December 1961 by air, sea and land with 30,000 troops. (Former dictator) Salazar ordered our troops to defend 'to the last man.' They had not even a single anti-aircraft gun. The officers on the spot refused to obey Salazar. After initial resistance, they surrendered. Apart from one or two they were all kicked out of the army. Ever since, the armed forces has been the scapegoat for all that is wrong in Portugal, including the impossible military situation in Africa and the lowered living standards at home because of the failures in Africa."

"The class composition of the officer corps had also changed. The Military Academy was no longer stuffed with the sons of the rich upper class, but by the sons of the lower middle class and even the working class. Soldiering had become a dangerous and low prestige profession. What with battlefield losses, desertions and draft-dodging, the army had to take into the junior officer corps whoever it could get. So there developed a big class difference between officers up to captains, and even majors; and the colonels and generals."

The artillery captain dealt in some detail with various sources of dissatisfaction in the army which was capped, in September 1973, when Prime Minister Cactano offered anyone who had graduated from university a six months military training course, at the end of which they would

have commissions above the heads of junior officers with at least four years' active service.

The first meeting of what later became the Armed Forces Movement was that of about 150 officers—except for three majors, all of them captains—on Sept. 12, 1973 to discuss the situation. Those taking part were mostly those affected by the new law on rapid promotions of youngsters with no military experience. It was the captains, as company commanders, who suffered the greatest combat losses in Africa apart from the ordinary soldiers—and now they were to be humiliated as well! The Sept. 12 meeting elected a commission with officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force, to look into the whole situation.

AGAINST MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

"The commission was to work secretly and recommend a course of action," the artillery captain continued. "There was no question of a coup at that time. There was no unified political viewpoint. We were very conscious of the danger of a Spanish-type civil war and wanted to do everything possible to avoid this. We did not want a Chile or any other Latin American-type putsch. At all costs we wanted to avoid anything that could lead to a military dictatorship. The strategy that the commission worked out was to bring pressure to bear on the government to change its policy; to repeal the offensive law on rapid promotions to safeguard the prestige of the career officers—and to clarify the situation."

In December 1973 there were changes at the Ministry of Defense, a civilian was put in charge and some increases in pay to the ranks and junior officers were allowed.

"The government changed personnel but not policies," the account continued. "It was at this point, in January 1974, that we realized that the only possibility of change was by a coup d'etat. Our aim was still to avoid civil war and any division within the armed forces. A new, much smaller commission was elected. By this time everyone knew everybody else and the new committee had the absolute confidence of everyone in what had now become the Armed Forces Movement. Planning for the coup started."

"Why did you decide later to invite General Spínola to take the top post after the coup?" I asked.

"Because we considered him honest, courageous, patriotic, a good officer, just and impartial, who maintained close personal relations with his officers and men. He was an officer of great prestige. The book which he wrote, demanding a political instead of military solution

in Africa, was as a result of his contacts with officers of the Armed Forces Movement. One of his merits was that he dared to oppose the official line."

"Is there not still a danger of a Chile-type coup—a fascist comeback?" was one of the last questions I posed.

"It is a Chile fascist-type regime that we have overthrown after nearly 50 years," he replied. "And it is we, the Armed Forces Movement, that did this. We are still around. The battalions move when we tell them to move. Our movement remains as united as ever. We still oppose any deviations in the application of our program—even if we have to stage another coup."

"What if the people vote in a communist-socialist popular front type government in next year's elections?" I asked.

"Our role is to give the Portuguese people a free choice under democratic conditions," the captain replied. "If they choose such a government—and that is up to them—there will be no interference from our side."

SPÍNOLA'S LINE

But this is not necessarily the perspective of Gen. Spínola, his recent speeches have made plain. While aiming his attacks ostensibly at "counter-revolution" and "anarchy"—and foreseeing the day when the armed forces might be "obliged to reply to violence by force"—Spínola's rhetoric has been understood by many as a double-edged sword. One can easily read between its lines Spínola's growing nervousness at the strength of popular feeling for an immediate end to the African wars, at the spread of the movement to oust fascists from trade union and peasant associations and at the growing influence of the leftist parties in the provisional cabinet.

Spínola's important June 11 statement on the colonial question seems to bring Portugal to a hazardous crossroads. Either the left consolidates its position in the provisional cabinet and dictates policy for speedy decolonization or the liberation struggles in Africa will be stepped up, with those inevitable consequences that the captain's coup was intended to avoid. One of the most crucial of these consequences was the possibility of civil war in Portugal.

With Spínola's speeches so clearly revealing the reason why the peace talks with the African independence movements are bogged down, people in Lisbon were beginning to ask whether springtime had moved straight into winter without the summer season for which people had been so ardently waiting.

Far East

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
26 JUN 1974

Lao patriots gain

Long road to peace in Laos

By WILFRED BURCHETT
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

In the two months since the formation of the Laotian coalition government, the Pathet Lao has become the real leadership of the country.

This is a testimonial to the remarkable struggle waged these past 20 years by the Lao patriots against seemingly impossible odds.

Under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao have overcome numerous U.S.-directed plots, coups and attempted coups, assassinations, invasions and aggressions by South Vietnamese, Thai and Meo tribal mercenaries financed and led by the CIA, capped by a merciless air war waged by the U.S. which exceeded the barbarous records established elsewhere in Indochina for tons of bombs dropped per head of population.

The story of what happened in the very early stages of U.S. intervention sets the pattern for all that has happened since.

At the time of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, the Pathet Lao forces under Prince Souphanouvong, which had wrested power from the Japanese in August 1945 and waged armed resistance against French attempts to restore its colonial rule, controlled about half the territory of Laos, with bases in all that country's 12 provinces.

As was the case with Vietnam, it was agreed at Geneva that, in return for nationwide elections and to facilitate the separation of combatants, there would be a regroupment of each side's military forces. The French expeditionary force withdrew in full security. The Pathet Lao troops likewise regrouped, as was stipulated, in the two northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. This meant abandoning old resistance bases in the South, especially those in the strategic Bolovens Plateau and other bases in Attapeu and Saravane provinces. But as in Vietnam, it was felt that a temporary withdrawal was an acceptable price to pay for the independence guaranteed by the Geneva agreements and that free elections would result in an overwhelming victory for supporters of the resistance forces. John Foster Dulles, then the U.S. Secretary of State, had other ideas, however.

DEFENSE MINISTER MURDERED

Less than two months after the Geneva agreements were signed, the prime minister who had inherited the French-appointed government in Vientiane, Prince Souvanna Phouma, met his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong in the Plain of Jars. They agreed on the date, site and agenda for political talks to arrange the nationwide elections. Nine days later, however, Souvanna Phouma's Minister of Defense, Kou Voravong, who had arranged the Plain of Jars meeting, was assassinated. A bullet was fired into his back through a window, at which the minister had been conveniently placed by his host.

A few days previous to the assassination, Kou Voravong had told the National Assembly that his co-delegate at the Geneva

conference, Phoui Sananikone, had accepted a U.S. bribe of \$1 million not to sign the Geneva agreement on Laos. U.S. intervention in Laotian affairs can be dated from the time of that bribe. Kou Voravong, however, signed for Laos and prevented a breakdown of the conference.

Kou Voravong had also publicly denounced a scheme to attack and wipe out the Pathet Lao troops as soon as the withdrawal was completed. The person who placed Kou Voravong in the window seat to receive the assassin's bullet was none other than Phoui Sananikone himself, who had invited his victim to dinner "to talk things over."

In the scandal which erupted after the assassination, Souvanna Phouma resigned as prime minister, to be replaced by Katay Don Sarith, a reactionary who had attracted the attention of Dulles with his book: "Laos—The Ideal Cornerstone in the Anti-Communist Struggle in Southeast Asia." Until he died somewhat mysteriously just five years later, Katay remained one of the most faithful instruments of U.S. interventionist policies in Laos.

On Dec. 30, 1954, the Pathet Lao delegates turned up on time at the site for the political negotiations agreed on over three months previously. They were put under house arrest by Katay's forces and told the conference site had "been changed." In the meantime commando troops had been dropped from U.S. planes behind the Pathet Lao lines, with orders to set up bases for further incursions. The Pathet Lao delegates agreed to change the conference site and insisted on the political talks proceeding.

In late March 1955, Dulles dropped in at Vientiane for a brief conference with Katay. In a sequence strongly reminiscent of what happened after he inspected South Korean troops along the 38th parallel in June 1950, within a few days of the Dulles visit to Vientiane, the first full-scale attacks were launched against Pathet Lao bases in the two northern provinces.

What has happened ever since has been a replay, on an ever-increasing scale, of American-backed attempts to wipe out the Pathet Lao. Negotiations were used exclusively to play for time to build up the right-wing forces for ever bigger efforts.

During that first year of negotiation, Katay's side interrupted the talks, once they finally got started, seven times, by simply walking out and not fixing a date for a resumption. His delegates returned only after serious battlefield setbacks. The Pathet Lao delegates remained at the conference site under house arrest, waiting patiently for the next round until Katay completely broke off the talks in November 1955. By that time—despite an agreement signed directly between Souphanouvong and Katay in Rangoon the previous month—Katay had moved over half the right-wing army into the Pathet Lao territory, launching an all out offensive in November-December 1955. But despite the presence of U.S. military "advisors," the offensive ended in disaster. Katay had to resign, and Souvanna Phouma again became prime minister.

VOTE FAVORS PATHET LAO

In July 1956, the two half-brothers met again—this time in Vientiane—and real negotiations got under way. During the months that followed, there was no fighting and on Dec. 28, 1956, it was announced that full agreement had been reached on setting up a government of National Union, with Pathet Lao participation. It was the first of a series of coalition governments preceding the one established in April of this year. None of the earlier ones worked due to U.S. tenacity in opposing anything that smacked of "national union." The U.S. embassy launched a tremendous campaign against the 1956 agreements. Embassy personnel visited every member of the National Assembly in an attempt to buy up enough votes to prevent ratification of the agreement. I was there at the time, personally witnessed the bribery campaign, and was expelled from Vientiane, all within 24 hours of my arrival. The threat was used that all U.S. "aid" would be halted if "Communists" entered the government, and supplies coming in via Thailand were halted as a warning. By such means formation of the government was held up until August 1957. Partial elections were held, in which the Pathet Lao presented 10 candidates—nine of whom were elected. The ally of the Pathet Lao, the Peace and Neutrality party, won three of four seats contested. Only four of Katay's 26 candidates were elected and none at all of Sananikone's, the leader of the other right-wing party. The results were a

who knew they would be duplicated in any nationwide electoral contest.

Then a new American "strong man," General Phoumi Nosavan, appeared on the scene as head of a fascist-type "Committee for the Defense of National Interests." With bribes of \$100,000 a vote to National Assembly deputies, the Souvanna Phouma government was finally brought down on July 22, 1958, and a new one was formed under Sannanikone, with eight of the 12 cabinet posts in the hands of Nosavan's men—who had not a single seat in the Assembly. Katay was made Minister of Defense and Interior. He immediately launched an extermination campaign against all Pathet Lao personnel. Pathet Lao bureaus had been opened in every province as a result of the 1956 agreements. Those staffing them were wiped out to a man in many provinces. Their decapitated heads were stuck up on posts to "prove" that the Pathet Lao no longer existed. The killings went on throughout the last months of 1958 and the beginning of 1959. This was a prelude to the final blow being prepared by the rightists.

According to the December 1956 agreements, the Pathet Lao reduced its armed forces to two battalions and these were to be integrated into the royal (Vientiane) army, under the command of the High Military Council. They obeyed Vientiane orders to be transferred to positions in the Plain of Jars and near the royal capital of Luang Prabang, respectively, and prepare for "integration," which was to take place on May 11, 1959. On that date, each Pathet Lao battalion was surrounded by three Vientiane battalions, with tanks and artillery pieces pointed at their barracks. A week later an ultimatum was issued to both battalions: "Surrender within 24 hours or be wiped out!" That night they broke out of their encirclement. The first battalion near Luang Prabang lost almost half its personnel in a fighting retreat back to the old base area. The second managed to escape virtually intact.

SOUPHANOUYONG JAILED, ESCAPES

Souphanouvong and 15 other Pathet Lao leaders, under house

WASHINGTON POST
17 June 1974

Leftist Leader Says CIA Plots Sabotage in Laos

By John Burgess

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, June 16 — "Rumors" circulating in Laos say that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is conspiring with Laotian rightists to sabotage the new coalition government, according to Phoumi Vongvichit, vice premier of the new government and a senior Central Committee member of the leftist Pathet Lao.

In written answers to 10 questions submitted on May 27, Phoumi said that "meetings have taken place in southern and northern Laos to prepare subversion against the Provisional Government of National Union."

The 65-year-old vice premier, who is also foreign minister of the new government, said that U.S. officials of all ranks had repeatedly pledged that the United States would respect the Vi-

entiane peace agreement and help the two Laotian parties "dress the wounds of war and build up independence and true peace [in Laos]."

He also said that "these repeated promises have made Lao patriots very happy."

Phoumi made repeated references to "rumors" that the C.I.A. had "exhorted certain people of the extreme right-wing of Vientiane to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the agreements."

As plenipotentiary representative of Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong, Phoumi negotiated much of the settlement that led to the formation on April 5 of Laos' third coalition government. He is the ranking Pathet Lao member of the government. Souphanouvong heads the Political

Consultative Council, an advisory body independent of the government.

Asked whether he thought the coalition was in danger, and if so from what sector, the vice premier said, the government "is only in danger so far as the C.I.A. supports the supreme right-wing clique to plot trouble against the nation. Without that, the government is free of all further danger."

Phoumi said that the new government would behave amicably toward all countries and would accept "unconditional assistance from all countries that want to help Laos, regardless of their political systems."

Laos would seek to develop a new orientation toward international politics, he said.

arrest in Vientiane, were flung into prison, and in the months that followed Sannanikone tried to find a judge who would sentence them to death, but without success.

"For guards," Souphanouvong told me later, "we had the most reactionary military police unit—trained, equipped and paid directly by the Americans. They had been hand-picked and especially indoctrinated. . . . They were forbidden to exchange a single word with us. . . ." But at least they were Laotians. The Pathet Lao leaders were in solitary confinement. Souphanouvong took upon himself the infinitely slow and patient work of winning the guards over by appealing to their patriotism.

"In May 1960," he told me, "we were tipped off that there would be no trial. The authorities knew we would use the courtroom as a forum to denounce their rotten policies. We were to be 'shot attempting to escape' while being transferred to another prison. We challenged the prison authorities with this and told them to shoot us on the spot—they could spare themselves the farce of an escape attempt. This stopped them for a while, but soon after we learned that a date had definitely been set for the trial, the result of which would be we would all die 'legally.' We decided the time had come to flee."

By that time Souphanouvong's persuasion had worked so well that an hour after midnight on May 23, 1960, the 16 Pathet Lao leaders and all 10 guards on duty that night, marched out of the Vientiane prison, all armed and in MP uniforms, past the quarters of 90 more MP's and their U.S. advisors, on their way to a "Long March" back to the old Sam Neua bases. The greatest manhunt in the history of Laos was mobilized to catch them but the prey, desperately weak as they were after 10 months in prison, were always a step or two ahead of the hunters.

From this leadership and the one and a half battalions that had escaped the extermination attempt was built up the fighting force which today controls a good 80 percent of the territory of Laos and over half the population, and which again shares power in Vientiane.

NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1974

Secret Study on Laos Aid Says Almost All Goes to One Faction

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 23—Senator Edward M. Kennedy expressed concern today that the United States, through economic and military aid to one Laotian faction, might be perpetuating political divisions in Laos despite the formation of a new coalition Government.

In support of his concern, the Massachusetts Democrat, as chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on refugees, made public a summary of a secret General Accounting Office report on the economic aid program in Laos. The report, classified secret at the insistence of the Administration, shows that the economic aid was going almost entirely for refugees and villages in areas controlled by the former Royal Lao Government.

State and Defense Department officials said the same held true for United States military aid, which they said went exclusively to Royal Laotian military units.

No Fundamental Changes

As an outgrowth of the 1973 cease-fire agreement, the Royal Lao Government, which was supported by the United States, formed this spring a provisional government of national union with the Pathet Lao faction, which was supported by North Vietnam. Despite the formation of a coalition Government, officials acknowledged that there had been no fundamental changes yet in the direction of United States aid

programs, which continue to support military forces and geographical areas still controlled by the Royal Lao faction.

For the coming fiscal year, which begins July 1, the Administration has asked Congress for \$55.2-million in economic aid and \$86.1-million in military aid for Laos. While Administration testimony has broadly discussed aid to maintain a neutral Laos, officials acknowledge that according to present plans most of this aid would go to the Royal Laotian side.

The explanation offered by State Department officials was that economic aid was going into Royal Laotian areas because the United States was continuing existing programs. At the same time, officials said the United States was not fixed in this policy and had informed the new Government that it

was willing to give aid to the provisional government that might be channeled into Pathet Lao areas.

"We are quite willing to shift it, if they ask us," one State Department official said. But thus far, he said, there had been no direct request from the Pathet Lao faction for economic aid for its zones.

There are indications, however, that such a shift in policy would be resisted in certain State Department circles that are opposed to any United States aid going into Communist-controlled areas of Indochina, including humanitarian aid provided through United Nations agencies or the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Earlier this month, according to officials, Graham A. Martin, the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, sent a cablegram to the State Department

urging that no money be put into Red Cross operations in Indochina so long as the international Red Cross committee "kicks USG around." "USG" standing for United States Government. He suggested the committee was courting the Communist side.

On military aid, officials said continued support of the Royal Laotian forces was necessary to "maintain a balance" with the Pathet Lao forces, which they said were still being supplied by North Vietnam.

Statement by Senator

Vice Adm. Ray Peet, the Pentagon director of the military assistance program, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee last week that the United States "security objectives" in Laos were "to support a balanced force which is of sufficient size and strength to maintain the survival of the politically neutral Royal Laotian

Government and the independence of the people, and to encourage pursuit by Laos of objectives compatible with United States interests."

The admiral did not spell out in his statement that "a balanced force" meant giving military aid exclusively to Royal Laotian forces.

In expressing concern over the course of United States policy in Laos, Senator Kennedy said in a statement:

"Despite our country's general public support for the cease-fire agreement and the new Government, several indicators suggest that the intent of some of our remaining presence in Laos can only help to perpetrate old relationships and the divisions of that country. And this poses a threat of renewed conflict in several areas."

NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1974

Profiteers in Cambodia Find Food Is Now Gold

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia —With her major cities besieged by Communist-led insurgents, Cambodia has become a paradise for a new kind of profiteering—not in gold or opium, but in food.

It takes half an hour for a load of fresh fish to triple in value as it is flown the 50 miles from the city of Kompong Chhnang to the beleaguered capital of Phnom Penh. Over that distance, beef prices nearly double, and sugar rises 50 per cent.

Merchants who are brand new to the food business are reported making profits of \$10,000 a day simply by flying the scarce staples from the country's agricultural areas, over insurgent-held territory and into Phnom Penh, where many families spend their entire incomes just to feed themselves.

In an economy stagnated by war, this is one of the only booming segments. Sixteen private airlines are operating their 30-year-old DC-3's jamming Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport, turning the tarmac into a busy truck terminal and marketplace.

American and Taiwanese pilots have flocked to Cambodia. A man selling planes arrived last week. Two huge new aircraft engines stood on a flatbed trailer outside an airline office in the center of town.

The frenzied commerce has run like a fever through Phnom Penh, as if the city

were an old western mining town whose plentiful gold might run out at any moment.

The prospect of fast money is so intoxicating, and the poverty of most working Cambodians so acute, that suffering and greed have been blended into a corrosive mixture that produces ingenious systems of cheat- and corruption.

Pilots and airline officials report that merchants try to overload planes by tampering with scales or by paying off pilots to carry an extra few hundred pounds.

Sugar Hidden on Planes

Laborers, soldiers and officials who work at outlying airports try to cash in on the trade by hiding 22-pound bags of sugar on planes to be picked up by their collaborators later at the airport in Phnom Penh, pilots say.

"A couple of weeks ago they hid 200 kilos [440 pounds] of sugar in the tail section of a DC-3," one aircraft owner declared. "The pilot couldn't move the controls, so they opened up the tail section and found the sugar."

In another instance, he said, workers and military men took advantage of a moment when a plane, ready to take off for Phnom Penh, had lowered its flaps, revealing long hollow spaces in the wings.

"They were stuffing 10-kilo bags of sugar into the holes in the wings," the owner exclaimed. "Fortunately, one of our ground people saw it and warned the pilot." Otherwise, he said, after the plane was air-

borne the pilot would have raised the flaps and jammed them.

One recent morning, on the dirt airstrip that serves Kompong Chhnang, a Cambodian Air Force pilot took off in an American-made T-28 propeller-driven plane. No bombs were slung beneath the wings, however, and no co-pilot was in the back seat. Instead, the seat was piled high with bags of sugar.

The sugar comes from Thailand, shipped by road to Battambang or Kompong Chhnang, where women crowd along the airstrip selling 22-pound bags for 2,500 riels, about \$6 at the official exchange rate.

Beyond Kompong Chhnang the road is controlled by insurgents, and so, in Phnom Penh, other women clamor to buy the bags for \$9 each from the crewmen, soldiers and military policemen who take them off the planes.

Big Profit to Be Made

By selling just three bags a day, a laborer at the airport can make six times his daily wage of about \$1.50 and a plane's crewman can double his day's pay by simply carrying one bag on a 30-minute flight from Kompong Chhnang to Phnom Penh.

But the big money is in tons, not pounds. The food merchants are almost all ethnic Chinese, and their use of the shortages to drive up prices has stirred the latent anti-Chinese bigotry that pervades Indochina.

The merchants buy fresh fish for about 34 cents a pound in Kompong Chhnang and sell it for about \$1 in Phnom Penh.

The cost of airlifting it to the capital runs only 10 cents a pound, so that even with that expense, the bribery and the low wages paid to loaders

and truck drivers, businessmen estimate that merchants make at least 55 cents profit a pound.

A DC-3 carries 7,000 pounds and generally flies two to three trips a day. That adds up to a daily profit of \$7,700 to \$11,550.

The airlift has been made possible by the United States, which buys all the aviation fuel with dollars, sells it to private distributors for riels, and turns the riels over to the Government.

One official said that Washington had agreed to increase fuel shipments on the condition that they would not be sold on the black market and that the airlines would fly only within Cambodia transporting only food.

"We do not want them flying drugs in from Laos," one American remarked.

A Planeload of Hennessy

There is no evidence that they fly drugs, but pilots say they sometimes fly smuggled luxury goods. "I've come out of Kompong Som with a complete planeload of Hennessy," one pilot declared.

The fuel comes up the Mekong River by convoy, along with American rice, which is then flown from Phnom Penh to other encircled cities.

These flights are often forced on private airlines by the Government, which never pays, airline executives complain. Pilots say they are also required to use private planes to ferry troops and ammunition around the country, free of charge.

"We pay the [control] tower a few thousand riels so we don't have to fly these every day," one pilot asserted, and they say, "O.K.—tomorrow."

One airline executive pulled out a notebook listing 12

different agencies and officials who had to be bribed in a provincial airport, including the military chief who allegedly receives 5,000 riels, or about \$12.50 each time a plane lands.

In Phnom Penh, a pilot said, "We pay the security police 100,000 riels a month for not stealing fuel."

1,500 Gallons Stolen

"They hit me one night for over 1,500 gallons," one air-

craft owner complained.

"I figure it would have taken three trucks, ten people, five siphons and at least eight hours worth of work to siphon off that much fuel. The plane was sitting right on the apron in front of the control tower, but nobody knew anything."

Pilots have also found security policemen trying to sell them spare parts that were stolen the night before.

"They steal your fuel, they

steal your oil, they steal your hydraulic fluid — anything they can sell," one pilot said.

"You pay the guy who pumps gasoline into your plane, you pay the tower operators, the customs police — even truck drivers get paid off. You know why? Because otherwise when he backs his truck up to your plane he'll bump it."

If the corruption were only better organized, the pilot mused. The trouble is that

every man is out for himself. "You could live with it if it were controlled," he explained. "If you knew that 10 per cent of what you made went to corruption, then you could plan."

But Cambodia cannot plan these days. It is a country scrambling to live from day to day amid a war and its profiteers. "Khmers used to be soft, very soft," a young Cambodian observed sadly. "But not now."

Monday, June 17, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

American Pilots Protest

Say Cambodian Military Commandeers Planes

By Elizabeth Becker
Special to The Washington Post

PHNOM PENH—American commercial pilots have asked the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh to forbid the Cambodian military from commandeering their private American-registered planes for military missions, but the embassy refused the request.

"I went to the embassy a few days ago to ask about this because I thought the embassy had to protect its citizens," said Carl Shipman, a 50-year-old American-licensed pilot for Heng Meas commercial airlines, "but the air attache told us the ambassador could not interfere in Cambodian government affairs."

Shipman had refused to transport Khmer Republic troops to Kompong Cham and the military subsequently threatened to cut off all aviation gasoline to his company if he did not comply. Since aviation gasoline is provided by American aid and its distribution controlled by the American embassy, Shipman felt the Cambodians from commandeering his plane.

"The attache said he would write a letter to the air force asking them not to take American registered planes to Kompong Cham,

but we need more protection than that," said Shipman.

Shipman is worried about the risk involved in flying military missions to endangered areas and the illegality of his participation in a foreign war. Other American pilots have been threatened and sometimes forced to fly military missions and two have complained, along with Shipman.

"Active participation in this war effort jeopardizes our American citizenship," Skip Bryant, another pilot, said.

"I was forced to fly troops to Kampot and I know that on the back of my passport it says I can lose my citizenship by serving in the armed forces of another country," Bryant said.

The pilots feel the embassy is not guarding their rights as American citizens and they don't believe the embassy is powerless.

"The Americans change the rules of their poker game daily," said Shipman.

One recent change is a mandatory utilization report for aviation gasoline issued by the U.S. embassy to all private airline companies. Each day these companies must make a report to the embassy stating the amount of aviation gas used, the type and tonnage of cargo shipped, the destination of the cargo, and the names of passengers aboard.

Well-informed diplomatic sources say the embassy hopes to control in-country airshipment of essential supplies between Phnom Penh and the provinces.

The United States apparently hopes to cut down inflation by supervising domestic cargo flights and thereby limiting the role of middlemen.

Shipman knows about these new measures, but he says things have not changed.

"The Cambodian government still commandeers any airline to do what they say," he said.

The Cambodian air force has planes to get in and out of tight places but the military often uses its cargo planes for paying passengers, Shipman said, adding, "then they put the squeeze on us to bring the troops in."

"I know none of us was dragged here in the first place, but I have flown for AID in Africa and the agency (CIA) in Laos, and I have never had trouble like this before."

His private company owns only one plane, like many of the more than 30 airline companies suddenly started operating this year when all inland roads were cut by the Khmer Rouge. Most companies run on a very small budget, transporting essential goods in and out of Phnom Penh, taking up the

duties once performed by fleets of trucks.

Bryant and Shipman said they both demand cash before they fly.

"The Americans need us to run this country," said Bryant, "but they won't give us protection from the military."

Shipman arrived in Cambodia last April and Bryant has lived here for more than three years. Both say they cooperate with the military when they fly out to the provinces, but the military rarely returns these favors.

"We carry whatever they like when we have the extra room," said Shipman. "Wounded soldiers, wives with their sugar to sell in Phnom Penh—we have to do it in these situations. But they don't give us reliable information on enemy positions and then they commandeer the airplanes."

The pilots plan to make renewed complaints to the embassy until they receive assurance that they will not be coerced into flying military missions.

"We are an embittered lot; we've worked in an around the government and know what the Americans can do. We aren't on high salaries like Air America. We're paid less than U.S. mercenaries in China in 1948," said Shipman. "I think flying military missions is illegal and I don't want to be shot up for nothing."